(Belt, D-East St. Louis; Hoffman, Belleville) creates a new 20th judicial circuit for St. Clair County and creates a new 24th for Randolph, Monroe, Washington, and Perry counties. It also increases the subcircuits in the 19th circuit from six to 10. Includes transition language. The Governor signed Senate Bill 2406 on Aug. 13, 2021, and it took effect immediately.
(Morrison, D-Highwood; Morgan, D-Highwood) makes several changes to the BCA. It amends section 7.05 to provide that shareholder meetings can be held through means of remote communication if the corporation implements reasonable measures to ensure that a) each person participating remotely is a shareholder; and b) shareholders participating remotely have a reasonable opportunity to participate in the meeting and to vote on resolutions considered at the meeting. It allows for both fully remote shareholder meetings and hybrid meetings at which some shareholders are present in person and some shareholders participate remotely. The Governor signed this bill into law Aug. 6, 2019 to become effective Jan. 1, 2022.
Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiff’s counsel $774,584.50 in attorney's fees, which represented decrease from $1,709,345 request in attorney’s fees that counsel claimed in fee petition submitted on behalf of plaintiff, who was prevailing party in Title VII discrimination claim. Dist. Ct. could properly establish reasonable hourly rate at $360 per hour instead of counsel’s requested $550 per hour in fee petition, even though counsel submitted six affidavits in support of his requested fee. Three affiants did not state their own hourly rate and made only conclusory statements to support fee request. Moreover, other three affiants either did not specially address requested rate, provided only general statements or did not list judicially approved or client-paid rates for work in similar employment discrimination cases. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly look to $360 per hour rate given to plaintiff’s counsel by another court in prior case. Too, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award counsel fees for time spent traveling to courthouse for routine hearings, where counsel failed to show that he billed other clients for travel time to such hearings, and where Dist. Ct. allowed parties to appear by telephone in order to avoid unnecessary expense to clients. Dist. Ct. also did not err in rejecting counsel’s request for upward adjustment based on plaintiff’s minority group status, where Dist. Ct. could properly note that successful Title VII plaintiffs are often members of minority groups.
(Slaughter, D-Chicago; Sims, D-Chicago) cleans up issues that have cropped up with criminal justice reform bill that was passed in veto session. Some of its changes include tweaking the use of force by law enforcement, body-camera issues, and delaying certain effective dates. Effective June 25, 2021.
(Harmon, D-Oak Park; Tarver, D-Chicago creates the Judicial Districts Act of 2021 to create new appellate and supreme court districts outside of Cook County. The judicial circuits are left intact but may be moved to a new judicial district. The appellate courthouses remain where they currently sit to continue to act as the appellate courthouse for that district.
(Harmon, D-Oak Park; Tarver, D-Chicago creates the Judicial Districts Act of 2021 to create new appellate and supreme court districts outside of Cook County. The judicial circuits are left intact but may be moved to a new judicial district. The appellate courthouses remain where they currently sit to continue to act as the appellate courthouse for that district.
Defendant pled guilty to 2 counts of aggravated DUI, 1 count of driving while his license was revoked, and other petty traffic offenses, and State agreed to cap its sentencing recommendation at 18 years. Court sentenced Defendant to 20 years on count I of aggravated DUI charge, merging count II with count I and entering convictions on other offenses. Defendant's appeal is an excessive sentence challenge from a "negotiated plea", which is improper. Defendant's recourse was to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and argue on appeal how the trial court erred in denying his motion, but he failed to do so. (HOLDER WHITE and STEIGMANN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of felony and misdemeanor aggravated unlawful use of an electronic communication device. Evidence showed that Defendant was engaged in texting conversations in the 4 minutes prior to the collision when his truck collided with a car. They exchanged 10 text messages in a 4-minute period. These charges were not subject to compulsory joinder with his traffic citation for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. Citation issued was brought by a uniform citation and complaint form, and Defendant pled guilty to traffic citation. Charges were superseded by indictment for a felony violation of the Vehicle Code based on death of passenger in other car, and State filed criminal complaint for misdemeanor violation of Code based upon great bodily harm to driver of other car. It was not unreasonable for court to conclude that Defendant's use of his cell phone was a proximate cause of passenger's death and driver's injuries. State was not required to prove that Defendant was sending or reading a text message at the exact moment of the collision. (HUTCHINSON and HUDSON, concurring.)
(Opinion modified 5/6/21.) Defendant caused a motor vehicle accident, and was convicted of 2 counts of aggravated DUI and 1 count of aggravated driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. Court did not err by admitting the results of 2 blood alcohol tests from blood draws that all had been taken in a hospital ER after the accident. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress as to the medical blood draw because Defendant failed to show that the draw was carried out by State actors.Thus, Defendant failed to make a prima facie case that the draw violated 4th amendment. Even if the administrative blood draw was improperly admitted, the results from that draw were cumulative to results from medical blood draw, which were properly admitted. As medical blood draw test established that Defendant's blood-alcohol concentration was well above legal limits, results of that test alone conclusively proved that Defendant drove with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. (McLAREN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of aggravated DUI. Defendant sought to exclude incriminating statements made by Defendant and his wife and results of sobriety and blood-alcohol tests conducted at his home and at police station, and evidence of damaged vehicle inside his locked garage. State failed to offer any proof of voluntary consent to warrantless entry, which was an unreasonable search. Conviction vacated, and remanded for an attenuation hearing with directions that if court finds that all evidence that Defendant seeks to suppress was attenuated from the taint of the warrantless entry and is thus admissible, court is to reinstate judgment of conviction. Other specific directions given if court finds that some evidence was attenuated. If court finds that none of the evidence was attenuated and thus all should be suppressed, judgment of acquittal to be entered. (HOWSE and McBRIDE, concurring.)