Traffic/DUI

Defendant pled guilty to 2 counts of aggravated DUI, 1 count of driving while his license was revoked, and other petty traffic offenses, and State agreed to cap its sentencing recommendation at 18 years. Court sentenced Defendant to 20 years on count I of aggravated DUI charge, merging count II with count I and entering convictions on other offenses.  Defendant's appeal is an excessive sentence challenge from a "negotiated plea", which is improper.  Defendant's recourse was to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and argue on appeal how the trial court erred in denying his motion, but he failed to do so.  (HOLDER WHITE and STEIGMANN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of felony and misdemeanor aggravated unlawful use of an electronic communication device. Evidence showed that Defendant was engaged in texting conversations in the 4 minutes prior to the collision when his truck collided with a car. They exchanged 10 text messages in a 4-minute period. These charges were not subject to compulsory joinder with his traffic citation for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. Citation issued was brought by a uniform citation and complaint form, and Defendant pled guilty to traffic citation. Charges were superseded by indictment for a felony violation of the Vehicle Code based on death of passenger in other car, and State filed criminal complaint for misdemeanor violation of Code based upon great bodily harm to driver of other car. It was not unreasonable for court to conclude that Defendant's use of his cell phone was a proximate cause of passenger's death and driver's injuries. State was not required to prove that Defendant was sending or reading a text message at the exact moment of the collision. (HUTCHINSON and HUDSON, concurring.)

(Opinion modified 5/6/21.) Defendant caused a motor vehicle accident, and was convicted of 2 counts of aggravated DUI and 1 count of aggravated driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. Court did not err by admitting the results of 2 blood alcohol tests from blood draws that all had been taken in a hospital ER after the accident. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress as to the medical blood draw because Defendant failed to show that the draw was carried out by State actors.Thus, Defendant failed to make a prima facie case that the draw violated 4th amendment. Even if the administrative blood draw was improperly admitted, the results from that draw were cumulative to results from medical blood draw, which were properly admitted. As medical blood draw test established that Defendant's blood-alcohol concentration was well above legal limits, results of that test alone conclusively proved that Defendant drove with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. (McLAREN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of aggravated DUI. Defendant sought to exclude incriminating statements made by Defendant and his wife and results of sobriety and blood-alcohol tests conducted at his home and at police station, and evidence of damaged vehicle inside his locked garage. State failed to offer any proof of voluntary consent to warrantless entry, which was an unreasonable search. Conviction vacated, and remanded for an attenuation hearing with directions that if court finds that all evidence that Defendant seeks to suppress was attenuated from the taint of the warrantless entry and is thus admissible, court is to reinstate judgment of conviction. Other specific directions given if court finds that some evidence was attenuated. If court finds that none of the evidence was attenuated and thus all should be suppressed, judgment of acquittal to be entered.  (HOWSE and McBRIDE, concurring.)

During routine traffic stop, officers ran a name check on Defendant, a passenger, which showed an investigative alert from Chicago Police Department for alleged sexual assault. Defendant was arrested and made incriminating statements. Court denied motion to suppress those statements, and Defendant was convicted of criminal sexual assault after bench trial. Mission of stop was to resolve a red light violation. It is not clear whether officers asking Defendant for ID and obtaining his driver's license were related to resolving the red light violation or were part of a detouring investigation, which prolonged the stop. State failed to meet its burden of showing that the stop was not unlawfully prolonged. Traffic stop violated 4th amendment and court should have granted motion to suppress. (THEIS, M. BURKE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring; A. BURKE, concurring in part and dissenting in part; NEVILLE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant was convicted of cannabis trafficking. Court did not err in denying Defendant's motion suppress evidence gathered following a traffic stop which lasted just over 7 minutes, from the time Defendant's rental vehicle and the squad car were fully stopped to the time that the police dog alerted on the vehicle. Officer acted diligently in fulfilling the purpose of the stop, performing necessary inquiries and tasks, during those 7 minutes. Traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged. (SCHMIDT, concurring; McDADE, dissenting.) 

Officer stopped Defendant's vehicle after seeing the vehicle change lanes while traveling through an intersection. Officer believed that maneuver violated the improper lane usage statute. There is no prohibition against changing lanes while driving through an intersection within that statute. Officer's interpretation of the statute in these circumstances was unreasonable. (McDADE and LYTTON, concurring.)

Defendant was involved in a high-speed chase, beginning in Marshal County and ending when Defendant crashed his vehicle in La Salle County. Defendant received Marshall County traffic citations for 3 misdemeanor offenses (fleeing and eluding, speeding, and reckless driving). Three months later, Defendant was charged by indictment with aggravated fleeing and eluding, a felony offense. Five months later, Defendant pled guilty to the misdemeanor of fleeing and eluding in Marshall County. Court properly granted his motion to dismiss the felony charge in La Salle County. Jeopardy attached when Defendant pled guilty in Marshall County. As charges in the 2 counties arose from the same act and were essentially the same offense. The Marshall County fleeing and eluding charge was a lesser-included offense of the La Salle County aggravated fleeing and eluding charge, the La Salle County prosecution was barred by double jeopardy.  (McDADE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated DUI. Defendant cannot establish deficient performance of trial counsel or prejudice for not asking court to take judicial notice of a NHTSA manual providing that an officer performing the HGN field sobriety test should hold the pen 12-15" from the subject's face. There is not a reasonable probability that Defendant's guilty finding would have been altered by such request. Case turned on credibility, and court largely based its credibility determination on matters unrelated to the HGN test. Court was permitted by law to treat Defendant's refusal to take breath test as competent evidence of consciousness of guilt. (CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of disobeying a police officer in violation of a city ordinance. Ticket summoned Defendant to appear but did not name the judge before whom he would appear. Eight days later, according to his certificate of service, Defendant mailed a pro se motion for substitution of judge to city prosecutor Defendant e-filed it 5 days later, and e-filed it again 6 days later. Defendant could not be charged with knowing that his case was assigned to Judge Skarin prior to his appearance before him on initial appearance date. Because Defendant filed his motion for substitution of judge within 10 days of that appearance, Judge should have granted that motion. (HUTCHINSON and JORGENSEN, concurring.)