Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether defendant was entitled to new sentencing hearing, where defendant was sentencing to 50-year term of incarceration on 1^st degree murder conviction, and where defendant had committed said offense when he was 16 years old. While trial court dismissed defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief that challenged his sentencing on 8^th Amendment grounds, Appellate Court, in reversing trial court and remanding matter for new sentencing hearing, essentially agreed with defendant that his sentence violated 8^th Amendment because it effectively was de facto mandatory life sentence that was prohibited under Reyes, 407 Ill.Dec. 452. Appellate Court further noted that while trial court exercised discretion when imposing original sentence, it failed to take into account how children are different than adults, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to lifetime in prison. In its petition for leave to appeal, govt. argued that defendant’s release at 66 years of age would not indisputably translate into life without parole sentence.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress gun seized from his home pursuant to search warrant seeking to find evidence of drug distribution committed by third-party. While defendant argued that issuance of search warrant was not supported by any evidence indicating that criminal activity had transpired in his home, Appellate Court found sufficient connection between defendant’s home and criminal activity to support issuance of search warrant, where: (1) police observed third-party leave defendant’s home while undercover officer spoke with third-party to set up imminent drug transaction; and (2) police then observed third-party walk from defendant’s home to location of drug transaction. Police also had observed in another drug transaction defendant’s use of vehicle that was registered to defendant’s home. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to reinstate his petition for post-conviction relief, where said motion was filed 10 years after defendant had voluntarily dismissed said petition, and where trial court held belief that defendant’s motion to reinstate was time-barred as matter of law because defendant had filed it more than one year after his petition for post-conviction relief had been voluntarily dismissed. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that trial court had discretion to grant instant motion to reinstate if defendant had sufficiently pleaded that delay was not due to his culpable negligence, and that remand was required for trial court to make said determination.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly instructed jury in instant trial on charge of drug-induced homicide that govt. must prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant’s acts were “contributing cause of death” (as opposed to but for cause of death), where govt. had charged defendant with delivering heroin that caused victim’s death, and where record showed that defendant had given victim cocaine shortly before her death. Appellate Court found that while trial court should have followed Burrage, 134 S.Ct. 881, that disapproved “contributing cause” language in jury instruction, since jury could have based conviction on theory of causation that relied on level of proof that was less that proof beyond reasonable doubt, Appellate Court found that any error was harmless, where instruction focused jury on defendant’s delivery of heroin and not on her act of delivering cocaine, and where parties stressed that delivery of heroin was gravamen of instant charged offense, and that defendant could not be convicted based on delivery of cocaine.

This case presents question as to whether Appellate Court properly refused to address on jurisdictional grounds defendant’s claim on appeal that trial court erred in denying his petition for post-conviction relief alleging that trial court had improperly failed to credit him with 183 days for time spent committed as unfit person. Appellate Court determined that instant request for presentence custody credit under section 5-8-7 of Unified Code of Corrections, 730 ILCS 5/5/-8-7, cannot be raised for first time on appeal from post-conviction proceedings. Moreover, Appellate Court observed that defendant may petition trial court to correct any non-substantial matters of inadvertence or mistake.

This case presents question as to whether Appellate Court properly dismissed on jurisdictional grounds defendant’s appeal of trial court order denying his pro se motion to correct mittimus that sought additional days of presentence credit, where defendant had failed to file said motion within 30 days of his sentencing, and where defendant had abandoned said issue on appeal and raised for first time on appeal issue as to whether certain fines and fees had been properly assessed. Appellate Court found that dismissal of appeal was appropriate because denial of defendant’s motion to correct mittimus was not appealable order under instant factual setting, and because defendant had failed to file motion to correct mittimus within 30 days as required under Rule 604(d).