Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendant-prison Director of Religious and Volunteer Services, was entitled to qualified immunity in plaintiffs-prisoners’ section 1983 action alleging that defendant’s failure to delay their transfer to new prison (to accommodate their kosher diet) until new facility offered opportunities for Jewish group worship and study violated their First Amendment rights. Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity, since plaintiffs failed to produce any law that gave them right to group worship, under circumstances where outside volunteers were unavailable at new facility to lead or train inmates to perform worship services. Moreover, no case law provides that prison official violates free Exercise Right Clause by transferring inmates to facility that does not provide congregate worship and study. Also, plaintiffs had no due process right to remain at particular prison.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in granting parties’ motion to approve proposed settlement of class action relating to plaintiffs’ claim that defendant failed to live up to promises made regarding its general-use, prepaid gift cards, where customers could not use remaining portions on said cards during “split-tender” transactions when customers attempted to purchase items that cost more than remaining portions of said cards. Proposed agreement called for: (1) class members to receive up to $20 in reimbursement for monthly fees actually incurred on remaining balances at times when stores refused to process split-tender transactions, as well as to receive reimbursements of $8 for monthly services fees, $5 for check issuance fees and $5 in other service fees; (2) known class members to receive total of $1.8 million in benefits out of potential $9.6 million in potential benefits; and (3) three sets of attorneys to receive attorney fees totaling $2.2 million and $40,000 in expenses. Ct. rejected Intervenors’ argument that proponents of settlement were required to submit brief in support of proposed settlement prior to deadline for submitting objections to settlement, where Ct. noted that: (1) there is no requirement that said brief be filed; and (2) notice of proposed settlement should provide class members with all information needed to make informed decision regarding merits of settlement. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly consider merits of defendant’s pending appeal on issue as to whether class members were required to arbitrate their individual claims, when finding that proposed $1.8 million benefit to known class members was reasonable.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on timeliness grounds plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants committed false imprisonment, where they failed to release him on expiration of his 300-day sentence. Record showed that on December 16, 2013 trial court granted plaintiff’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, after finding that plaintiff should have been released in September of 2013 and immediately released him on $50,000 bond, which was subsequently released on January 17, 2014. As such, instant claim was time-barred, where defendant filed instant action on December 30, 2015, which was more than two years after any false imprisonment ended on December 16, 2013. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that time spent on bond was continuation of his false imprisonment which lasted until bond was released on January 14, 2014.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion in instant action seeking share of FDIC’s recovery obtained on behalf of failed bank in separate action, where plaintiff argued that FDIC’s recovery constituted “alternate remedy” to instant False Claims Act claim filed by plaintiff alleging that certain directors of said bank had defrauded govt. by approving loans through bank’s overvaluing of properties serving as collateral for said loans. Record showed that plaintiff had previously been denied leave to intervene in FDIC’s recovery action under circumstances where plaintiff argued that he was entitled to whistleblower award under False Claims Act. As such, doctrine of claim preclusion precluded plaintiff from proceeding in instant qui tam action, where: (1) plaintiff attempted to recover whistleblower awards in both FDIC and in instant qui tam actions; (2) in both actions, plaintiff filed motion alleging that FDIC had violated relator’s share provision of False Claims Act by not paying him portion of its settlement proceeds; (3) in both actions plaintiff sought ruling that FDIC’s case constituted alternative remedy under False Claims Act; and (4) plaintiff failed to appeal denial of his motion to intervene in FDIC case. As such, plaintiff could not repeat his demand in instant case for share of FDIC’s settlement proceeds.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison guards beat him during prison incident in retaliation for filing grievances, where said dismissal was done after Dist. Ct. had declined plaintiff’s request for recruitment of counsel based on its believe that plaintiff was able to litigate case pro se. Plaintiff alleged that he had only 8^th grade education, was heavily medicated with psychotropic drugs, and used assistance of another prisoner. Moreover, Dist. Ct. should have granted plaintiff’s request for counsel where, in addition to plaintiff's allegations: (1) Dist. Ct. did not disbelieve plaintiff’s contention that he used another prisoner to assist him in instant case; and (2) counsel could have helped plaintiff on merits of case by amending complaint to allege that force used by defendants against him exceeded any force that would have been necessary to subdue him in instant altercation with defendants.

