Defendant pled guilty to predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, and was sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment. Defense counsel's failure to object to de minimis amount of monetary assessments ($57) did not constitute constitutionally deficient performance.(WRIGHT, specially concurring; LYTTON, dissenting.)
Respondent was found to be a sexually violent person (SVP), and after dispositional hearing he was committed to institutional care in a secure facility. Court considered all evidence before it and weighed factors accordingly, and court did not abuse its discretion in denying Respondent's request for conditional release. Respondent's notice of appeal is considered timely filed; on last day to file notice of appeal, upon Respondent informing court that he wanted to appeal, court ordered clerk to file a notice of appeal, but clerk failed to do so until 2 days later. As SVP proceedings are quasi-criminal, Respondent should have been able to justifiably rely on court's directive that clerk was to file a timely notice of appeal.(CARTER and McDADE, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of 1st-degree murder. Court properly denied Defendant leave to file a successive pro se postconviction petition. Defendant has not asserted a colorable claim of actual innocence, as affidavits filed by Defendant do not raise the probability that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found Defendant guilty. Affidavits are not from eyewitnesses to the offense, and thus they do not directly contradict prior statements of State's 2 eyewitnesses. (BURKE, concurring; ELLIS, dissenting.)
Record contained sufficient evidence to support guilty verdict on charge of conspiracy to defraud govt., where defendant-attorney submitted asylum applications from his clients that contained either fabricated allegations or exaggerated facts regarding extent of persecution that clients had endured. Record showed that defendant in nine asylum proceedings/interviews had employed interpreter who spoon-fed answers to clients and incorrectly translated clients’ responses to provide more favorable, but untruthful answers. Fact that Dist. Ct. had vacated all three substantive convictions for providing false statements related to one asylum application did not require that his conspiracy conviction be vacated, since: (1) crime of conspiracy focuses on agreement itself; (2) failing to achieve conspiracy’s goal does not negate underlying agreement; and (3) defendant’s client admitted to lying during his asylum interview. Also, any variance between allegations contained in conspiracy indictment and evidence at trial was immaterial, since there was sufficient evidence to establish one conspiracy to defraud govt.
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.Court conducted an in camera hearing on his pretrial motion to disclose the surveillance location from where a police officer allegedly observed him commit the offense. During hearing, officer revealed his surveillance location generally but court erred in not ascertaining officer's specific surveillance point. Precise surveillance location is necessary for court to properly apply the burden-shifting approach and balance public interest in keeping location secret against Defendant's interest in preparing defense for trial. Court erred in allowing scope of in camera hearing to expand into matters unrelated to officer's surveillance location outside presence of Defendant and his counsel, violating Defendant's right to confrontation. Court erred in allowing State to appear during and participate in the in camera hearing.(McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying with prejudice defendant’s habeas petition challenging his Wisconsin first degree intentional murder conviction under circumstances where: (1) defendant filed habeas petition that contained three claims that had not been exhausted in state court and three claims that had been exhausted in state court; (2) Dist. Ct. denied defendant’s request to stay and hold his petition in abeyance so that he could return to state court to fully exhaust his state court remedies as to certain claims; and (3) Dist. Ct. denied habeas petition on exhausted claims where said claims lacked any merit. Defendant’s apparent strategy of splitting his claims into groups that had and had not been exhausted in state court was inconsistent with AEDPA’s goal of streamlining habeas proceedings. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s stay motion, where defendant’s intent at time he sought said stay had effect of delaying exhaustion of state court remedies as to certain claims in hope of reinstating his direct appeal rights on other claims. Thus, Dist. Ct. properly denied instant stay request and dismiss habeas petition, even though said dismissal would preclude habeas review of defendant’s unexhausted claims.
In prosecution on drug distribution charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing as term of supervised release requirement that defendant remain within jurisdiction of Dist. Ct. where he was being supervised. Instant condition was administrative in nature and can be imposed whenever Dist. Ct. adequately explains need for supervised release in first instance, and record showed that Dist. Ct. adequately explained need for supervised release after defendant’s release from prison. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion by failing to include scienter requirement that would limit violations only to “knowing” departures from Dist. Ct.’s geographical judicial district, since there was no contention that defendant lived on or near border of two judicial districts. Remand, though, was required for Dist. Ct. to correct scrivener’s error in written sentencing order, which failed to include Dist. Ct.’s definition of “excessive” use of alcohol in term of supervised release calling for defendant to refrain from excessive use of alcohol.
Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on drug conspiracy charge stemming from scheme in which defendants and others planned to rob fictional drug stash house, under circumstances where govt. agent initially recruited one individual tp rob said stash house and where said individual recruited others, who then recruited defendant. Co-conspirator testified that: (1) defendant participated in meeting to plan robbery of fictional drug stash house; (2) plan called for potential use of guns and for defendant to be one of three individuals to actually rob said house; and (3) defendant inquired as to whether fictional guard to said house would have to be shot. Moreover, while there was no precise testimony as to what defendant said during said planning meeting, co-conspirator’s testimony established that defendant had participated in planning robbery, had known of existence of conspiracy and agreed to become part of it, and took substantial step toward accomplishing robbery by riding in transport van and donning latex gloves that formed part of plan. Fact that co-conspirator made agreement with govt. to provide favorable testimony did not require different result. Also, record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on unlawful possession of firearm charge, even though record lacked evidence showing that defendant had actually held firearms that had been gathered to facilitate said robbery, since, under Pinkerton theory of liability, defendant is liable for foreseeable criminal conduct of co-conspirators who possessed said firearms, where, as here, use of firearms was essential part of robbery plan.
Court entered 2nd-stage dismissal of his postconviction petition, without evidentiary hearing. Defendant made a substantial showing that he was not culpably negligent for untimely filing of his postconviction petition. Thus, court erred in dismissing petition as untimely. Defendant made a substantial showing of constitutional violations as to 2 issues in his petition: that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his alibi witness, and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge his extended-term sentence of 50 years based on Apprendi. Case remanded for 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing on these 3 issues. (PIERCE and SIMON, concurring.)
Court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was pursuant to a partially negotiated plea agreement. A defendant, who entered into a partially negotiated plea agreement, may challenge his sentence on basis that court relied on improper sentencing factors without withdrawing his guilty plea. Rules of forfeiture should be relaxed in this instance, in light of lack of clarity as to Defendant’s Rule 604(d) rights and obligations. Plain error analysis applies, as court considered multiple improper factors which raises seriousness of court’s error. (STEIGMANN and APPLETON, concurring.)