Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's 4th Amendment rights by unreasonably seizing her after her arrest on drug possession charge when defendants denied her request for baby aspirin. While plaintiff actually experienced heart attack during her transport to jail, defendants were not on notice of plaintiff's serious heart condition at time of her aspirin request, and plaintiff's medical need for said aspirin did not appear to be great. Moreover, record showed that defendants promptly called ambulance once they were notified that plaintiff was experiencing chest pains. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in barring plaintiff's expert from testifying that 15-second interval between time police announced their presence at plaintiff's door and time they rammed open her door was unreasonable where resolution of said issue could be accomplished through everyday experiences of jurors.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants (Town of Cicero and its police officers) used excessive force, violated plaintiffs' due process and equal protection rights and subjected plaintiffs to false arrest and malicious prosecution arising out of neighborhood disturbance that resulted in street brawl, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants' motion to amend judgment in favor of plaintiffs to reflect that Town and its officers were jointly and severally liable for damages awarded to plaintiff. Record showed that jury instruction improperly submitted issue of Town's liability where Town had previously stipulated that its officers were acting within scope of their employment, and jury's separate calculation of damages as to each police officer, as well as to Town produced double recovery windfall for plaintiffs. Fact that Town had submitted erroneous jury instruction did not constitute waiver of issue.

In Bivens action against defendant-former Secretary of Defense alleging that U.S. Military officials illegally detained plaintiffs-American citizens in American military camps in Iraq and subjected them to illegal torture, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying in part defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity, plaintiffs' claim that their treatment amounted to cruel and inhuman treatment that violated 5th Amendment's substantive due process clause. Plaintiffs alleged sufficient details supporting defendant's personal responsibility for alleged torture, and that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity where law was established at time of 2006 alleged incident that said conduct was unconstitutional. Ct. further found that Bivens' remedy was available for alleged torture of civilian U.S. citizens by U.S. military personnel in war zone. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in failing to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for property damages under military authority exception to Administrative Procedure Act. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that Wisc. statute, which precluded prison officials from providing hormone therapy to transgender inmates, violated 8th Amendment. Record showed that hormone therapy qualified as medically necessary treatment to alleviate symptoms of dysphoria, and defendant failed to produce evidence that another treatment could adequately replace necessary hormone therapy.

In proposed class action seeking recovery against defendants who used insider information to timely purchase at profit 30-year Treasury bonds, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying request by entity to continue as class representative where said entity had settled its individual claim with defendants. Ct. rejected entity's claim that it still had stake in action to extent that it might recover some of its costs if class prevailed in instant action. Dist. Ct. similarly did not err in denying separate individual's request to become class representative where Dist. Ct. had previously found that said individual's claim was untimely. As to timeliness issue, Ct. rejected individual's argument that limitation period for instant securities fraud claim did not begin until defendants had confessed or court adjudicated their liability in prior SEC action.

Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiffs (stroke victim and his wife) had forfeited their appeal of Dist. Ct. judgment finding in medical malpractice claim that plaintiffs had failed to show that defendant-VA hospital’s conduct was proximate cause of plaintiff’s stroke, where plaintiffs generated Dist. Ct. record that included transcript of only one of several witnesses in instant bench trial. Rule 10(b)(2) of Fed. Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that appellants include transcripts of all evidence relevant to Dist. Ct. finding or conclusion, and Ct. of Appeals was unable to address plaintiff’s sufficiency of evidence claim based on testimony of only one witness.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on collateral estoppel grounds plaintiff's RICO and common law fraud claims arising out of allegations that: (1) debtor in prior bankruptcy proceeding placed series of large, out of ordinary orders for plastic molds with no intention to pay plaintiff for said orders and then underwent bankruptcy in order to sell said molds to third-party at discount; and (2) defendant-bank conspired with debtor to extend debtor's credit and then destroy plaintiff's lien on said plastic molds. Record showed that plaintiff had litigated and lost same fraud allegations in bankruptcy proceeding in which plaintiff had objected to sale of debtor's assets and had sought equitable subordination of bank's lien.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff's qui tam action alleging that defendants violated False Claims Act by submitting knowingly false certificates/vouchers seeking payment on sale of F-16 fighter jets to Greece where source of payment was borrowed U.S. funds. Dist Ct. could properly find that plaintiff failed as factual matter to establish that statements made in said certification/vouchers violated terms of subject contract or were objectively false. Ct. also held that plaintiff failed to show that any misstatement was material to govt. decision to continue financing Greek sale, or that any misstatement was knowingly made.

In action alleging false arrest and excessive force arising out of traffic stop for seat belt violation that eventually resulted on defendant-police officer tasering plaintiff five times and using pepper spray, Dist. Ct. did not err in submitting to jury nominal damages instruction where jury eventually found for plaintiff on excessive force claim, but awarded him only $1 in damages. While plaintiff argued that said instruction was improper where record showed that he was tasered five times, jury could have found that tasering of plaintiff was not excessive given plaintiff's resistance to defendant's order to stop, but that officer's subsequent actions in using pepper spray and jumping on plaintiff's chest was excessive, but caused little or no quantifiable injury or pain. Moreover, Dist. Ct.'s denial of plaintiff's attorney fees' petition was not improper where: (1) jury found in favor of defendant on false arrest claim; and (2) plaintiff received only nominal damages in spite of alleging that he sustained $160,000 in damages.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing class action alleging that defendant violated Ill. Consumer Fraud Act by creating pyramid scheme involving sale of right to act as travel agent and sales of travel services to customers, after Dist. Ct. concluded that said Act did not apply to claims of non-Illinois resident plaintiffs, and that claims of Illinois plaintiffs constituted intra-state controversy that belonged in state court. Dist. Ct. had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider instant class action where plaintiffs met jurisdictional requirements at time action was filed. Moreover, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing portion of case on merits and then determining that remaining claims fell short of jurisdictional requirements. Ct. also found that Dist. Ct. could not, pursuant to ruling on instant motion to dismiss, find that non-Illinois resident plaintiffs lacked valid claim under Ill. Consumer Fraud Act.