Traffic/DUI

State appealed from trial court order granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence discovered in conjunction with a traffic stop, arguing that the odor of cannabis alone constituted probable cause to search the vehicle. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the officer had probable because she did not rely on the odor of cannabis alone, but only searched the vehicle after one of the occupants admitted to possessing cannabis. The court further commented that it was not persuaded by defendant’s argument that the odor of cannabis alone cannot establish probable cause to search a vehicle because the Vehicle Code requires that cannabis be transported in an odor-proof container. (CAVANAGH and HARRIS, concurring)

State appealed from a trial court order granting defendant’s motion for an automatic rescission of defendant’s suspended driving privileges subsequent to a DUI ticket on the basis that the hearing was not held within 30 days from the date of the filing of the petition to rescind and that 34 days of delay were attributable to the State. The State argued on appeal that the defendant invited error when he agreed to a hearing date beyond the 30-day deadline and that the days attributed to the State should have been attributed to the defendant. Defendant argued that the State had forfeited its invited-error argument. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that at least some of the delay was improperly attributed to the State so that automatic rescission was not proper and declining to find that the State forfeited its invited-error argument. (JORGENSEN and KENNEDY, concurring)

Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of cannabis in conjunction with a traffic stop. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, finding that the officer lacked probable cause to search the vehicle. The State appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred when it found that the odor of burnt cannabis emitting from a vehicle was insufficient to support probable cause. The appellate court affirmed, finding that there was no evidence that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that there was a reasonable probability that the vehicle contained contraband or other evidence of criminal activity giving rise to probable cause to search the vehicle. (DAUGHERITY and HETTEL, concurring)

Defendant entered an open plea of guilty to aggravated driving under the influence, which was a Class 1 felony because he had three prior convictions for DUI and one for aggravated DUI. Defendant was sentenced to 10 years. Defendant appealed from the circuit court’s orders denying his motion to withdraw his plea and to reconsider the sentence. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the State’s failure to find one of the predicate convictions earlier in the process and the State filing a new charge after finding this information did not result from vindictiveness and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 10-year sentence. (TURNER and CAVANAGH, concurring)

Plaintiffs received administrative notice of ordinance violations from the City of Chicago for using their phones while driving. The violation notices were adjudicated administratively by the City’s Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) and had findings of liability entered against them. Plaintiffs then filed suit alleging that the DOAH lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the ordinance violations and, as a result, that the findings of liability were void. The circuit court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the City’s use of the DOAH and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that plaintiffs had standing to raise their claims and that the violations occurred prior to a 2014 amendment to section 12-610.2 of the Vehicle Code were properly adjudicated because the City’s traffic code was not similar to any offense in the Vehicle Code at that time. (LAMPKIN and ROCHFORD, concurring)

Petitioner was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor for displaying an unauthorized license plate on a vehicle under section 4-104(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code and filed a petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure asserting that his conviction violated the Illinois proportionate penalties clause. Petitioner argued that section 3-703 of the Vehicle Code created a Class C misdemeanor covering the same conduct, but imposed a lesser penalty and that neither provision contained an express mental state requirement. The appellate court concluded that section 4-104(a)(4) had an implied mental state of knowledge and section 3-703 created an absolute liability offense and, because the mental state requirements were not identical, no proportionate penalties clause violation occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. (ANNE M. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE and OVERSTREET, concurring)

Plaintiffs filed an action alleging that the City of Chicago violated section 11-208.3(b)(10) of the Illinois Vehicle Code when it imposed fines in excess of $250 for ordinance violations. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice and plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court reversed, finding that the circuit court erred when it concluded that the $250 figure in subsection (b)(10) was a legislative drafting error and remanded for further proceedings. (PIERCE and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI involving death and aggravated DUI involving great bodily harm. He appealed arguing the trial court improperly considered a factor inherent in the offense when it considered in aggravation that defendant’s conduct caused or threatened serious harm. The appellate court affirmed, finding that while the trial court considered the degree of harm inflicted on the victims and the threat of harm to persons other than the victims, both of these factors were proper aggravating factors. (HUTCHINSON and BIRKETT, concurring)

Defendant was arrested for DUI and his driver’s license was summarily suspended. The circuit court granted defendant’s petition to rescind the summary suspension on the basis that the officer had no reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was driving a motor vehicle on a highway while under the influence of alcohol. The appellate court reversed, finding the trial court’s order was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the officer’s testimony that they did not know who maintained the parking lot where defendant was arrested was not sufficient to support defendant’s affirmative defense. (O’BRIEN and SCHMIDT, concurring.)