Traffic/DUI

(Court opinion corrected 3/20/18.) Defendant was charged with DUI and obstructing a peace officer. Court erred in granting Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Tip from clerk at gas station, who reported that there was a drunk driver in the building, was sufficiently reliable to justify stop. Tip was not anonymous, as clerk who made call to police was readily identifiable. Clerk specifically described driver of vehicle and provided make and color of vehicle; tip was reliable as it was based on contemporaneous events and provided enough information to allow officer to identify Defendant as the person referred to by clerk. Tip was sufficiently detailed to permit reasonable inference of DUI, given clerk's description of Defendant's driving and clerk's close proximity to Defendant and ability to observe him in store. Officer had probable cause to arrest Defendant for DUI. (McLAREN and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was driving while intoxicated, and on suspended license, and struck 2 pedestrians, 1 of whom later died of resulting injuries, and Defendant failed to report the accident. Defendant entered open plea, and court properly sentenced Defendant to consecutive prison terms of 8 years of aggravated DUI and 4 years for failing to report an accident involving death. Court properly found that Defendant's medical condition (blood disorder) did not constitute extraordinary circumstances to justify probation. Sentence was not an abuse of discretion, given seriousness of offenses and that court considered aggravating and mitigating factors. (HARRIS and DeARMOND, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 3/1/18). Respondent minor was charged in a petition for adjudication of wardship alleging that he committed various gun offenses. Court properly granted Respondent's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Respondent's flight alone did not justify subsequent Terry stop when police temporarily detained Respondent, and officer did not provide specific and articulable facts justifying Terry stop. Thus, subsequent search was not justified.(BURKE and GORDON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI, after striking a 7-year-old boy with his vehicle, when the boy rode his bicycle in front of Defendant's vehicle. Police chief drove defendant to hospital to provide blood and urine samples for drug screening, and test results showed presence of THC and amphetamine.Drug test did not fall within any recognized exception to requirement of a warrant, and was unreasonable search. As there is insufficient evidence to convict Defendant without evidence of test results, conviction is reversed outright.(BARBERIS and GOLDENHERSH, concurring.)

Defendant was arrested for DUI and submitted to breath-alcohol test that showed BAC of 0.215. Court properly granted Defendant's motion to suppress results and petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS). Defendant testified that she had blood in her mouth when she took breath test, and court credited her claim. Defendant presented unrebutted expert testimony that blood in her mouth was a contaminant that affected reliability of her test results, and court accepted that opinion. Thus, Defendant presented prima facie case that results of breath test were untrustworthy, and State failed to rebut it. (WELCH and MOORE, concurring).

(Court opinion corrected 2/7/18.) Defendant was charged with child endangerment, damage to property, and DUI, when she crashed into a wall in parking lot, with her 2 children in vehicle.  After urine test results showed drugs in her system, she was also charged with driving under the influence of drugs and driving under influence of cannabis. The fact that police officers helped restrain Defendant, at request of medical staff, while nurses performed catheterization, did not turn medical procedure into state action. Physician ordered catheterization because Defendant was combative. State did not have knowledge of her DUI-cannabis charge until it received test results; that charge was not subject to compulsory joinder, and thus Defendant was not denied her right to a speedy trial. (NEVILLE and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 1/9/18.) Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of aggravated DUI. Defendant's vehicle struck and injured a minor who was wearing dark clothes and walking in the middle of the road on a dark night with no moonlight. There was no evidence suggesting that Defendant's driving was a contributing proximate cause of minor's injuries, other than pretrial statement of minor's friend, who was walking with her at the time, which is problematic and inconclusive. All other evidence suggests that minor's conduct was sole proximate cause of her injuries.(McDADE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

In a hit-and-run accident, Defendant struck and killed a pedestrian and injured her 6-year-old son. After his arrest, Defendant was forcibly subjected to blood and urine tests, and the urine tests were positive for cannabis, ecstasy, and cocaine. Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder, failure to report a motor vehicle accident involving death or injury, and aggravated DUI. Court erred in refusing to instruct jury on lesser included offense of reckless homicide as a rational jury could have found that Defendant acted recklessly in causing death of other driver. State could not establish that Defendant failed to report accident within half an hour without impermissibly introducing evidence of his postarrest silence. Section 11-501.2(c)(2) of Illinois Vehicle Code is unconstitutional on its face, insofar as it sets forth a categorical exception to the 4th amendment's warrant requirement of the kind rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2013 Missouri v. McNeely decision, which held that courts should undertake a careful case-by-case assessment of exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw. (NEVILLE, concurring; PUCINSKI, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of driving on a suspended license Court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. Officer had a sufficient basis for traffic stop as he observed an object hanging from Defendant’s rearview mirror that he stated he reasonably believed to be an obstruction. The stop allowed officer to investigate further into the obstruction hanging from rearview mirror (which officer testified was a rosary). (LYTTON and SCHMIDT, concurring.)