Criminal Law

People v. Hunter

Illinois Supreme Court
Criminal Court
Juvenile Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
2017 IL 121306
Decision Date: 
Thursday, November 30, 2017
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co.
Holding: 
Appellate court affirmed.
Justice: 
THEIS

Defendant juveniles were sentenced prior to the new juvenile sentencing provisions, including subsection (b) which gives the trial court discretion not to impose otherwise mandatory firearm sentencing enhancements.  Subsection (b) of the new juvenile sentencing provisions mitigates punishment because the potential sentence is "less severe" than under the prior sentencing scheme. Thus, Defendants are not eligible to be sentenced under subsection (b). Because amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) of Juvenile Court Act (which eliminated armed robbery while armed with a firearm and aggravated vehicular hijacking while armed with a firearm, offenses of which that Defendant had been convicted, from the list of automatic transfer offenses) became effective after one juvenile Defendant's trial court proceedings were concluded, because no reversible error necessitates remand for further proceedings to which the amended statute could apply, and because that Defendant is no longer subject to jurisdiction of juvenile court, that amendment does not apply retroactively in that Defendant's case.(KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and BURKE, concurring.)

People v. Staake

Illinois Supreme Court
Criminal Court
Speedy Trial
Citation
Case Number: 
2017 IL 121755
Decision Date: 
Thursday, November 30, 2017
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
Schuyler Co.
Holding: 
Appellate court affirmed.
Justice: 
THOMAS

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2nd degree murder in stabbing death, and was sentenced to 18 years. The 1st-degree murder charge was not a new and additional charge, and it thus relates back to the original 2nd degree murder charge. Any delays attributable to Defendant on initial charge are also attributable to him on subsequent charge. As no speedy-trial violation occurred, trial counsel's failure to raise a speedy-trial claim was neither deficient nor prejudicial. (KARMEIER, FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

People v. Casas

Illinois Supreme Court
Criminal Court
Bail Bond
Citation
Case Number: 
2017 IL 120797
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, December 5, 2017
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
DuPage Co.
Holding: 
Appellate court reversed; remanded.
Justice: 
FREEMAN

After indictment and subsequent superseding information against Defendant for violation of bail bond, court dismissed information for failure to comply with statute of limitations. Violation of bail bond is a continuing offense. Once Defendant was convicted and sentenced, his obligation to appear terminated and he was no longer violating his bail bond. Court properly found that State's information for violation of bail bond was filed after limitations period had expired. (KARMEIER, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

People v. Brown

Illinois Supreme Court
Criminal Court
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Citation
Case Number: 
2017 IL 121681
Decision Date: 
Thursday, November 30, 2017
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
Champaign Co.
Holding: 
Appellate court affirmed; circuit court affirmed.
Justice: 
KILBRIDE

Defendant, who entered a fully negotiated guilty plea to charge of being an armed habitual criminal, and was sentenced to 18 years, challenged his plea counsel's performance in a postconviction petition. Defendant claimed reliance on his plea counsel's erroneous advise that he would serve only 50% of 18-year sentence if he pled guilty to that charge. Defendant failed to establish requisite showing of prejudice because he did not show that a decision to reject his plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances of his case. Without requisite substantial showing of a constitutional violation, Defendant is not entitled to evidentiary hearing on his postconviction petition. (KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

U.S. v. Oberg

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 17-1546
Decision Date: 
December 1, 2017
Federal District: 
S.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed

Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing 30-year sentence on charges of sexual exploitation of minor and possession of visual depictions of minor under age 12 engaging in sexually explicit conduct, where said charges arose out of discovery of 337 photographs and three sexually explicit videos of defendant’s 5-year-old daughter on defendant’s computer. Instant sentence was within applicable guideline range, and although defendant argued that instant sentencing range was unduly severe, and that instant sentence was substantively unreasonable, where he had no relevant criminal history and no history of participating in similar conduct with other victims, Dist. Ct. could properly reject defendant’s policy argument that guideline range imposed too lengthy sentences.  Moreover, Dist. Ct. could emphasize seriousness of instant offense when considering and then rejecting defendant’s arguments seeking lower sentence.

