Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants' habeas petitions that challenged their 180-month terms of incarceration on firearm charges, where both sentences were based, in part, on finding that each defendant qualified as armed career criminal under Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) due, in part, to their Illinois convictions for residential burglary. While both defendants claimed that their convictions did not qualify as “generic burglaries” under ACCA because either mobile homes or trailers did not qualify as “structures,” Ct. of Appeals found that trailers and mobile homes are “structures” where trailers/mobile homes are used by people as dwellings that are covered by Ill. residential-burglary statute. As such, said offense qualified as generic burglary under section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), and thus both defendants were properly sentenced as armed career criminals.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his 276-month term of incarceration on drug and firearms charges, where said sentence was based, in part, on finding that defendant qualified for sentencing treatment as armed career criminal under Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). While defendant argued that his prior Illinois conviction for attempted murder did not qualify as “violent felony” under ACCA since it could be committed without use of force, Ct. of Appeals found that said offense did qualify as violent felony under ACCA, where: (1) offense of murder qualified as violent felony; and (2) attempt to commit murder also qualified as violent felony since substantive offense of murder is violent felony under section 924(e) of ACCA. Ct. further noted that conviction of attempted murder required proof of intent to commit all elements of completed crime.

Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 120-month term of incarceration on drug distribution charge, where said sentence was based, in part, on Dist. Ct.’s finding that defendant qualified for supervisory role enhancement under section 3B1.1(c) of USSG. Defendant’s isolated, one-time request to another independent drug dealer to cover for him on drug sale did not make defendant “supervisor” or “manager” for purposes of section 3B1.1(c). Moreover, error was not harmless since instant enhancement disqualified defendant from obtaining any safety-valve relief from his statutory minimum sentence. Fact that defendant told other dealer where to pick up drugs and where to deliver them and pick up money did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 15-year term of incarceration on illegal possession of firearm charge, where Dist. Ct. based said sentence on finding that defendant qualified as armed career offender under Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) that was based, in part, on defendant’s prior Indiana Class B burglary of dwelling conviction. Said conviction qualified as violent felony under ACCA, since said offense had all elements of generic burglary as contemplated under 18 USC section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) plus element requiring proof that defendant committed said offense either while armed with deadly weapon or while defendant was in building that qualified as “dwelling.” Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that instant Indiana conviction did not qualify as violent felony because Indiana’s definition of “dwelling” was broader than generic building or structure as contemplated under ACCA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing without evidentiary hearing defendant’s habeas petition challenging his wire fraud conviction on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to govt.’s exclusion of prospective African-American juror, who indicated that he was attorney who was “very close to multiple criminal lawyers and some prosecutors.” Defendant could not establish prima facie case of race discrimination arising out of said exclusion, where defendant could not show that govt. allowed other lawyers outside instant protected classification to remain on jury. Also, Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire expert to rebut amount of loss attributable to defendant that arose out of wire fraud scheme, since defendant failed to present evidence indicating that said loss would have been under $400,000 threshold level used by Dist. Ct. to calculate instant 168-month sentence.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s habeas petition challenging his rape/murder conviction on ground that state trial court improperly admitted his confession, which he claimed was involuntary. While record contained factors that would support finding that confession was involuntary, including fact that defendant was 16 at time of confession, that he had IQ in low 80s, that his confession contained inconsistencies, and that interrogators gave broad assurances that honesty would produce leniency, record also contained factors suggesting that confession was voluntary, including fact that interrogators gave no specific promise of leniency, that defendant spoke freely to interrogators with his mother’s consent after receiving Miranda warnings, that interrogations took place in comfortable settings without physical coercion or intimidation over brief period of time, and that defendant provided many damning details in response to open-ended questions. As such, state-court’s determination that defendant’s confession was voluntary was reasonable, and federal courts cannot declare state-court factual determinations to be unreasonable merely because federal courts would have reached different conclusion. Also, defendant failed to present any case law that condemned specific techniques used by interrogators against defendant. (Dissent opinions filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in imposing concurrent sentences on charges of conspiracy to distribute child pornography and conspiracy to sexually exploit child, where Dist. Ct. also imposed sentence on charge of engaging in child-exploitation enterprise. Instant conspiracy charges were lesser-included/predicate offenses for instant enterprise charge, and thus imposing any sentences for conspiracy offenses would violate Double Jeopardy Clause, since sentences on conspiracy charges would constitute separate sentences for same enterprise offense. Upon remand, Dist. Ct. is directed to vacate either greater or lesser counts and to enter new judgments. (Amended opinion.)