Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s request under First Step Act for reduction of his 300-month sentence on crack cocaine distribution charge. Defendant based instant request, in part, on contention that reduction is sentence was warranted because: (1) his drug quantities under new crack-to-powder ratio would have produced lower sentencing range; and (2) original sentencing judge’s finding that he qualified for career offender status based, in part, in his reckless discharge of firearm conviction no longer applied because under more recent case law, said conviction did not qualify as crime of violence under section 4B1.1(a) of USSG. However, Dist. Ct. could base denial on these two bases, where: (1) original sentencing judge indicated that he would have given same sentence regardless of defendant’s career offender status; and (2) defendant’s guideline range remained same after accounting for reduced crack-to-powder cocaine ratio. However, remand was required for reconsideration of instant request, where Dist. Ct. committed procedural error by failing to address one primary argument that reduction in sentence was appropriate due to defendant’s record of good conduct while in prison.

Dist. Ct. did not err in re-sentencing defendant to 300-month term of incarceration on drug distribution and firearm charges, where said sentence was based in part on finding that defendant qualified for career offender treatment under section 4B1.2 of USSG, based in part on his prior Indiana attempted murder conviction. While defendant argued that his attempted murder conviction did not qualify as crime of violence for purposes of career offender treatment, Dist. Ct. could properly have found that: (1) crime of murder is listed crime of violence under section 4B1.2(a); and (2) Application Note 1 of said Guideline instructs that attempting to commit listed offense should also be considered as crime of violence under section 4B1.2(a)(2) of USSG. Defendant also forfeited any argument in his habeas petition that his trial counsel was ineffective during pre-trial proceedings, where defendant had failed to raise said precise issue with Dist. Ct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendant was entitled to dismissal under Speedy Trial Act of his credit union robbery charge, where government conceded that over 70 non-excludable days had elapsed from date of defendant‘s arraignment. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in making said dismissal without prejudice to government filing new charge under circumstance where major source of delay came from transporting defendant to his mental competency evaluation. Dist. Ct. properly found that two of three factors used to determine whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice, i,e. seriousness of offense and facts and circumstances which led to dismissal, favored dismissal without prejudice, where: (1) defendant’s robbery charge was serious offense; and (2) instant cumulative delay was only 106 days, defendant raised only belated objection to how his transport was to occur, and instant transportation delay was inadvertent. Also, while third factor, i.e., impact of re-prosecution on administration of Act and on administration of justice, may have favored dismissal with prejudice to extent government had not addressed similar delays in transporting other inmates to their evaluations, Dist. Ct. could properly find that third-factor did not outweigh other two factors supporting finding of dismissal without prejudice.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ request for reduction in their 320-month and 204-month sentences under First Step Act. Both defendants were eligible for such relief, even though their charged drug conspiracy pertained to both crack cocaine and heroin. However, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying their requests for relief, where Dist. Ct gave thorough consideration of relevant 3553(a) sentencing factors that included defendants’ participation in rehabilitation, their prison disciplinary history, nature and seriousness of their offenses, prior criminal history and importance of deterrence. Ct. rejected defendants’ contention that denial of their requests for reduced sentence was improper because Dist. Ct. had duty to avoid unwarranted disparate sentences when compared to sentences given to their co-defendants, since sentencing disparity between co-conspirators is not valid basis to challenge instant Guideline sentences that were otherwise correctly calculated. (Amended Opinion)

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his two murder convictions on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and present testimony of alibi witness. While record contained conflicting evidence as to whether trial counsel had actually interviewed said witness, record also showed that said witness had been subpoenaed and disclosed as potential witness, and that witness’s alibi testimony that defendant was elsewhere at time of shooting would have opened door to State presenting testimony regarding defendant’s contrary statements made to police that acknowledged his presence when victims were shot. As such, state court could properly find that any failure to interview witness or present witness at time of trial was matter of sound trial strategy, where record suggested that trial counsel had considered presenting said witness, but ultimately decided not to do so. Fact that trial counsel had died prior to giving testimony regarding his trial strategy did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in reducing defendant’s life sentence on drug and firearm convictions to 420-month term of incarceration, where defendant had sought sentence reduction under First Step Act, even though defendant had argued that he was entitled to much larger reduction due to intervening Supreme Court decision in Mathis, 579 U.S. 500, which, if in force at time of defendant’s sentencing, would have produced Guideline range of between 210 and 262 months of incarceration. While both government and Dist. Ct. held belief that defendant was legally entitled to lower sentence, Dist. Ct. could properly find that reduction to only 420-month term of incarceration was warranted, where examination of section 3553(a) factors indicated that defendant had extensive criminal history, and where defendant had engaged in extensive drug operation at issue in charged offenses that included possession of four firearms and ammunition. Ct. also rejected defendant’s argument that his only minor reduction in sentence constituted unwarranted disparity with respect to reduced sentence that co-defendant had received under First Step Act, where disparity could be explained by difference in section 3553(a) factors applicable to both defendant and co-defendant. (Amended opinion)