Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly sentenced defendant to 6.5-year term of incarceration on burglary charge, where said sentence was based on finding that defendant’s criminal history qualified him for Class X treatment. Appellate Court, in vacating defendant’s sentence, found that defendant did not qualify for Class X treatment, because: (1) although defendant had two prior Class 2 or greater criminal convictions, his 2005 conviction concerned conduct that occurred at time he was 15 years old; and (2) said conviction could not support imposition of Class X sentence, where, had defendant committed his 2005 offense under laws in effect at time of instant 2016 burglary, said offense would have led to juvenile adjudication instead of Class 2 felony conviction. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that: (1) there is no distinction between convictions rendered while defendant was juvenile and those that occur after defendant is no longer subject to authority of juvenile court; and (2) amendments to Juvenile Court Act do not apply retroactively to cases already completed.

This case presents question as to whether Appellate Court properly reversed defendant’s conviction on three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of child, where trial court barred members of defendant’s family from courtroom during minor victim’s trial testimony. Appellate Court, in finding violation of defendant’s right to public trial, noted that trial court had failed to comply with section 115-11 of Code of Criminal Procedure because trial court had failed to inquire as to whether members of defendant’s family had direct interest in case, and because, even though defendant had not preserved instant error for review, trial court’s failure to comply with section 115-11 was structural, constitutional error that required reversal of his conviction. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that defendant’s constitutional right to public trial was not implicated because: (1) media was not removed from trial; (2) closure was limited to duration of child’s testimony; and (3) defendant failed to show that closure prevented him from having fair trial. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether defendant’s conviction on domestic battery charge is nullity because trial court did not properly administer trial oath to jury. Record showed that defendant did not object prior to or during trial to jury not being administered trial oath. Appellate court majority found that such failure was not structural error and subsequently affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence under plain error standard. Dissenting Justice contended that failure of jury to receive trial oath was structural error requiring reversal of defendant’s conviction.

This case presents question as to whether defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective, where counsel failed to assert speedy trial violation based on state’s failure to proceed to trial within 160 days of defendant’s trial demand. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s conviction, found that defendant’s two DUI charges were subject to compulsory joinder rule that triggered speedy trial term as of date when defendant was brought into custody on initial DUI charge, where arresting officer had sufficient knowledge of both offenses on date officer had charged defendant with initial DUI offense and filed complaint on said charge, and where police officer was “proper prosecuting officer.” In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that compulsory joinder rule did not apply because instant officer filing charge by uniform citation is not “proper prosecuting officer,” and that because compulsory joinder rule did not apply, there was no speedy trial violation.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly entered summary dismissal of defendant’s pro se petition for post-conviction relief that asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for not raising viable defense in two criminal sexual assault charges to which defendant had pleaded guilty. Defendant asserted that he was actually innocent of said charges because he was not “family member” and had not resided in same household as victim for 6-month period prior to assaults. Appellate Court, in affirming instant dismissal, found that defendant had failed to show any prejudice arising out of trial counsel’s performance because defendant could not demonstrate that he would have pleaded not guilty to instant charges and insisted on going to trial, where: (1) defendant failed to state in his petition or affidavit that he would not have pleaded guilty to said charges in absence of counsel’s deficient performance; (2) defendant was charged with nine counts of sexual assault, six of which did not involve family member defense; and (3) defendant did not claim that he would have succeeded on any of said six counts that were nol-prossed by prosecutor as part of instant plea deal.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly admitted blood test results at defendant’s trial on charge of aggravated DUI, where Rule 803(6) otherwise prohibits use of business records exception to admit medical records in criminal cases. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that more specific language set forth in section 11-504.4 of Vehicle Code, which authorizes admissions of “lab reports” in DUI prosecutions, should prevail over any conflict with Rule 803(6), since section 11-504.4 was more specific statute.

This case presents question in instant prosecution on charge of home invasion, aggravated domestic battery and possession of stolen motor vehicle involving defendant’s ex-girlfriend as to whether State properly authenticated social media screen shot allegedly sent by defendant to ex-girlfriend. Appellate Court found that State presented sufficient evidence to authenticate instant Facebook message, where: (1) there was testimony from ex-girlfriend that defendant messaged her on Facebook multiple times under “Masetti Meech” username which appeared on subject screen shot; and (2) instant message contained content that was not widely known to persons other than defendant and girlfriend, including location of ex-girlfriend's stolen car. Defendant argued that there was lack of authentication of screen shot, where State failed to produce messages that appeared before and after screen shot. He also argued that record lacked sufficient evidence to support his stolen motor vehicle conviction, where State failed to show that he took vehicle with intention to permanently deprive ex-girlfriend of her vehicle.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for new trial, even though defendant contended that his trial counsel was ineffective because he labored under conflict of interest in instant murder trial due to his prior representation of murder victim. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s conviction and remanding matter for new trial, found that defendant’s trial counsel had labored under pre se conflict of interest due to his prior representation of deceased victim. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that there is no per se conflict of interest where the victim is deceased at time of trial, and where counsel's prior representation of victim was through court appointment. Moreover, it argued that any justification for recognition of per se conflict of interest in instant case would not apply, since defense counsel had no feeling of continuing loyalty to victim at time of defendant’s trial.