After jury had retired to deliberate, court granted jury's request to review a video recording in evidence but played the video for the jury in the courtroom with the court, parties, and alternate jurors present. No error by court, because deliberations were not taking place while jurors were watching the video. (A. BURKE, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, and M. BURKE, concurring).
Defendant was charged with misdemeanor DUI. Court erred in granting Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Seeing Defendant's glassy eyes, smelling alcohol from Defendant and the vehicle, and hearing Defendant admit to drinking 2 1/2 IPAs provided officer with reasonable suspicion that Defendant might be committing DUI. These observations occurred simultaneously with the traffic stop, and once officer had the reasonable suspicion, he did not unlawfully prolong the valid traffic stop by having Defendant submit to field sobriety testing. (STEIGMANN and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)
Defendant was cited for DUI and for driving with a breath alcohol content over .08. Defendant was notified of the statutory summary suspension (SSS) of her driving privileges. Defendant did not commit traffic violation of failing to obey a traffic control device when she did not proceed with a left turn during the four seconds (when the intersection was clear and the vehicle in front of Defendant's vehicle proceeded forward and made a left turn). The video indicated the rumble strip was not marked in a manner prohibiting a motorist making a left turn onto Route 53 from driving over it, and Defendant did not make any sudden or erratic movements when completing the left turn. Thus, there were no specific, articulable facts to create a reasonable suspicion that Defendant committed or was about to commit a crime to justify the traffic stop. (LYTTON and O'BRIEN, concurring.)
Court erred by granting Defendant’s motion in line to bar admission of Defendant's consensual blood-alcohol and urine test results in his criminal trial for aggravated DUI. It is not required that a defendant was under arrest at the time he consented to drug or alcohol testing for the test results to be admissible in a DUI trial. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence as officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop Defendant, and officer’s mistake of law was not objectively reasonable. Video recording showed that Defendant moved from the far-left lane of highway, across 2 center lanes, into the far-right lane which becomes an entrance ramp to interstate. Before crossing these lanes, Defendant activated his right turn signal, in compliance with section 11-804(d) of Motor Vehicle Code, to indicate his intent to change lanes. As Defendant was not “turning within a business or residence district”, his signal did not need to flash for 100 feet before he departed any lane. Thus, Defendant did not commit turn signal violation which officer cited as basis for stop. (HOLDRIDGE and O’BRIEN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated DUI. Defendant claimed trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress, because a 911 call did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. Because 911 caller reported that Defendant was asleep at the wheel at an intersection, there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for DUI. (HUDSON and BRIDGES, concurring.)
(Court opinion corrected 6/3/20.) Defendant petitioned to rescind the statutory summary suspension (SSS) of her driving privileges. Court granted petition, based on State's failure to disclose to Defendant the names of relevant and discoverable witnesses (paramedics involved in treatment of Defendant) until day of hearing, which effectively preventing Defendant from calling those witnesses resulted in failure to provide Defendant with a timely hearing under Section 2-118.1(b) of Vehicle Code. State's filing of an objection to Defendant's discovery objections did not automatically toll the 30-day period in section 2-118.1(b) for Defendant to be given a hearing on petition to rescind. (McLAREN and HUDSON, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of the Class 1 felony of driving on a revoked license and sentenced as a mandatory Class X offender to 12 years.Sentencing range for this offense is extended because Defendant has 2 prior convictions for the same offense, and the instant and prior convictions were committed when his license was revoked for another prior conviction (reckless homicide.) No error in trial court's reliance on the license abstract alongside certified copies of convictions in sentencing Defendant. (MIKVA and CONNORS, concurring.)
Police officers stopped Defendant's truck near a bar after being informed that he was involved in an altercation inside the bar. After showing visible signs of intoxication and showing indicators of impairment on standard field sobriety tests, Defendant was arrested for DUI. Police officer was conducting a stop pursuant to an ongoing investigation as to Defendant's in a bar fight that had occurred 10 minutes previously, and this was a lawful investigative stop as information from dispatch led officers to reasonably suspect Defendant may have committed a crime.There was no evidence that the information provided by dispatch was unreliable or suspect, and Defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the stop was unlawful. Court erred in granting motion to quash and suppress evidence. (STEIGMANN and HARRIS, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated DUI, aggravated driving with BAC of 0.08 or greater, and aggravated driving while license revoked. Defendant failed to establish that, when hospital drew his blood after his one-car accident, it was acting as an agent or instrumentality of the State. Evidence presented at suppression hearing established that it was drawn for purpose of his medical treatment. Thus, court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Evidence was sufficient to prove Defendant guilty of the alleged offenses. Court properly admitted Defendant's blood test results under business records exception to hearsay rule, as specifically allowed by section 11-501.4 of Vehicle Code. Testimony of doctor and nurse was sufficient to establish foundation for admission of blood test results. (SCHMIDT, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)