Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider Dist. Ct. order dismissing one of two defendants on ground that plaintiff's eight-month delay in serving complaint on said defendant violated reasonable diligence requirement set forth in Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 103(b). Dist. Ct.'s order was not final and appealable where plaintiff's action remained pending against other defendant (although said action had been subject to bankruptcy court stay order issued as result of plaintiff's bankruptcy petition). Ct. of Appeals rejected plaintiff's claim that Dist. Ct. order was final and appealable because his action against remaining defendant was void ab initio because it had been filed during pendency of plaintiff's bankruptcy petition where plaintiff had taken contrary position in Dist. Ct. about issue as to whether his claim against remaining defendant remained alive.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely portions of plaintiff's section 1983 action alleging that defendants conspired to deprive him of plaintiff's mobile home park where acts that formed said portion of plaintiff's lawsuit occurred beyond applicable two-year limitations period. Moreover, plaintiff waived any issue with respect to dismissal of timely claims where plaintiff failed to raise said issue on appeal. Ct. rejected plaintiff's assertion that limitations period was subject to doctrine of fraudulent concealment, where Ct. found that defendant had failed to plead any facts indicating that defendants had engaged in any deception that prevented plaintiff from discovering that he was injured.

In civil RICO action alleging that defendants Gov. Blagojevich and others participated in scheme in which Blagojevich took bribes in exchange for influencing state legislature to pass Horse Racing Trust Fund for benefit of defendants-race track owners, Dist. Ct. did not err in ultimately withdrawing temporary restraining order that required that any money generated by said Fund be placed in escrow account that defendants could not reach while underlying merits of case was pending. Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief was barred since casino surcharge imposed on plaintiffs by Horse Racing Act was essentially tax that was covered by prohibition in Tax Injunction Act that precluded Dist. Ct. from enjoining collection or suspension of instant casino surcharge. As such, plaintiffs' only potential forum for injunctive relief was in state court. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff's section 1983 claim pursuant to defendant's Rule 12(c) motion alleging that plaintiff's claim failed to state cause of action, where plaintiff failed to address merits of dismissal motion, but rather filed late motion to amend his complaint, which was also denied. Dist. Ct. was not required to grant plaintiff's motion to amend where said motion had been filed well after deadline set forth in scheduling order, and where amended complaint added new theory of case and substantially revised another theory of case. Moreover, plaintiff waived any error with respect to propriety of dismissal order where plaintiff failed to file response in Dist. Ct. that addressed merits of dismissal motion.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s action asserting that defendant-former legal client of plaintiff, was required to indemnify plaintiff pursuant to terms of settlement of prior lawsuit between parties involving sale of casino stock where underlying lawsuit against plaintiff alleged that plaintiff cheated former law partner out of law firm’s portion of said casino stock. Indemnification provision in settlement agreement between parties failed because it created infinitely repeating loop of liability between parties. Moreover, indemnification provision could not be enforced under Illinois law to extent that plaintiff sought indemnification for his own intentional misconduct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in directing defendants (judgment debtors who had defaulted on loans totaling $39 million) in citation to discover proceedings to tender their passports until certain funds were transferred to Dist. Ct. Record showed that instant defendants, who had transferred sizeable assets to out-of-country bank, demonstrated flight risk, especially where defendants had few assets in U.S. Moreover, instant order was within Dist. Ct.'s authority where said order was needed to support Dist. Ct.'s ability to enforce underlying judgment and to prevent loss of assets.

Dist. Ct. erred in remanding to state court instant class action regarding alleged violations of Ill. Minimum Wage Law that had been removed to federal court under Class Action Fairness Act, where Dist. Ct. found that respondents had failed to establish that amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. Respondents' calculation of disputed statutory penalty, which pushed total amount in controversy over $5 million, was reasonable, and Dist. Ct. failed to show how it own calculation of relevant damages, statutory and attorney fees came up short of $5 million, or explain how respondents' calculations were legally impossible.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants’ Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate default judgment (that was filed nearly one year after entry of default judgment) asserting that plaintiff lacked personal jurisdiction over defendants, where Dist. Ct. had found that said motion was untimely. Said motion could have been brought at any time, even though two of three defendants had filed informal pro se letter with Dist. Ct. prior to entry of default judgment, where: (1) said letter did not constitute appearance or challenge to Dist. Ct.’s jurisdiction; and (2) corporate defendant made no appearance via counsel prior to entry of default judgment. Accordingly, remand was required for ruling on merits of Rule 60(b)(4) motion for all three defendants.

Dist. Ct erred in dismissing plaintiff’s lawsuit on lack of standing grounds, where said lawsuit sought to invalidate permit issued by defendant-U.S. Corps of Engineers that granted defendant-landfill owner ability to use for owner’s existing landfill wetland soil located near park. Plaintiff’s allegation that three of its members would have diminished pleasure in viewing wildlife from park if wetlands were destroyed is sufficient to confer standing. Moreover, plaintiff’s success in instant lawsuit would eliminate probable injury to plaintiff’s members from proposed landfill site at same wetlands at issue in instant permit. Fact that Dist. Ct. might make future ruling that any bad effects of proposed landfill would be immaterial on permit validity issue is insufficient to defeat plaintiff's standing to bring instant case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's FMLA action after finding that plaintiff had reached oral agreement to settle case and had failed to sign settlement papers as directed in prior orders. Magistrate Judge memorialized details of settlement and confirmed plaintiff's agreement as to said terms, and Ct. rejected plaintiff's claim that defendant's failure to reveal during settlement negotiations fact that decision-maker was subject of criminal investigation on allegations of child molestation precluded defendant from enforcing instant settlement agreement. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss instant action as sanction for plaintiff's conduct where record showed that plaintiff had consistently ignored directives to sign settlement papers over seven-month period.