Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff-Libertarian Party’s motion for summary judgment in its section 1983 action alleging that Ill. statute (10 ILCS 5/10-2) violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, where said statute required new parties such as plaintiff to field full slate of candidates, i.e., one candidate for each race in relevant political subdivision. Full-slate requirement severely burdens 1^st Amendment rights of minor parties, where said requirement: (1) forces minor parties to find and recruit candidates for races they want nothing to do with; and (2) diverts party funding away from candidates genuinely interested in winning their races. Fact that party’s failure to field full slate of candidates did not preclude party’s candidates from accessing ballot as independent candidates did not require different result. Moreover, instant full-slate requirement did not advance govt.’s articulated reasons for supporting such requirement, i.e., promoting political stability, avoiding overcrowded ballot and preventing voter confusion.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-decedent prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs when plaintiff died of methadone overdose while in custody. Record showed that: (1) defendant (prison guard), when unsuccessfully attempting to wake plaintiff from his bed, became concerned that plaintiff was breathing irregularly; (2) said defendant then ignored plaintiff’s cell-mate who indicated that something was seriously wrong with plaintiff; and (3) said defendant notified others that decedent presented obvious symptoms of serious medical condition, and yet defendants did nothing to act on said concerns when reasonable officer would have had duty to seek medical attention. Fact that defendants claimed that cell-mate told them that plaintiff always slept with irregular breathing did not require different result where said testimony only created material fact for jury resolution.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-deceased detainee’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide any follow-up medical care after plaintiff suffered multiple seizures and was discharged by hospital back to defendants with instructions to seek prompt medical care if plaintiff experienced complications, where record showed that plaintiff ultimately died from cardiac condition within 24 hours of his initial arrest, and where plaintiff presented additional complications including blood discharge from mouth and inability to ambulate following his discharge from hospital. While plaintiffs maintained that plaintiff’s discharge from emergency room indicated that he was “fine for time being,” and that his subsequent complaints and inability to walk was attempt by plaintiff to be uncooperative, record contained triable issue as to whether defendants had sufficient notice of plaintiff’s serious medical condition that deteriorated after his discharge from hospital. Record also contained evidence that several defendants (both prison guards and medical personnel) did nothing while plaintiff was in obvious medical distress. Moreover, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing certain County defendants based on claim that County had no control over plaintiff because it had refused to book plaintiff in as prisoner because of his poor medical condition, since: (1) County personnel had physical control over plaintiff at some point after his discharge from hospital; and (2) County could not insulate itself from liability by enacting admission policies that dictated when its constitutional obligation to plaintiff began.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing as untimely, plaintiff-physician’s 2014 section 1983 action, seeking damages arising out of claim that defendant wrongfully suspended plaintiff’s physician’s license without giving prior hearing. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff initially filed federal lawsuit challenging instant five-year license suspension, which was dismissed under Younger abstention doctrine due to pendency of administrative appeal of plaintiff’s license suspension; and (2) plaintiff subsequently filed series of state-court actions challenging his suspension, which did not conclude until May of 2014, when circuit court found that plaintiff’s license should not have been suspended. While Dist. Ct. held belief that relevant two-year limitations period began in 1998, when license suspension was initially imposed, Ct. of Appeals found that instant section 1983 action did not accrue until May of 2014, where: (1) damages at issue in instant action were “off the table” until plaintiff finally had prevailed in state-court action in May of 2014; and (2) plaintiff could not have filed federal action until state court proceedings had been completed.

Dist. Ct. lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to act on lawsuit filed by plaintiff-Republican Party seeking declaration that it was not required to seat defendants-two elected ward committeemen on plaintiff’s central committee. Instant lawsuit, in which plaintiff claimed that defendants were ineligible to be seated on committee because each defendant had voted in Democratic Party primary within last eight years, rested only on state law and plaintiff’s rules, and instant litigants were not of diverse citizenship.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing at screening stage under section 1915A plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that his 2009 arrest by defendants-police officers following traffic stop violated his 4^th Amendment rights, since defendants had stopped his car not because they had probable cause, but rather because they had engaged in racial profiling, and since they had impermissibly prolonged his stop in order to obtain drug-sniffing dog. While Dist. Ct. based its dismissal on belief that plaintiff could not raise either issue in section 1983 action because he could only raise them on direct appeal or in post-conviction petition, if said issues had not been previously waived by plaintiff’s guilty plea to drug charges arising out of instant arrest, plaintiff could raise both racial profiling and prolonged arrest issues in section 1983 action, since his lawsuit would not undermine his conviction. Moreover, plaintiff’s damages would be limited to monetary value of his loss of time during his arrest and any dignitary insult inflicted by racial profiling.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for certification of class action in action alleging that defendant-health insurance company violated ERISA by contracting with outside affiliates to perform prescription drug services, claims payments and other administrative work and then having said outside affiliates overcharge defendant’s customers and splitting said overcharges with defendant. Remand was required because Dist. Ct. had failed to consider or explain: (1) whether defendant owed many proposed class members any fiduciary duty at all, especially for those class members whom defendant did not insure and who did not pay defendant any premiums; and (2) how ERISA even applied to class members who bought health insurance directly from defendant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prosecutors and investigators’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants initiated retaliatory investigation against plaintiff and others in violation of plaintiff’s 1^st and 4^th Amendment rights, where defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Instant investigation arose out of allegations of misconduct that plaintiff claimed was based on her support of anti-union legislative bill and her support of Wisc. governor, where defendants used unique “John Doe” procedure that was overseen by Wisc. state judge. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that her 4^th Amendment rights were violated by defendant’s search of her home, where said search was supported by valid search warrant, even though plaintiff claimed that issuing judge was not neutral or detached and made no attempt to evaluate legal basis for said warrant. Fact that police threatened to use battering ram when executing search warrant did not establish excessive force claim, and police could properly detain plaintiff during duration of execution of search warrant. Also, plaintiff failed to present case law to establish any violation of her 1^st Amendment rights arising out of alleged retaliatory nature of investigation, where there was no case law that clearly established that plaintiff’s verbal support of pending legislation was protected speech, where said speech was arguably part of her job as public employee.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state valid cause of action in plaintiffs-religious institutions of higher education’s section 1983 action alleging that three Illinois statutes (Academic Degree Act, Private College Act, and Private Business and Vocational School Act), that mandate that defendant-state agency review said colleges’ operations, programs, faculty and facilities before issuing certificate that would allow said colleges to issue bachelor, masters or doctorate degrees, violated their First Amendment and equal protection rights. Plaintiffs could not establish any violation of Establishment Clause arising out of any alleged state entanglement with their religious operations, since they had not first sought certification of approval under said statutes. Also, plaintiffs’ claim that said statutes impinged on their free exercise of religion was without merit since said statutes are neutral laws of general application that apply to both secular and religion institutions. Too, Ct. observed that plaintiffs could not operate without any State oversight while issuing whatever degrees they deemed appropriate. Moreover, plaintiffs could not state viable equal protection claim, even though statutes did not apply to older institutions, since, in absence of discrimination, govt. can include grandfather clause in legislation without violating notions of equal protection.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in action under Ill. Human Rights Act alleging that defendant terminated plaintiff-employee due to his purported history of attendance and disciplinary problems on account of his race. Plaintiff failed to present evidence of suitable comparative co-worker with same volume of disciplinary and attendance incidents who was treated in more favorable fashion. Moreover, plaintiff was only able to testify that he had seen other co-workers report to work late on unspecified times and on dates that he could not recall, and he could not state whether said co-workers had permission to come in late or whether said alleged attendance violations occurred before or after key email that announced strict adherence to office schedule.