Traffic/DUI

Defendant was involved in a high-speed chase, beginning in Marshal County and ending when Defendant crashed his vehicle in La Salle County. Defendant received Marshall County traffic citations for 3 misdemeanor offenses (fleeing and eluding, speeding, and reckless driving). Three months later, Defendant was charged by indictment with aggravated fleeing and eluding, a felony offense. Five months later, Defendant pled guilty to the misdemeanor of fleeing and eluding in Marshall County. Court properly granted his motion to dismiss the felony charge in La Salle County. Jeopardy attached when Defendant pled guilty in Marshall County. As charges in the 2 counties arose from the same act and were essentially the same offense. The Marshall County fleeing and eluding charge was a lesser-included offense of the La Salle County aggravated fleeing and eluding charge, the La Salle County prosecution was barred by double jeopardy.  (McDADE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated DUI. Defendant cannot establish deficient performance of trial counsel or prejudice for not asking court to take judicial notice of a NHTSA manual providing that an officer performing the HGN field sobriety test should hold the pen 12-15" from the subject's face. There is not a reasonable probability that Defendant's guilty finding would have been altered by such request. Case turned on credibility, and court largely based its credibility determination on matters unrelated to the HGN test. Court was permitted by law to treat Defendant's refusal to take breath test as competent evidence of consciousness of guilt. (CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of disobeying a police officer in violation of a city ordinance. Ticket summoned Defendant to appear but did not name the judge before whom he would appear. Eight days later, according to his certificate of service, Defendant mailed a pro se motion for substitution of judge to city prosecutor Defendant e-filed it 5 days later, and e-filed it again 6 days later. Defendant could not be charged with knowing that his case was assigned to Judge Skarin prior to his appearance before him on initial appearance date. Because Defendant filed his motion for substitution of judge within 10 days of that appearance, Judge should have granted that motion. (HUTCHINSON and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

After jury had retired to deliberate, court granted jury's request to review a video recording in evidence but played the video for the jury in the courtroom with the court, parties, and alternate jurors present. No error by court, because deliberations were not taking place while jurors were watching the video.  (A. BURKE, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, and M. BURKE, concurring).

Defendant was charged with misdemeanor DUI. Court erred in granting Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Seeing Defendant's glassy eyes, smelling alcohol from Defendant and the vehicle, and hearing Defendant admit to drinking 2 1/2 IPAs provided officer with reasonable suspicion that Defendant might be committing DUI. These observations occurred simultaneously with the traffic stop, and once officer had the reasonable suspicion, he did not unlawfully prolong the valid traffic stop by having Defendant submit to field sobriety testing. (STEIGMANN and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant was cited for DUI and for driving with a breath alcohol content over .08. Defendant was notified of the statutory summary suspension (SSS) of her driving privileges. Defendant did not commit traffic violation of failing to obey a traffic control device when she did not proceed with a left turn during the four seconds (when the intersection was clear and the vehicle in front of Defendant's vehicle proceeded forward and made a left turn). The video indicated the rumble strip was not marked in a manner prohibiting a motorist making a left turn onto Route 53 from driving over it, and Defendant did not make any sudden or erratic movements when completing the left turn. Thus, there were no specific, articulable facts to create a reasonable suspicion that Defendant committed or was about to commit a crime to justify the traffic stop. (LYTTON and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Court erred by granting Defendant’s motion in line to bar admission of Defendant's consensual blood-alcohol and urine test results in his criminal trial for aggravated DUI. It is not required that a defendant was under arrest at the time he consented to drug or alcohol testing for the test results to be admissible in a DUI trial. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence as officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop Defendant, and officer’s mistake of law was not objectively reasonable. Video recording showed that Defendant moved from the far-left lane of highway, across 2 center lanes, into the far-right lane which becomes an entrance ramp to interstate. Before crossing these lanes, Defendant activated his right turn signal, in compliance with section 11-804(d) of Motor Vehicle Code, to indicate his intent to change lanes. As Defendant was not “turning within a business or residence district”, his signal did not need to flash for 100 feet before he departed any lane. Thus, Defendant did not commit turn signal violation which officer cited as basis for stop.  (HOLDRIDGE and O’BRIEN, concurring.)

 Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated DUI. Defendant claimed trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress, because a 911 call did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle.  Because 911 caller reported that Defendant was asleep at the wheel at an intersection, there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for DUI.    (HUDSON and BRIDGES, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/3/20.) Defendant petitioned to rescind the statutory summary suspension (SSS) of her driving privileges. Court granted petition, based on State's failure to disclose to Defendant the names of relevant and discoverable witnesses (paramedics involved in treatment of Defendant) until day of hearing, which effectively preventing Defendant from calling those witnesses resulted in failure to provide Defendant with a timely hearing under Section 2-118.1(b) of Vehicle Code. State's filing of an objection to Defendant's discovery objections did not automatically toll the 30-day period in section 2-118.1(b) for Defendant to be given a hearing on petition to rescind. (McLAREN and HUDSON, concurring.)