Criminal Law

Defendant, age 15 at time of offenses, was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of 1st degree murder and 1 count of attempted 1st degree murder, and was sentenced to mandatory life in prison to run consecutively with a 30-year sentence for the attempt. Parties agreed that mandatory life sentence violates the U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 Miller v. Alabama holding  finding that mandatory life without parole for a juvenile defies the eighth amendment. Court resentenced Defendant to 2 concurrent terms of 54 years, to run consecutively with a 6-year sentence for attempt. Upon resentencing, court expressed no finding of permanent incorrigibility, and expert's undisputed testimony overwhelmingly conflicted with permanent incorrigibility. This is a de facto life sentence which violates 8th amendment, and is vacated. One 34-year sentence is imposed for 1st degree murder, and 6-year sentence for the attempt, for a total of 40 years. (WALKER and GRIFFIN, concurring.)

Defendant, was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st degree murder of his 6-month-old son, and sentenced to natural life imprisonment. Assistant medical examiner testified that some of the baby's injuries were newer and others were more remote in time. Defendant was 18 years and 5 months old when infant died. After his arrest, Defendant was diagnosed with a nonspecific psychosis. Mental health issues may lower a defendant's functional age. Court gave no consideration to Defendant's age except for determining that it qualified him for death-penalty consideration. Defendant made a sufficient legal and factual showing for his petition to be filed. Remanded to allow court to consider whether Defendant's mental and other issues at time of offense rendered him functionally under age 18 or whether, as applied to him, his sentence violates proportionate penalties clause. (LAMPKIN, concurring; BURKE, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder, aggravated kidnaping, and aggravated vehicular hijacking and received consecutive sentences, for a total of 145 years. Codefendant, convicted of same offenses, received consecutive sentencing totaling 105 years. Defendant's postconviction petition alleges that his sentence is unconstitutionally disparate from his codefendant's sentence. Appellate court found that postconviction counsel had provided unreasonable assistance in providing inaccurate sentencing information as to Defendant and codefendant. Trial court erred by reappointing the same counsel whom appellate court had already found to have provided unreasonable assistance. This same counsel again provided inaccurate sentencing information to the trial court. At codefendant's resentencing, trial court found that codefendant was the actual shooter and was "the moving force" behind the robbery plan, both points which counsel failed to argue. (HALL and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 1st degree murder. Court properly entered 2nd-stage dismissal of Defendant's postconviction petition. Video evidence documenting Defendant's Miranda waiver and subsequent inculpatory statements provides no reason to suspect that she was negatively affected by a lack of sleep, or that her will was overborne by coldness in the interview room or anemia.No evidence that her statements were extracted through trickery or deceit by detectives. Defendant's recantation long after her 2 inculpatory statements (made hours apart from each other) suggests that she eventually had second thoughts about the wisdom of having made the statements. Defendant did not make a substantial showing that it is reasonably probable that her statements would have been suppressed as involuntary, or that trial outcome would have been different,  if trial counsel had presented additional portions of the interview video and testimony as to her alleged intoxication at time of interview. Thus, court properly dismissed ineffective assistance of counsel claim without an evidentiary hearing. (HALL and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant, age 20 at time of offenses, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and attempted 1st degree murder, for shooting of one victim who died and one who sustained a leg injury. Defendant filed 2 successive postconviction petitions asserting claim of actual innocence. Two affidavits attached to petitions are newly discovered and material and noncumulative. Affidavit lends corroboration to State's witness's trial testimony that affiant had moved out of town prior to trial, and her affidavit states that she successfully hid from police to avoid testifying at trial and to leave behind police intimidation and threats to take away custody of her children if she did not cooperate. Affiants were both eyewitnesses who would testify that Defendant was not one of the shooters, whereas no eyewitness testified to that at the original trial. Defendant made substantial showing that the new evidence has the probability to lead to a different result at retrial. (LAMPKIN and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession with intent to deliver. Court erred in grating Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in the vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger. Officer had observed driver weaving within a single lane 5 hours earlier, but did not arrest driver at that time. Officer then observed driver leave its lane of travel twice and cross partly into the adjacent lane, touching a lane marker. This gave officer reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver was impaired and a basis to conduct an investigative stop. (BIRKETT and ZENOFF, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted in 2017 of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. There was no evidence Defendant lived in the house where the gun and holster were recovered, and there was uncontradicted evidence that they belonged to Defendant's mother's late husband. Gun was not in plain view but inside a basement crawlspace. In the absence of independent evidence to corroborate Defendant's confession, evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. (DELORT and HOFFMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of being an armed habitual criminal. When officers arrested Defendant and confiscated the gun admitted into evidence at trial, arresting officers had probable cause to believe that he was in violation of a provision of the Illinois aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute that was later deemed facially unconstitutional. Where probable cause exists at the time of a defendant's arrest, the exclusionary rule does not apply, and the court need not consider the good faith exception to that rule. The Illinois Supreme Court's 2017 decision in People v. Holmes is still controlling precedent. (CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of home invasion, burglary, attempted robbery, and aggravated battery. Court erred by giving accomplice-witness instruction where the testimony of the witness in question failed to implicate Defendant. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder. Neither of Defendant's assistant public defenders had any employment ties to the state's attorney's office at the time they represented Defendant.The mere possibility that Defendant's trial attorneys could potentially be called to testify as civilian witnesses against Defendant in a future unrelated criminal proceeding would not impact their professional obligations and loyalty to Defendant during their representation of him during his murder trial. (FITZGERALD SMITH and COBBS, concurring.)