Traffic/DUI

The State appealed from the circuit court’s order granting defendant’s motion to quash his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and to suppress evidence. On appeal, the court considered the nature of the traffic stop and whether an arrest occurred when the police officer took the defendant’s car keys, which would require probable cause, or whether taking the keys was a Terry stop which only required a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The appellate court concluded that while a seizure occurred when the officer took the defendant’s keys, it was merely a Terry stop rather than an arrest and vacated the trial court order to the contrary. (SCHOSTOK and BIRKETT, concurring)

Defendant, who was charged with aggravated DUI, appealed from a trial court order granting the State’s petition to deny him pretrial release. The appellate court reversed, finding that the defendant was not charged with a detainable offense and reversed so that the trial court could properly consider the appropriate conditions for defendant’s release. (JORGENSEN and MULLEN, concurring)

In a group of consolidated appeals, the Illinois appellate court considered whether the Illinois Driver Licensing Law, which treats judgments entered on bond forfeitures in traffic cases as equivalent to convictions, extends to beyond that Act to the sealing provisions of the Criminal Identification Act. The appellate court held that it did not and affirmed a trial court order denying the defendant’s request to seal records associated with a still-pending prosecution for driving on a suspended license. The court also found that the pending prosecution was not a barrier to expunging the records of three unrelated misdemeanor prosecutions. (ROCHFORD and HOFFMAN, concurring)

Defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court finding her guilty of violating a municipal ordinance. Defendant argued on appeal that she was denied the opportunity to plead guilty without having to appear because the information contained on the citation was incorrect and that the citation failed to identify the nature of the offense, which impeded her ability to prepare a defendant. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the defendant ultimately had the opportunity to plead guilty and that the citation sufficiently notified her of the nature of the charge. (HUTCHINSON and SCHOSTOK, concurring)

State appealed from trial court order granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence discovered in conjunction with a traffic stop, arguing that the odor of cannabis alone constituted probable cause to search the vehicle. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the officer had probable because she did not rely on the odor of cannabis alone, but only searched the vehicle after one of the occupants admitted to possessing cannabis. The court further commented that it was not persuaded by defendant’s argument that the odor of cannabis alone cannot establish probable cause to search a vehicle because the Vehicle Code requires that cannabis be transported in an odor-proof container. (CAVANAGH and HARRIS, concurring)

State appealed from a trial court order granting defendant’s motion for an automatic rescission of defendant’s suspended driving privileges subsequent to a DUI ticket on the basis that the hearing was not held within 30 days from the date of the filing of the petition to rescind and that 34 days of delay were attributable to the State. The State argued on appeal that the defendant invited error when he agreed to a hearing date beyond the 30-day deadline and that the days attributed to the State should have been attributed to the defendant. Defendant argued that the State had forfeited its invited-error argument. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that at least some of the delay was improperly attributed to the State so that automatic rescission was not proper and declining to find that the State forfeited its invited-error argument. (JORGENSEN and KENNEDY, concurring)