Traffic/DUI

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of DUI of any amount of drugs, after parties stipulated officer found Defendant in physical control of the vehicle and chemical tests showed Defendant had THC in his system at time of arrest. Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to move to dismiss charges on speedy-trial grounds. The right to assistance of counsel, whether appointed or not, necessarily includes the right to effe3ctive counsel. The charges for which Defendant sought to apply the compulsory-joinder rule were brought by the arresting officer through a uniform citation and complaint. Thus, the additional 114-day delay (the time between the original charge and the supplanting charges) was not attributable to the State, and the compulsory-joinder rule did not apply. Counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to make an objection that his right to speedy trial was violated, as such objection would have been meritless, and any motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds premised on the compulsory-joinder rule would have been otherwise futile.  (THEIS, M. BURKE, and OVERSTREET, concurring; A. BURKE and NEVILLE, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of aggravated DUI, after a single-vehicle crash that resulted in the death of his longtime friend. Court's finding that Defendant's motion to substitute counsel was being used merely as a delaying tactic is unsupported by the record. A defendant's 6th amendment right to counsel includes the right to counsel of choice. Trial court abused its discretion in denying motion to substitute counsel because trial judge, who was nearing retirement, did not want to allow substitute counsel time to obtain transcripts and prepare a supplemental motion for new trial. Jury was equipped with information of method of conversion of blood serum alcohol concentration to whole blood alcohol concentration through testimony of investigating police officer. Expert testimony was not required to establish the conversion factor. (HUDSON, concurring; BRENNAN, dissenting.)

Defendant received a uniform traffic ticket for DUI.Defendant filed petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS), but 13 days later voluntarily withdrew her petition and did not request to reinstate it until more than 30 days after the initial filing date. In the meantime, Secretary of State confirmed the SSS. As Defendant had withdrawn her petition within the 30-day period, there was no longer a pending petition to rescind on which the State could schedule and hold a hearing.Thus, court erred in rescinding Defendant's SSS. (O'BRIEN and SCHMIDT, concurring.) 

Court properly denied Defendant’s petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS). No due process violation from officer not immediately sending a copy of notice of SSS to Secretary of State, so that confirmation of suspension did not come until after suspension was set to begin. Confirmation was not needed to provide notice to Defendant because Defendant received notice of suspension, and suspension would automatically occur on 46^th day after issuance of notice, and Defendant was given opportunity to be heard at a hearing, which can be held either pre- or post-suspension. The fact that State sent the sworn report to Secretary of State instead of the officer is not fatal to the suspension. (LYTTON and SCHMIDT, concurring.)