Ct. of Appeals remanded plaintiff-prisoner’s appeal from Dist. Ct. order granting defendants-prison officials’ section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his 8^th Amendment rights by failing to provide adequate medical care to treat his non-Hodgkins lymphoma. Remand was required to conduct hearing limited to issue as to whether plaintiff had filed timely notice of appeal, where: (1) plaintiff provided two alleged copies of his notice of appeal that had separate dates, as well as undated copy of his prison mail card; (2) prison mail card indicated that only one document was sent to Dist. Ct. at time plaintiff claimed he mailed notice of appeal; and (3) Dist. Ct., which failed to receive any notice of appeal from plaintiff, received unrelated document for different case involving plaintiff at or about same time plaintiff claimed he mailed notice of appeal in instant case to Dist. Ct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding after bench trial that defendant (owner of barge that collided with lock and dam on Illinois River that was operated by Army Corps of Engineers) was not responsible for flood damage to plaintiffs’ homes caused by river water overflowing river bank after lock and dam gates were raised in attempt to allow plaintiff’s barge to proceed down river. Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that sole cause of collision and resulting flooding was due to negligence of Lockmaster operating said gates, and that Lockmaster, as member of Corps of Engineers, was entitled to immunity under discretionary function exception to Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USC section 2680(a). Dist. Ct. was also entitled to find that defendant did not violate any of Inland Navigation rules during incident where: (1) defendant and other barges experienced severe rainfall at time of incident; (2) defendant attempted to navigate lock and dam only after its barge and others were unable to secure themselves in order to wait out storm; and (3) defendant and others were operating under plan to operate gates at safe levels without causing river to overflow its banks during storm. Ct. further noted that defendant’s captain could reasonably, though erroneously, rely on Lockmaster to prudently exercise his sole authority over gates and passage through canal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s proposed class action, where plaintiff challenged 2007 issuance of parking ticket that plaintiff claimed violated Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), where record showed that: (1) applicable statute of limitations is four years; (2) different plaintiff had filed nearly identical class complaint in August of 2010, which stayed applicable limitations period on plaintiff's claim until case was “stripped of its character” as class action; (3) Dist. Ct. granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment in 2010 action in September of 2010 and terminated pending motion for class certification as moot; and (4) in 2015 plaintiff’s attorney filed successor class action when U.S. Supreme Ct. had denied plaintiff’s petition for certiorari in 2010 case and then subsequently filed instant action naming plaintiff as class representative. Instant limitations period began in 2007 upon issuance of ticket and ran until August of 2010, when first class action was filed. However, once 2010 action was dismissed with prejudice in September of 2010 without certification of class action, limitation period resumed and ran out in July of 2011, long before plaintiff had filed instant lawsuit. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that limitation period was tolled until U.S. Supreme Ct. had denied petition for certiorari in appeal from 2010 dismissal of first class action.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated plaintiffs’ 4^th Amendment rights by using excessive force and searching plaintiffs’ home during police chase when third-party whom defendants were chasing abruptly entered plaintiffs’ home, Dist. Ct. did not err in refusing plaintiffs’ request to admit GPS evidence that purported to track path that defendants took during chase of third-party, where: (1) said evidence would have been too confusing for jury; (2) witness used by plaintiffs to explain said evidence was undisclosed expert for purposes of Rule 702; and (3) plaintiffs failed to explain relevance of determining how defendants arrived at their home during police chase. Moreover, defendants had probable cause to enter plaintiffs’ home without warrant, where: (1) third-party was spotted on street corner in known area having significant drug trade; (2) third-party fled from defendants when one defendant approached him; (3) defendants had probable cause to believe that third-party was trespassing when he entered plaintiffs’ home at end of police chase; and (4) defendants did not need to obtain warrant to enter plaintiffs’ home when they were in hot pursuit of third-party. Also, while Dist. Ct. erred in taking judicial notice of acts underlying third-party’s guilty plea when determining whether defendants had probable cause to enter plaintiffs’ home, any error was harmless or waived when plaintiffs invited said error by insisting at trial that entire guilty-plea transcript be introduced into evidence.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion for post-judgment relief in section 1983 action alleging that he was wrongfully arrested and prosecuted for violating Ill. Sex Offender Registration Act, where plaintiff asserted that defendants-police officers and others knew at time of plaintiff’s arrest that he was not required to register as sex offender and had concealed exculpatory evidence to make it appear as though he was required to register. While Dist. Ct. found that pro se plaintiff had failed to plead viable cause of action when denying post-judgment motion, plaintiff had requested recruitment of counsel, and Dist. Ct. had failed to apply legal standards under Pruitt, 503 F.3d 647, when considering plaintiff’s request for recruitment of counsel that required Dist. Ct. to determine whether plaintiff had made reasonable attempt to obtain counsel and whether plaintiff appeared competent to litigate case himself. As such, Dist. Ct. could not act on plaintiff’s post-judgment motion without considering his request for recruitment of counsel, especially where facts in plaintiff’s amended complaint suggested at least two possible bases for relief.