Traffic/DUI

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of DUI(a)(6). Compulsory joinder can apply to misdemeanor charges that are initially filed by a police officer.Defendant was initially charged with DUI(a)(4) by citation and complaint filed by officer in 12/2015, which derived from officer's investigation and interaction with Defendant at scene of auto accident; State filed subsequent DUI(a)(6) charge more than 4 months later. Officer could have filed both charges in 12/2015. Thus, the 2 charges are subject to compulsory joinder. Defense counsel was ineffective by failing to assert a violation of his right to a trial within the statutorily prescribed 160-day period. Counsel's inaction altered the outcome of the case because counsel could have moved to dismiss the one charge that Defendant was convicted of, DUI(a)(6). (LYTTON and HOLDRIDGE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of driving without a valid license.As no report of proceedings is included in appellate record, and thus there is no way to determine whether evidence against Defendant was improperly admitted or otherwise invalid.Court had personal jurisdiction over De3fendant because he appeared in court after traffic ticket complaint was filed. Subject matter jurisdiction was conferred by Illinois Constitution as prosecution for driving without a valid license is a justiciable matter. (LYTTON, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, dissenting.)

Defendant pled guilty to DUI and endangering the life of a child in a companion case, as she had a 2-year-old child on her lap, unrestrained, when Defendant was behind the wheel of a vehicle on the side of the road. Defendant was sentenced to 180 days in jail, 24 months probation, 200 hours of public service work, and a $1,000 fine. After hearing, court denied Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. Section 11-501(c)(3) of Motor Vehicle Code should not be construed to impose a mandatory minimum period of 6 months' imprisonment. Court expressed its opinion that it was statutorily required to sentence Defendant to 6 months of incarceration, and erred by failing to exercise its discretion in sentencing Defendant. Sentence vacated; remanded for a new sentencing hearing. (CAVANAGH, concurring; STEIGMANN, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of DUI. Sheriff’s deputy was dispatched to scene where another driver had reported a pickup truck driving erratically, and pointed toward back of an RV park. Upon arrival, deputy saw Defendant standing next to the driver’s side of a truck, which was running, and driver’s side door was open. Deputy approached Defendant and noticed his eyes were glassy and “droopy” and that he had a strong odor of alcohol on his breach, his groin was wet, and there was an open beer bottle and Defendant’s wallet in center console. Field sobriety tests and breath test showed that Defendant was intoxicated. Evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was in actual physical control of the truck. Ownership is not a prerequisite to showing that Defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle. The recovery of Defendant’s personal property from the center console permitted reasonable inference that he had recently been in the vehicle. (BIRKETT and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was arrested for DUI. The "Law Enforcement Sworn Report" issued to Defendant at the time incorrectly listed the notice date and breath-test date as 1/12/96; but the correct date of 1/12/19 was listed as arrest date and date officer certified statements were correct. An amended sworn report was prepared listing arrest date and test date as 1/12/19, and notice date and certification date as 1/22/19, although report was not mailed until 1/23/19. Court erred in rescinding statutory summary suspension. The original sworn report was not fatally defective; despite scrivener's error, Secretary of State had enough information to confirm suspension. As Secretary confirmed Defendant's suspension more than 46 days after Defendant originally received notice, summary suspension should not have been rescinded. (ZENOFF and BURKE, concurring.) 

Defendant was charged with driving with a breath-alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more and DUI. Court erred in granting his motion to suppress result of breath test Defendant took at police station. Although officer deviated from the prescribed procedure in that he failed to continuously observe Defendant for the full 20-minute period, video of Defendant in booking room shows that during officer's absences from the room Defendant did not commit a disqualifying act. Thus, officer's failure to continuously observe Defendant was not fatal to reliance on the result of the breath test. (McLAREN and BURKE, concurring.)

Plaintiff sued towing company and its agent for towing his vehicle in violation of section 4-203(f)(3) of Illinois Vehicle Code, “Unlawful Removal of Vehicle”. Plaintiff prevailed at trial; Defendants appealed court’s award of attorney fees. Vehicle Code awards fees only against the owner or lessor of the property, or someone authorized by that person, who orders a vehicle removed from the property, and not the towing company.  (FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, on all counts in 2 separate cases arising from 2 separate traffic incidents that occurred on the same day. First incident, in Naperville,  alleged leaving the scene of an accident involving an unattended vehicle, and failure to reduce speed; second incident (16 minutes later), in Warrenville, was arrest for DUI (drugs/combination of drugs/cannabis). As Defendant failed to rebut State’s expert’s critical testimony that there was no evidence of contamination in urine sample, leak of sample neither prejudiced Defendant nor rendered test results unreliable. Defendant stipulated that State’s expert was an expert in drug recognition; and scientific evidence of intoxication is unnecessary. Evidence was sufficient to show that Defendant was under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs when he drove his vehicle, and thus his conviction for DUI is affirmed. Convictions in case as to first incident is vacated and remanded, as court erred in adjudicating those counts on date that case was set for status, not trial, thus denying Defendant due process.   (HUTCHINSON and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)