Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failing to state cause of action plaintiff-prisoner's action alleging that defendants-prison medical officials deliberately failed to treat his rheumatoid arthritis through use of drug that had previously been successful in treating plaintiff's condition. Record contained some evidence that, in spite of plaintiff's frequent requests for said drug, defendants chose easier and less efficacious treatment without exercising professional judgment. As such, defendants' alleged conduct satisfied deliberate indifference standard to extent that record also showed that said defendants continued over 10-month period to use ineffective course of treatment. Dist. Ct., however, properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant-prison medical supervisor, where record showed that said defendant had only brief interaction with plaintiff throughout instant course of treatment and gave medical treatment to plaintiff at time before said treatment was known to be ineffective.

Ct. of Appeals denied prisoner’s petition for writ of mandamus seeking to direct Dist. Ct. to rescind order requiring that money in his prison trust account be applied to both his Dist. Ct. filing fee, as well as unpaid balance of special assessment that was previously imposed as part of defendant’s sentence. Dist. Ct. order directing payment of unpaid filing fee from defendant’s prison account was proper under Lucien, 141 F3d 773. However, Dist. Ct. lacked authority to direct payment of special assessment where defendant had previously made arrangements with prison officials to pay said assessment via installment payments. Ct. further noted that issue regarding defendant’s ability to pay filing fee was now moot where Ct. had simultaneously affirmed defendant’s appeal of his sentence.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-School District’s motion for summary judgment in action seeking to enjoin defendant from renting out church sanctuary to hold secular high school graduation ceremony where plaintiffs alleged that holding said graduation ceremony in church violated Establishment Clause. Ct. of Appeals held that renting of church space was neither impermissibly coercive nor endorsement of religion. Ct. further noted that graduates were not forced to participate in any religious exercise even though graduation took place in presence of large and obvious Christian symbols. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff on disorderly conduct charge stemming from incident in which group of citizens (including one individual with whom plaintiff had turbulent history) accused plaintiff of filming their children in neighborhood park. While filming others in public is not illegal and agitated accusations of parents were not enough to support probable cause by itself, videotaping when accompanied by suspicious circumstances may constitute disorderly conduct. Moreover, one officer, who was aware of turbulent history between plaintiff and one accuser, was entitled to qualified immunity where said knowledge plus agitated complaints of parents at scene could have created sufficient circumstances so as to warrant plaintiff’s arrest. Second officer also was entitled to qualified immunity where he could have reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that plaintiff was harassing children and alarming their parents.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff-prisoner's motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis in action alleging that defendant-prison officials violated his 8th Amendment rights by subjecting him to excessive force in removing him from his cell and refusing to provide him with medical care for injuries he sustained as result of said force. Basis for instant denial was fact that plaintiff had three "strikes" arising out of three prior complaints that had been dismissed without prejudice on ground that said complaints were "unintelligible." While all three prior complaints should have been dismissed with prejudice so as to properly count them as strikes against plaintiff, none of three prior dismissal orders counted as strikes due to fact that dismissals were without prejudice and were not based on grounds specified in section 1915(g).

In action under Child Abduction Remedies Act, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in entering expedited discovery order and in denying plaintiff's request to continue case to obtain more discovery from defendant. Plaintiff failed to timely apprise Dist. Ct. of need for additional discovery by waiting until first day of scheduled hearing on merits of claim to raise said issue, and record otherwise showed that Dist. Ct. actually accommodated plaintiff's request for said discovery by directing defendant to produce records involving his alleged history of alcoholism, drug use and domestic abuse by date of hearing to address said issues. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in directing plaintiff to send her child back to Sweden so as to allow Swedish court opportunity to resolve custody issues where record showed that child had spent vast majority of his life in Sweden, and where record demonstrated that plaintiff had established Sweden as her new residence prior to bringing child back to U.S.

In remand of case for new damages hearing after entry of default judgment, Dist. Ct. erred in awarding plaintiff $27,002 in action alleging tortious interference with plaintiff's contractual relations and economic advantage when defendant added plaintiff to its internet protocol addresses of verified spam distributors. Record supported Dist. Ct.'s issuance of sanctions against plaintiff in form of limitation on plaintiff's potential damages due to plaintiff's repeated failure to appear at deposition and its tender of unresponsive answers to interrogatories, as well as barring 16 witnesses who had not been timely disclosed in discovery. However, Dist. Ct.'s award of $27,002 in damages was improper since it was based on plaintiff's gross revenue, rather than its net profit. Moreover, Ct of Appeals found that appropriate remedy was limited to one dollar for each of plaintiff's three claims given plaintiff's discovery violations during remand and given plaintiff's inability to establish reasonable estimate of harm suffered from defendant's conduct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in approving proposed $180 million settlement of class action claim arising out of ERISA lawsuit alleging that defendant-pension plan failed to include cost of living adjustment to lump sum distributions to class members who elected to take early retirement. While record showed that all early retirees would receive recovery of at most only 35.5% of their requested relief, Dist. Ct. could properly approve of settlement where class claim rested on unsettled law. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly approve attorneys' fees totaling $43.5 million based on amount of work involved, risks of non-payment and quality of representation and find that pure percentage fee approach best replicated market for ERISA class action attorneys. Ct. rejected objector's contention that Dist. Ct.'s fee calculation was flawed because it did not give proper weight to lodestar crosscheck.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiff to excessive force and wrongful arrest after arriving at accident scene in which they found plaintiff unresponsive behind wheel of his car, even though individuals at hospital eventually determined that plaintiff had suffered diabetic episode. Defendants could have reasonably believed that plaintiff had driven in intoxicated state at time they initially encountered plaintiff where dispatcher had indicated that driver of said vehicle had driven off road and where officers had smelled alcohol in plaintiff’s car. Fact that others saw diabetic kit in plaintiff’s vehicle subsequent to his arrest did not require different result. Moreover, officers’ reasonable belief that plaintiff was intoxicated and unresponsive to their commands supported their use of pepper spray and baton to subdue him so as to defeat plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants denied plaintiff-prisoner’s medical care for diabetes and thyroid condition that eventually led to her death approximately 24 hours after her arrest. Record showed that: (1) defendants had internal policy that precluded them from giving new arrestees medication while in initial lockup unless they had gone to hospital; (2) plaintiff’s lawyer, as well as plaintiff’s relatives alerted defendants as to plaintiff’s need for medical attention and medications; and (3) plaintiff requested doctor and called for her medications shortly before her death. Fact that defendants may not have known of precise cause of plaintiff’s condition did not require different result where record contained enough evidence to show that defendants should have reasonably known that plaintiff needed medical care. Moreover, Dist. Ct. erred in excluding plaintiff’s expert witness who gave opinion as to cause of death where said expert was qualified to render opinion and based said opinion on plaintiff’s medical and legal records.