Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Court abused its discretion in applying surveillance location privilege. Surveillance officer's location should have been disclosed, and lack of disclosure deprived Defendant of a fair trial, as it seriously hampered Defendant's ability to test credibility of the only witness against him.(NEVILLE and HYMAN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated battery of his 6-year-old stepson; State claimed that Defendant intentionally immersed child in hot water in bathtub, causing child to sustain 2nd- and 3rd-degree burns. Common-law exception to hearsay rule did not apply to identification portion of child's statement to nurse that Defendant poured a cup of hot water on him, as statement was made more than 1 week after incident and treatment of his injuries had already commenced. Court's admission and use of hearsay statement was reversible error. As hearsay statement was the only evidence placing Defendant in the bathroom where injury occurred, State failed to prove Defendant guilty of essential elements of offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Double jeopardy clause forbids successive trial. (LAMPKIN, concurring; GORDON, partially concurring and partially dissenting.)
Minor respondent was adjudicated delinquent for committing offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and possession of a controlled substance. Court erred in denying Respondent's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence obtained as a result of the illegal stop. Respondent's unrelated arrest warrant did not intervene between the stop and the discovery of the evidence, as the police did not know about the arrest warrant before or during Respondent's search. (PIERCE and HARRIS, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2nd degree murder aggravated battery with a firearm and not guilty of aggravated battery with a firearm. During voir dire, court asked whether prospective jurors "disagreed" with the Zehr principle of Rule 431(b), and then court asked State and defense counsel whether they believed that prospective jurors had "been properly admonished as far as Zehr principles." State and defense counsel responded in the affirmative. Defendant affirmatively waived improper questioning of prospective jurors on Zehr principles, by his counsel affirmatively acquiescing to the style of questioning. Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to 17 years. Circuit court clerk improperly fined Defendant, as court did not impose any specific fines, and thus fines are vacated.(KNECHT and APPLETON, concurring.)
A defendant is not guilty of home invasion when, with the resident's consent, he enters that resident's dwelling place even though his doing so is in violation of a court order. Court erred in ruling that resident's permission was irrelevant because Defendant's entry into residence was in violation of conditions of his bail bond. (TURNER and APPLETON, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of failure to register as a sex offender. The lack of a fixed residence is not an element of the crime. Defendant did not register a fixed residence and thus acquiesced to the weekly reporting requirement, which is the most onerous registration requirement. Thus, State did not have to prove Defendant lacked a fixed residence. Fines, which were not imposed by court and which were improperly assessed by circuit clerk, are vacated.(STEIGMANN and APPLETON, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to 60 years. No direct evidence linked Defendant to the victim's death. State's evidence could reasonably support only a determination that Defendant had sex with victim at some time in 72 hours prior to her death. It would be pure speculation to conclude that Defendant and victim had sex shortly before her death or that Defendant was the last person to see victim alive; but guilt may not rest on speculation. Evidence introduced by State was so weak as to create a reasonable doubt on issue of whether Defendant committed the murder. (CONNORS and DELORT, concurring.)
Defendant appealed a trial court order rejecting a plea deal that was reoffered by State on remand, after a federal habeas court found that Defendant had received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, because his counsel failed to advise Defendant that he was subject to a mandatory life sentence. State then reoffered the 20-year plea deal to charge of attempted armed robbery, a Class 1 felony that would not trigger mandatory life imprisonment. Trial court had discretion to reject details of plea, but that discretion was limited by the requirement that remedy had to neutralize the taint of constitutional violation, and did not extend to rejecting a plea to a charge that did not trigger a mandatory life sentence. (HOLDRIDGE and CARTER, concurring.)
Defendant, who has a record of minor, nonviolent offenses, broke window of a truck and stole hat and 2 packs of cigarettes. As Defendant qualified for Class X sentencing, his conviction resulted in sentence of 10 1/2 years. As sentence does not reflect trivial nature of offense, and is not necessary to protect the public, sentence is reduced to minimum of 6 years. (PUCINSKI, concurring; MASON, dissenting.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his 8-year sentence on drug conspiracy charge, after finding that defendant qualified as career offender under sentencing guidelines based upon his prior convictions for attempted murder and attempted armed robbery, which Dist. Ct. viewed as “crimes of violence” under residual clause set forth in section 4B1.2 of USSG. While defendant argued that instant residual clause was unconstitutionally vague, instant residual clause survived similar vagueness challenge in Beckles, 137 S.Ct. 886 due to advisory nature of sentencing guidelines. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument that career offender guideline was effectively mandatory (and was thus subject to his vagueness challenge) at time of his sentencing.