Federal Civil Practice

Plaintiff-detainee waived both issues on appeal from jury verdict in favor of defendants in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-members of treatment team at Rushville Treatment Center violated his First Amendment rights by subjecting him to “decision-making model” treatment plan in retaliation for plaintiff’s sending of letter to executive director of conditional release program for purposes of assisting his counsel in challenging plaintiff’s inpatient detention at Center. While plaintiff argued on appeal that Dist. Ct. gave wrong jury instruction in instant retaliation claim because it relieved defendants from burden of showing that they would have taken same action even absent his protected activity, plaintiff waived said issue by failing to object to jury instruction on two separate occasions. Fact that plaintiff represented himself at trial did not require that Ct. of Appeals consider said issue under plain error standard. Plaintiff similarly waived issue on appeal regarding Dist. Ct.’s admission of two documents containing psychiatrist notes that plaintiff claimed were not admissible under patient-psychiatrist privilege, where: (1) plaintiff did not object to one document’s admission, while plaintiff failed to include privilege issue when unsuccessfully objecting to other document; and (2) plaintiff had introduced into evidence other privileged patient-psychiatrist treatment records.

Dist. Ct. erred in awarding plaintiffs’ attorneys $4.8 million in fees associated with prosecution of class action pertaining to defendant’s front-loading washing machine, where said award represented 1.75 times $2.7 million in fees attorneys had charged for their work on case. Record showed that class members would share in no more than $900,000 from settlement of class action, and while Dist. Ct. found that 1.75 multiplier was justified due to novelty/complexity, degree of success and public interest factors in case, Ct. of Appeals found that attorneys had failed to prove that reasonable fee would exceed $2.7 million, which was already three times what was awarded to class.

