Traffic/DUI

Defendant was arrested for DUI and submitted to breath-alcohol test that showed BAC of 0.215. Court properly granted Defendant's motion to suppress results and petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS). Defendant testified that she had blood in her mouth when she took breath test, and court credited her claim. Defendant presented unrebutted expert testimony that blood in her mouth was a contaminant that affected reliability of her test results, and court accepted that opinion. Thus, Defendant presented prima facie case that results of breath test were untrustworthy, and State failed to rebut it. (WELCH and MOORE, concurring).

(Court opinion corrected 2/7/18.) Defendant was charged with child endangerment, damage to property, and DUI, when she crashed into a wall in parking lot, with her 2 children in vehicle.  After urine test results showed drugs in her system, she was also charged with driving under the influence of drugs and driving under influence of cannabis. The fact that police officers helped restrain Defendant, at request of medical staff, while nurses performed catheterization, did not turn medical procedure into state action. Physician ordered catheterization because Defendant was combative. State did not have knowledge of her DUI-cannabis charge until it received test results; that charge was not subject to compulsory joinder, and thus Defendant was not denied her right to a speedy trial. (NEVILLE and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 1/9/18.) Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of aggravated DUI. Defendant's vehicle struck and injured a minor who was wearing dark clothes and walking in the middle of the road on a dark night with no moonlight. There was no evidence suggesting that Defendant's driving was a contributing proximate cause of minor's injuries, other than pretrial statement of minor's friend, who was walking with her at the time, which is problematic and inconclusive. All other evidence suggests that minor's conduct was sole proximate cause of her injuries.(McDADE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

In a hit-and-run accident, Defendant struck and killed a pedestrian and injured her 6-year-old son. After his arrest, Defendant was forcibly subjected to blood and urine tests, and the urine tests were positive for cannabis, ecstasy, and cocaine. Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder, failure to report a motor vehicle accident involving death or injury, and aggravated DUI. Court erred in refusing to instruct jury on lesser included offense of reckless homicide as a rational jury could have found that Defendant acted recklessly in causing death of other driver. State could not establish that Defendant failed to report accident within half an hour without impermissibly introducing evidence of his postarrest silence. Section 11-501.2(c)(2) of Illinois Vehicle Code is unconstitutional on its face, insofar as it sets forth a categorical exception to the 4th amendment's warrant requirement of the kind rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2013 Missouri v. McNeely decision, which held that courts should undertake a careful case-by-case assessment of exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw. (NEVILLE, concurring; PUCINSKI, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of driving on a suspended license Court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. Officer had a sufficient basis for traffic stop as he observed an object hanging from Defendant’s rearview mirror that he stated he reasonably believed to be an obstruction. The stop allowed officer to investigate further into the obstruction hanging from rearview mirror (which officer testified was a rosary). (LYTTON and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of aggravated DUI. Plain language of statute required only that Defendant’s conduct in DUI was a proximate cause of other driver’s injuries, not sole or immediate cause. That other driver’s own conduct contributed to injuries would not relieve Defendant of criminal liability. Thus, court’s decision to preclude evidence that other driver was not wearing her seat belt did not deny Defendant the ability to present a defense. Retrograde extrapolation evidence as a method of estimating a person’s BAC has general acceptance in its relevant scientific community. Court did not abuse its discretion in finding State’s expert qualified to render opinions on topic of retrograde extrapolation. (STEIGMANN and DeARMOND, concurring.)

Defendant was arrested for DUI. Court granted Defendant's petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension (SSS). Court erred in sustaining Defendant's hearsay objection during SSS hearing. State attempted to elicit testimony from arresting officer explaining what he learned during his investigation and why he believed he had probable cause to arrest Defendant for DUI. When a defendant challenges whether arresting officer had reasonable grounds for arrest, officer's testimony, even if it includes hearsay, is permissible during SSS hearing as it provides court with necessary information to rule on petition to rescind SSS. Court's ruling is affirmed because of forfeiture, as State did not make this argument as to hearsay to trial court or to appellate court. (HARRIS and APPLETON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of speeding and disobeying a traffic control signal in Village. Defendant appealed pro se, arguing that court erred in not accepting his "defense" that Village failed to show relevant speed limit signs, traffic control devices, and road markings complied with Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices and speed limit was established based on an engineering study. The speed limit and traffic signs and devices are presumptively valid, and Defendant failed to rebut that presumption with competent evidence. (NEVILLE and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with DUI after a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. Defendant filed motion to suppress results of a blood-alcohol analysis that was done at hospital on night of accident, contending that blood draw was an unlawful search. Filing of a motion to suppress does not establish that a search took place. Defendant bore burden, at suppression hearing, to show that his blood was drawn but he failed to offer any evidence to establish that fact, and thus failed to establish that element of his prima facie case. No evidence was shown that any individual who may have drawn Defendant's blood did so while acting at the behest, or under the influence, of the police. Even if blood was drawn from Defendant at hospital, it was a private search that did not implicate the 4th amendment.(KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and THEIS, concurring.)