Criminal Law

Defendant, age 15 at time of offense, pled guilty to 1 count of 1st-degree murder and 1 count of attempted murder, and sentenced to total of 68 years. Sentence is a de facto life sentence and cannot stand based on the considerations in his original sentencing hearing. Sentencing court did not sufficiently consider Defendant's youth or make the other irreparability finding that would allow for Defendant to be permissibly subject to a de facto life sentence. (PIERCE and WALKER, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing.) Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school.  Court denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence (heroin and related items) inside his motel room.  A warrantless "free air" dog sniff outside the door of his motel room did not violate the fourth amendment. Officer testified that once dog reached "the general area" outside the room, he signaled an alert to the odor of narcotics; but on cross-exam stated that dog was approximately at the door handle and the door seam and "within inches of the door" when he alerted. The door to Defendant's room was set back in a little alcove; the alcove had a door, but the area was open to the public and the door was propped open.Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcove outside his room, and there is no evidence that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the alcove. When Defendant's expectation was the hope that the odor of narcotics would not be sensed by a drug-detection dog in the alcove outside his room, that expectation is not reasonable and not subject to 4th amendment protection. (KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and KARMEIER, concurring; BURKE and NEVILLE, dissenting.)

Court, sua sponte, vacated Defendant's negotiated guilty plea in response to several comments made by Defendant. Defendant was later convicted, after bench trial, of felony criminal trespass to a residence and domestic battery. Appellate court reversed, finding that jeopardy had attached when circuit court accepted Defendant's guilty plea and that circuit court abused its discretion in vacating guilty plea. Judge did not abuse his discretion in vacating the guilty plea sua sponte.Defendant's wholesale repudiation of the factual basis indicated a misunderstanding of the consequences of pleading guilty. Court had good reason to doubt the truth of the plea, and thus the court need not have obtained the parties' consent to vacate the plea.The bench trial did not offend the bar against double jeopardy. (A. BURKE, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, THEIS, NEVILLE, and M. BURKE, concurring.)

Section 112a-11.5 of Code of Criminal Procedure, which permits issuance of a protective order in a crime involving domestic violence, a sexual offense, or stalking, does not violate due process by allowing State to make a prima facie case for issuance of a protective order by producing an indictment without requiring the complaining witness be subject to confrontation and cross-examination. The statute does not compel testimony or presentation of evidence by Defendant in violation of constitutional protections against self-incrimination. There is no impermissible burden shifting nor a conflict that renders the operation of either that statute or the Civil No Contact Order Act untenable. (A. BURKE, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, THEIS, NEVILLE, and M. BURKE, concurring.)

More than 16 years after Defendant's convictions and sentences for 1st degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault of a 15-year-old girl were affirmed and after numerous other petitions for collateral relief were dismissed or denied, Defendant filed petition for relief from judgment. State moved to dismiss petition on procedural grounds, which court granted 4 days after petition was served on Defendant and his counsel. Appointed counsel did not respond to motion and was not present during ruling. Counsel had not been given notice of proceedings in which court ruled on motion. Although court failed to give Defendant reasonable opportunity to respond to motion to dismiss, this was harmless error. Petition weas procedurally time barred by 16 years and was otherwise incurably deficient as a matter of law. Thus, defects in petition could not be cured.  (A. BURKE, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, KARMEIER, NEVILLE, and M. BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant, age 16 at time of offenses, was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of 1st degree murder and sentenced to natural life. Court later conducted a new sentencing hearing to consider the characteristics of youth as required by 2012 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama, and sentenced him to 60 years, which is a de facto life sentence. Nothing in record supports a finding that Defendant's conduct reflected irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation, but indicated that Defendant was capable of rehabilitation. Court's focus on deterrence is incongruous with Miller's concerns as to sentencing of juvenile defendants. Remanded for new sentencing hearing. (MIKVA and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 9/25/20.) Defendant, age 16 at time of offenses, was charged as an adult with aggravated battery with a firearm, attempted 1st-degree murder, and 2 other offenses; he pled guilty to aggravated battery with a firearm and was sentenced to 21 years. Court, at Krankel hearing, failed to inquire into the basis of Defendant's claims that his initial attorney was ineffective. Defendant's later-appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant had met Krankel's threshold requirement of an actual allegation of ineffective assistance with some factual basis, and he requested new counsel. If a defendant has made a sufficient pro se claim of ineffective assistance and request for new counsel, the general appointment of new counsel does not eliminate trial court's obligation to make a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the pro se claim. Defendant's Krankel counsel abandoned the ineffective-assistance claims that Defendant raised in his pro se motion but did not move to withdraw. Record is not clear whether appointed defense counsel fulfilled her duty to independently evaluate Defendant's pro se claims, so prejudice is presumed. (BRIDGES and BRENNAN, concurring.)

The limited authority doctrine, which provides that authority to enter a building for a specific lawful purpose is vitiated when the wrongdoer departs from that purpose and commits a felony or theft, applies to residential burglary by entry. (A. BURKE, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, KARMEIER, NEVILLE, and M. BURKE, concurring.)