Dist. Ct. did not err in ordering defendants to pay plaintiff $3,744 in attorney fees associated with his counsel’s preparation for unsuccessful court-ordered settlement conference that occurred prior to trial on plaintiff’s section 1983 action that resulted in jury finding in favor of defendants. Dist. Ct. could properly find under Rule 16(f)(1)(B) that defendants did not participate in scheduled settlement conference in good faith, where counsel for defendant told plaintiff and Dist. Ct. at hearing prior to settlement conference that defendants had made prior $150,000 settlement offer and then came to settlement conference and offered less than $75,000, which was in range that plaintiff had previously rejected in prior settlement negotiations. Moreover, while defendants could properly change their settlement position prior to participating in settlement conference, their failure to notify Dist. Ct. and plaintiff of that change made settlement conference futile exercise. Also, defendants allowed plaintiff to prepare for settlement conference under assumption that starting point for negotiations would be significantly higher than what was offered and rejected during prior settlement negotiations.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction in action alleging that Illinois state law (10 ILCS 5/4-50) that gives more options regarding same day registration and voting for residents of counties with populations of 100,000 or more than it does for those who live in less-populated counties violated plaintiffs’ equal protection rights. Plaintiffs failed to show that they would have suffered irreparable harm, but for issuance of preliminary injunction, where record contained evidence that Election-Day registration had positive effect on voter turnout, and where plaintiffs’ expert failed to identify which groups of voters were statistically more or less likely to benefit from same-day option and failed to establish basis for his opinion that instant statute severely burdened residents of smaller-populated counties. Also, plaintiffs failed to establish likelihood of success, where: (1) Dist. Ct. erred in using strict scrutiny standard in issuing preliminary injunction; (2) record failed to support claim that there was necessary correlation between affluence, county size and tendency to vote Democratic; and (3) plaintiff’s expert provided no evidence of discriminatory intent resulting from different treatment given to certain counties.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff-City’s action against defendants (City counsel and its members), alleging that disclosure of certain recorded telephone calls sought by defendants would violate federal wiretap statute. Instant action between executive and legislative components of same city is not justiciable since parties were part of same unit of government. Moreover, Dist. Ct. should have declined to consider instant action, where: (1) record showed that defendant had previously subpoenaed plaintiff for said recordings and had filed lawsuit in state court to enforce said subpoena; and (2) instant lawsuit was improper attempt to litigate in federal court, federal defense to existing state court action. Fact that individual defendants filed second lawsuit against plaintiff seeking damages under 18 USC section 2520, which was consolidated with instant action, did not require different result, since: (1) existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is necessary, but not sufficient condition for issuing declaratory judgment; and (2) by time of trial on instant lawsuit, defendants’ requests for damages had been resolved and their case had been dismissed.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim on ground that plaintiff had agreed to settlement of said claim. Relevant portion of settlement provided that there would be no binding agreement until typed settlement agreement had been signed, and parties had failed to sign typed settlement agreement. As such, remand was required for continuation of case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-prison official’s and prison nurse’s motion for summary judgment alleging that they were entitled to qualified immunity in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action that asserted that defendants were deliberately indifferent to prisoner’s medical needs by failing to prevent his suicide after they had become aware of his suicide risk. Defendant nurse, as employee of private company assigned to prison, was not entitled to qualified immunity defense due to her status as private contractor. Moreover, although defendant prison official was potentially entitled to qualified immunity defense, Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider his issues on appeal that raised disputes as to whether prisoner’s risk of suicide was sufficiently acute or whether said defendant was actually aware of suicide risk, since both issues concerned questions of fact that could not be reviewed at this stage of proceeding. Ct. further found that prisoner’s right to be free from deliberate indifference to his risk of suicide while he was in custody was clearly established at time of his 2012 suicide.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction plaintiff-insurance company’s action against defendant-class action representative seeking to enforce Canadian judgment that rejected defendant’s attempt to enforce $5 million judgment obtained by class representative in prior Illinois state court action, after Canadian court found that plaintiff, who was insurance carrier of defendant in Illinois action, had not received sufficient notice of Illinois judgment. Neither of two possible bases for jurisdiction, i.e., Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) or alienage branch of diversity jurisdiction, applied, where: (1) CAFA applies only where plaintiff is class action and not when class action is defendant; and (2) no class member could satisfy $75,000 amount in controversy requirement for purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction because underlying class action concerned class members’ receipt of 23,521 unsolicited fax communications, and no exceptions to general prohibition on aggregation of claims applied.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-city officials’ motion to dismiss under Rooker-Feldman Doctrine plaintiffs’ section 1983 action alleging that defendants engaged in conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights by ticketing them for traffic violation under city ordinance that resulted in unappealed fines or entry of deferral agreements. While Indiana court eventually found in subsequent case that said ordinance was invalid because it violated state home-rule statute, Rooker-Feldman Doctrine required dismissal without prejudice of all but plaintiffs' deferral agreement-related claims since: (1) plaintiffs previously lost on said claims in state court; (2) their injuries flowed from final state-court judgments that imposed said fines; and (3) plaintiffs improperly sought in instant lawsuit to have federal Dist. Ct. review and reject said state-court judgments. As such, plaintiffs’ remedies for these claims lied only in state court. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, though, did not apply to deferral agreement-related claims, since said agreements did not result in final state court judgment. However, dismissal with prejudice was warranted as to such claims since plaintiff failed to explain how deferral agreements violated any provision of U.S. Constitution.

Ct. of Appeals denied plaintiff-prisoner’s request for appellate attorney fees as prevailing party in defendants-prison officials’ appeal that challenged Dist. Ct.’s order that diverted under Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) only 10 percent of plaintiff’s damage award  to satisfy Dist. Ct.’s award of attorney fees to plaintiff, as well as denied defendants’ contention that state-law sovereign immunity barred plaintiff’s state-law battery claim. While plaintiff prevailed on sovereign immunity claim on appeal, he was not entitled to any appellate attorney fees as prevailing party as to either claim raised on appeal, since: (1) plaintiff did not prevail on PLRA claim, where Ct. of Appeals agreed with defendants that full 25 percent of plaintiff’s damages should be used to satisfy attorney fee award set by Dist. Ct.; (2) 42 USC section 1988(b) does not directly authorize attorney fees for pursuing successful state-law claims; and (3) defendants’ appeal on instant state law sovereign immunity claim did not threaten or relate to plaintiff’s success on his federal claims.