Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-parole officer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated his 4^th Amendment rights by causing Dept. of Corrections to keep him in prison six months beyond his scheduled release date, where defendant generated parole violation report that falsely claimed that: (1) electronic monitoring was condition of plaintiff’s supervised release; and (2) Dept. had attempted to place plaintiff at host site that would allow plaintiff to comply with electronic monitoring requirement. As sex offender, plaintiff needed Dept. to approve one of his two suggested host sites prior to his release on supervised release as required under section 1610.110 of Ill. Admin. Code, and Dept. had not approved either suggested host site as of plaintiff’s scheduled release date or thereafter. Thus, while defendant’s report contained factual errors, defendant was still entitled to qualified immunity, since no court has found that 4^th Amendment requires prison to release sex offender who lacks lawful and approved place to live.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering default judgments in two related cases against same defendant-employer and other defendants alleging violations of state and federal wage-payment laws and in denying defendants’ motions to vacate said default judgments based on claim that: (1) defendant-employer’s owner failed to receive either motion by defendant’s counsel to withdraw or Dist. Ct.’s order directing him to appear at hearing because defendant was no longer in business; (2) defendant’s owner did not receive notice of default judgment until Summer of 2016 and filed motion to vacate in October of 2016; and (3) defendant’s owner had health issues in 2011 and 2014. Dist. Ct. could properly find that said excuses failed to establish good cause for failing to abide by Dist. Ct. orders that formed basis of default judgments, since defendant’s owner had obligation to keep track of instant cases and to apprise clerk of any change in address. Also, denial of motion to vacate was appropriate, where instant two-month delay in filing motion to vacate default judgments did not demonstrate “quick action,” especially where defendant’s owner conceded that he read January press release about default judgment shortly after press release was published, and defendants otherwise failed to proffer meritorious defense to allegations in instant complaints.

In action alleging that defendant violated False Claims Act and Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act by making false statements in Yearly Verification Reports that (as owner of mortgage company submitting FHA loan applications on behalf of third-parties) he was not currently involved in any criminal proceeding, Dist. Ct. did not err by finding that defendant’s misrepresentations in said reports were “material,” where: (1) 24 CFR section 202.5(j)(2) affirmatively prohibits program participation by loan correspondents who have been indicted or convicted of criminal offense bearing on correspondent’s integrity; and (2) HUD’s action in debarring defendant upon learning of defendant’s indictment at time of submission of reports confirmed that defendant’s false statements were material. However, Ct., in overruling Cicero, 957 F.2d 1362, found that Dist. Ct. erred in using “but for” as opposed to proximate causation test when finding that defendant owed over $111 million in damages arising out of defaulted loans. As such, remand was required for determination as to whether defendant’s submission of false reports was legal cause for losses associated with defaulted loans.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to pay $400 filing fee plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that his solitary confinement in prison violated Constitution because said confinement aggravated his psychological problems and his asthma, where Dist. Ct. had previously denied plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis due to fact that plaintiff had three prior lawsuits that had been dismissed as frivolous, and where plaintiff had alleged that his history of self-harm due to his solitary confinement qualified him for in forma pauperis treatment in spite of dismissals of his prior lawsuits, because he was individual under imminent danger of serious physical injury. Dist. Ct. could not dismiss plaintiff’s allegations of self-harm as merely self-serving statements, and defendant was entitled to hearing to determine whether such allegations are true. Ct. further observed that if plaintiff’s allegations linking history of self-harm to his solitary confinement were untrue, plaintiff must pay entire filing fee, and if Dist. Ct. finds that plaintiff lied in effort to manipulate Dist. Ct. to grant his in forma pauperis petition, Dist. Ct. could also dismiss case as sanction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-employer and plaintiff’s co-workers’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-police officer’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by harassing him for adhering to police department policy and procedures and for filing numerous complaints involving himself, as well as his sons, whom plaintiff alleged were mistreated by defendants. Instant internal complaints about violations of police department policies and about mistreatment of his sons did not qualify as protected speech for purposes of asserting First Amendment claim, since such complaints were made pursuant to plaintiff’s official duties as police officer. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss plaintiff’s “class-of-one” equal protection claim in which he asserted that defendants filed false complaints, targeted his sons and improperly withheld Retirement Card, since Ct. in Engvist, 553 U.S. 591, precluded public employees from asserting “class-of-one” equal protection claims in context of disputes relating to public employees’ interactions with their supervisors or co-workers. