Traffic/DUI

Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of cannabis in conjunction with a traffic stop. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, finding that the officer lacked probable cause to search the vehicle. The State appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred when it found that the odor of burnt cannabis emitting from a vehicle was insufficient to support probable cause. The appellate court affirmed, finding that there was no evidence that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that there was a reasonable probability that the vehicle contained contraband or other evidence of criminal activity giving rise to probable cause to search the vehicle. (DAUGHERITY and HETTEL, concurring)

Defendant entered an open plea of guilty to aggravated driving under the influence, which was a Class 1 felony because he had three prior convictions for DUI and one for aggravated DUI. Defendant was sentenced to 10 years. Defendant appealed from the circuit court’s orders denying his motion to withdraw his plea and to reconsider the sentence. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the State’s failure to find one of the predicate convictions earlier in the process and the State filing a new charge after finding this information did not result from vindictiveness and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 10-year sentence. (TURNER and CAVANAGH, concurring)

Plaintiffs received administrative notice of ordinance violations from the City of Chicago for using their phones while driving. The violation notices were adjudicated administratively by the City’s Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) and had findings of liability entered against them. Plaintiffs then filed suit alleging that the DOAH lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the ordinance violations and, as a result, that the findings of liability were void. The circuit court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the City’s use of the DOAH and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that plaintiffs had standing to raise their claims and that the violations occurred prior to a 2014 amendment to section 12-610.2 of the Vehicle Code were properly adjudicated because the City’s traffic code was not similar to any offense in the Vehicle Code at that time. (LAMPKIN and ROCHFORD, concurring)

Petitioner was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor for displaying an unauthorized license plate on a vehicle under section 4-104(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code and filed a petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure asserting that his conviction violated the Illinois proportionate penalties clause. Petitioner argued that section 3-703 of the Vehicle Code created a Class C misdemeanor covering the same conduct, but imposed a lesser penalty and that neither provision contained an express mental state requirement. The appellate court concluded that section 4-104(a)(4) had an implied mental state of knowledge and section 3-703 created an absolute liability offense and, because the mental state requirements were not identical, no proportionate penalties clause violation occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. (ANNE M. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE and OVERSTREET, concurring)

Plaintiffs filed an action alleging that the City of Chicago violated section 11-208.3(b)(10) of the Illinois Vehicle Code when it imposed fines in excess of $250 for ordinance violations. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice and plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court reversed, finding that the circuit court erred when it concluded that the $250 figure in subsection (b)(10) was a legislative drafting error and remanded for further proceedings. (PIERCE and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI involving death and aggravated DUI involving great bodily harm. He appealed arguing the trial court improperly considered a factor inherent in the offense when it considered in aggravation that defendant’s conduct caused or threatened serious harm. The appellate court affirmed, finding that while the trial court considered the degree of harm inflicted on the victims and the threat of harm to persons other than the victims, both of these factors were proper aggravating factors. (HUTCHINSON and BIRKETT, concurring)

Defendant was arrested for DUI and his driver’s license was summarily suspended. The circuit court granted defendant’s petition to rescind the summary suspension on the basis that the officer had no reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was driving a motor vehicle on a highway while under the influence of alcohol. The appellate court reversed, finding the trial court’s order was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the officer’s testimony that they did not know who maintained the parking lot where defendant was arrested was not sufficient to support defendant’s affirmative defense. (O’BRIEN and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

State appealed from a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant in a summary suspension of a driver’s license proceeding after the court rendered facts admitted when the State failed to respond to SCR 216 requests to admit facts. State argued that as a matter of law it could not respond to a request to admit. The appellate court affirmed, finding the State’s Attorney has the authority to respond to requests to admit pursuant to the executive authority vested in the office. (O’BRIEN and HOLDRIDGE, concurring)

Defendant appealed from his conviction for driving while under the influence alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that section 11-501(a)(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code violated his right to due process. In a prior opinion, the appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction by finding that trial court had failed to protect his right to a speedy trial. The State filed a petition for leave to appeal, which was granted, and the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The matter was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of the second issue. The appellate court affirmed, finding under the rational basis test that at the time of the offense section 11-501(a)(6) bore a reasonable relationship to the legislative objective of keeping cannabis-impaired drivers off of the road and, as such, that it did not violate defendant’s right to due process. (LYTTON and HOLDRIDGE, concurring)