Adorno v. Melvin

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Due Process
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 16-2273
Decision Date: 
December 1, 2017
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Reversed

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s habeas petition challenging his attempted murder conviction on grounds that state-court trial judge deprived him of due process, where trial judge, in addressing prospective jurors, attempted to define “reasonable doubt” through reference to lesser preponderance of evidence standard, and where defendant argued that said remarks invited jurors to convict him on less than reasonable doubt standard. No reversible error occurred, where: (1) trial court told jurors that it was “up to you to decide in words” what reasonable doubt means; and (2) such directive was not tantamount to invitation to convict defendant on some lesser standard of proof.

U.S. v. Jehan

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 17-1779
Decision Date: 
November 28, 2017
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion under 18 USC section 3582(c)(2) to reduce his 240-month sentence on drug conspiracy charge, where Dist. Ct. properly found that defendant’s sentence was based on his binding guilty plea agreement and not on Guideline range affected by amendment to Sentencing Guidelines. While under Freeman, 131 S.Ct. 2685, defendants who enter into binding plea agreements might be entitled to sentencing reduction where sentence imposed under agreement was based on amended Guideline range, Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that his sentence was based on Guideline sentencing range, where plea agreement did not expressly link defendant’s offense level and criminal history to original 300-month sentence imposed in instant case. As such, said sentence could not be based on Guidelines, and thus was not eligible for further reduction under section 3582(c)(2). Fact that plea agreement provided for possibility of Rule 35(b) reduction in sentence did not require different result.

People v. Coleman

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Appellate Jurisdiction
Citation
Case Number: 
2017 IL App (4th) 160770
Decision Date: 
Monday, November 27, 2017
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
Macon Co.
Holding: 
Appeal dismissed.
Justice: 
APPLETON

Defendant, who was convicted of unlawful delivery of cocaine after having prior conviction of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, filed pro se motion for additional presentence credit, which trial court denied. Because Defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal, appellate court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. The final judgment in a criminal case is the entry of the sentence. Trial court entered 2nd amended sentencing judgment, and under Rule 606(b), Defendant had 30 days after that date to file either a motion directed against the judgment or a notice of appeal. Nunc pro tunc orders may be used to correct clerical errors, but may not be used to challenge a court's previous decision. (HARRIS and STEIGMANN, concurring.)

People v. Grant

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Appellate Jurisdiction
Citation
Case Number: 
2017 IL App (4th) 150636
Decision Date: 
Monday, November 27, 2017
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
Vermilion Co.
Holding: 
Appeal dismissed.
Justice: 
APPLETON

Because Defendant, who pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, did not file a timely Rule 604(d) motion after his guilty plea, trial court retained jurisdiction only to "correct clerical errors or matters of form", including to consider Defendant's motion to amend mittimus, but not to review any substantive issue. However, that jurisdiction does not automatically extend to the appellate court. Trial court's order denying motion to amend mittimus is not a final order for purposes of appeal. Thus, because Defendant filed no Rule 604(d) motion, appellate court has no jurisdiction to review that order denying motion. (TURNER and STEIGMANN, concurring.)

Frentz v. Brown

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 15-3479
Decision Date: 
November 22, 2017
Federal District: 
S.D. Ind., Indianapolis Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert insanity defense. While trial counsel argued at trial that defendant lacked required mental state when defendant shot his housemate at time when defendant was in process of quitting his extensive drinking and was suffering withdrawal symptoms that included medication and hallucinations, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying habeas petition, even though defendant presented expert at hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief, who stated that defendant was not of sound mind at time of murder, where Dist. Ct. could discount said defendant’s expert after finding that said opinion was based on incomplete information. Moreover, defendant’s expert did not establish that trial counsel had reason to believe that defendant met insanity standard under Indiana law at time of trial, and trial counsel’s decision not to present insanity defense was within spectrum of permissible trial strategy, where: (1) expert hired by trial counsel could not say that defendant was suffering from hallucinations at time of murder; and (2) defendant changed his story several times about said murder, including giving inconsistent declarations as to whether he shot victim, which suggested that defendant was lucid at all times and was attempting to hide his own actions.