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in dismissing plaintiff’s claim that defendant-employer violated his procedural due process rights by withholding Retirement Card without due process of law, where basis of Dist. Ct.’s ruling was its erroneous belief that plaintiff failed to plead facts suggesting that he possessed cognizable property interest in receiving said card.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support Dist. Ct.’s finding that defendant’s medical expert was credible, and that plaintiff’s medical expert was not credible in plaintiff’s wrongful death claim brought under Federal Tort Claims Act that centered on treatment given to plaintiff, who went into cardiac arrest and eventually died in one of defendant’s facilities. While plaintiff argued that Dist. Ct. was biased against plaintiff when finding that defendant’s medical expert was credible, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant’s expert witness was credible, where her opinions were drawn from plaintiff’s medical records, as well as from relevant medical literature and data, while defendant’s expert was not credible since: (1) his testimony brought to light his lack of familiarity with numerous sections of plaintiff’s medical records; and (2) his opinions were based on facts that were not supported by plaintiff’s medical records or by relevant medical literature. Dist. Ct. could also discount plaintiff's expert by fact that said expert had innate bias due to his relationship with plaintiff’s family prior to his death.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s legal malpractice action against defendants-Arizona lawyers, where said dismissal was based on finding that Dist. Ct. lacked personal jurisdiction over defendants to consider plaintiff’s complaint. Illinois lacked requisite contacts with defendants so as to establish personal jurisdiction, where: (1) although plaintiff (Illinois citizen) sought out defendants’ legal services, subject matter of legal representation concerned land located in Arizona that was subject to Arizona law; and (2) all business done on behalf of plaintiff was done in Arizona by Arizona lawyers. Fact that contract governing attorney-client relationship, attorney fees arising out of said contract and plaintiff’s recognition of injury had ties to Illinois did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ motion to certify class action in plaintiffs-personal home health care assistants’ claim against defendant-union, alleging that union’s collection of their “fair-share” fees violated their First Amendment rights, where: (1) plaintiffs did not want to join union; and (2) union did not provide plaintiffs with option of not paying said fees prior to their collection. While Supreme Court in Quinn, 134 S.Ct. 2618, agreed with plaintiffs that instant involuntary deduction and collection of fees violated their First Amendment rights, Dist. Ct. could still deny plaintiffs’ request for certification of class action of all non-union-member assistants from whom fair-share fees were collected from April of 2008 through June of 2014, since: (1) proposed class concerned potential of 80,000 members; (2) certain class members would not have experienced any injury to extent they would have happily paid said fess without complaint; (3) intra-class conflicts among class members as to whether to seek financial remedies from union precluded finding that instant proposed class representatives would be adequate; and (4) individual questions as to whether each class member suffered any loss would predominate over other questions so as to preclude class action treatment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-Election Bd.’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ (Green Party state representative candidates) action alleging that Illinois Election Code’s requirements that plaintiffs obtain petition signatures from at least 5 percent of number of voters who voted in previous regular election for said office, that said petition signatures be gathered within 90 days preceding last day for filing petition for nomination, and that each petition sheet contain notarized statement attesting to genuine nature of signatures violated plaintiffs’ 1^st and 14^th Amendment rights. Five percent signature requirement did not violate 1^st or 14^th Amendment since reasonably diligent candidate could be expected to meet said requirement, especially where prior Green Party candidates had met such requirement. Moreover, notary requirement did not violate First Amendment, where: (1) plaintiffs could have satisfied said requirement with as few as 121 petition sheets; (2) there was no issue with respect to access to notaries; and (3) notary requirement served as deterrent to election fraud. Also, 90-day petition window did not violate either 1^st or 14^th Amendments, where each candidate needed to obtain only 27 signatures per day to satisfy said requirement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-city officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ section 1983 action alleging that portion of City ordinance, that banned all signs displayed on overpasses on Interstate 90 that ran through City violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Ordinance was content-neutral and imposed only time, place and manner limitations. Moreover, while plaintiffs asserted that First Amendment allowed them to place signs anywhere in City, instant ordinance was justified as means to lower risk of traffic collisions caused by drivers slowing down to read signs. Fact that defendants had failed to present empirical studies to support said justification did not require different result. Ordinance, though, was overbroad to extent that it applied to 100-foot extended buffer zone on either end of overpasses, since defendants failed to justify instant ban on signs within buffer zone that were not large enough to attract drivers’ attention. As such, remand was required to allow defendants to present justification for said ban.