Traffic/DUI

(Court opinion corrected 6/3/20.) Defendant petitioned to rescind the statutory summary suspension (SSS) of her driving privileges. Court granted petition, based on State's failure to disclose to Defendant the names of relevant and discoverable witnesses (paramedics involved in treatment of Defendant) until day of hearing, which effectively preventing Defendant from calling those witnesses resulted in failure to provide Defendant with a timely hearing under Section 2-118.1(b) of Vehicle Code. State's filing of an objection to Defendant's discovery objections did not automatically toll the 30-day period in section 2-118.1(b) for Defendant to be given a hearing on petition to rescind. (McLAREN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of the Class 1 felony of driving on a revoked license and sentenced as a mandatory Class X offender to 12 years.Sentencing range for this offense is extended because Defendant has 2 prior convictions for the same offense, and the instant and prior convictions were committed when his license was revoked for another prior conviction (reckless homicide.)  No error in trial court's reliance on the license abstract alongside certified copies of convictions in sentencing Defendant. (MIKVA and CONNORS, concurring.)

Police officers stopped Defendant's truck near a bar after being informed that he was involved in an altercation inside the bar. After showing visible signs of intoxication and showing indicators of impairment on standard field sobriety tests, Defendant was arrested for DUI. Police officer was conducting a stop pursuant to an ongoing investigation as to Defendant's in a bar fight that had occurred 10 minutes previously, and this was a lawful investigative stop as information from dispatch led officers to reasonably suspect Defendant may have committed a crime.There was no evidence that the information provided by dispatch was unreliable or suspect, and Defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the stop was unlawful. Court erred in granting motion to quash and suppress evidence. (STEIGMANN and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated DUI, aggravated driving with BAC of 0.08 or greater, and aggravated driving while license revoked. Defendant failed to establish that, when hospital drew his blood after his one-car accident, it was acting as an agent or instrumentality of the State. Evidence presented at suppression hearing established that it was drawn for purpose of his medical treatment. Thus, court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Evidence was sufficient to prove Defendant guilty of the alleged offenses. Court properly admitted Defendant's blood test results under business records exception to hearsay rule, as specifically allowed by section 11-501.4 of Vehicle Code. Testimony of doctor and nurse was sufficient to establish foundation for admission of blood test results.  (SCHMIDT, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of DUI(a)(6). Compulsory joinder can apply to misdemeanor charges that are initially filed by a police officer.Defendant was initially charged with DUI(a)(4) by citation and complaint filed by officer in 12/2015, which derived from officer's investigation and interaction with Defendant at scene of auto accident; State filed subsequent DUI(a)(6) charge more than 4 months later. Officer could have filed both charges in 12/2015. Thus, the 2 charges are subject to compulsory joinder. Defense counsel was ineffective by failing to assert a violation of his right to a trial within the statutorily prescribed 160-day period. Counsel's inaction altered the outcome of the case because counsel could have moved to dismiss the one charge that Defendant was convicted of, DUI(a)(6). (LYTTON and HOLDRIDGE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of driving without a valid license.As no report of proceedings is included in appellate record, and thus there is no way to determine whether evidence against Defendant was improperly admitted or otherwise invalid.Court had personal jurisdiction over De3fendant because he appeared in court after traffic ticket complaint was filed. Subject matter jurisdiction was conferred by Illinois Constitution as prosecution for driving without a valid license is a justiciable matter. (LYTTON, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, dissenting.)

Defendant pled guilty to DUI and endangering the life of a child in a companion case, as she had a 2-year-old child on her lap, unrestrained, when Defendant was behind the wheel of a vehicle on the side of the road. Defendant was sentenced to 180 days in jail, 24 months probation, 200 hours of public service work, and a $1,000 fine. After hearing, court denied Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. Section 11-501(c)(3) of Motor Vehicle Code should not be construed to impose a mandatory minimum period of 6 months' imprisonment. Court expressed its opinion that it was statutorily required to sentence Defendant to 6 months of incarceration, and erred by failing to exercise its discretion in sentencing Defendant. Sentence vacated; remanded for a new sentencing hearing. (CAVANAGH, concurring; STEIGMANN, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of DUI. Sheriff’s deputy was dispatched to scene where another driver had reported a pickup truck driving erratically, and pointed toward back of an RV park. Upon arrival, deputy saw Defendant standing next to the driver’s side of a truck, which was running, and driver’s side door was open. Deputy approached Defendant and noticed his eyes were glassy and “droopy” and that he had a strong odor of alcohol on his breach, his groin was wet, and there was an open beer bottle and Defendant’s wallet in center console. Field sobriety tests and breath test showed that Defendant was intoxicated. Evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was in actual physical control of the truck. Ownership is not a prerequisite to showing that Defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle. The recovery of Defendant’s personal property from the center console permitted reasonable inference that he had recently been in the vehicle. (BIRKETT and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was arrested for DUI. The "Law Enforcement Sworn Report" issued to Defendant at the time incorrectly listed the notice date and breath-test date as 1/12/96; but the correct date of 1/12/19 was listed as arrest date and date officer certified statements were correct. An amended sworn report was prepared listing arrest date and test date as 1/12/19, and notice date and certification date as 1/22/19, although report was not mailed until 1/23/19. Court erred in rescinding statutory summary suspension. The original sworn report was not fatally defective; despite scrivener's error, Secretary of State had enough information to confirm suspension. As Secretary confirmed Defendant's suspension more than 46 days after Defendant originally received notice, summary suspension should not have been rescinded. (ZENOFF and BURKE, concurring.)