Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of delivery of a controlled substance at a truck stop and delivery of a controlled substance. Defense counsel's performance was not objectively unreasonable due to his counsel's failure to request an informant instruction, as Illinois law neither encourages nor requires it. Court would not have abused its discretion by refusing to tender proposed informant instruction. State did not commit prosecutorial misconduct in its direct examination of paid informant, as to her prior drug addiction and sobriety, as it was a probable basis for impeachment. State did not commit prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument as to remarks about informant's prior addiction; prosecutor did not  personally vouch for informant's credibility, and were a response to defense counsel's remarks about her credibility. Court properly refused entrapment instruction, as Defendant failed to admit to each element to offenses of delivery (by accountability).  (APPLETON and KNECHT, concurring.)

Court's order granting successive postconviction petition filed by Defendant was proper. Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st-degree murder of 3 -1/2 month old infant for whom she was caring in day care.Testimony of forensic pathologist in federal habeas corpus proceedings and at evidentiary hearing was material evidence for Brady purposes, because it could reasonably be taken to put case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in verdict. This testimony contradicted pediatrician's testimony that infant's injuries could only have been caused by forces like shaking. (LYTTON and McDADE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of burglary and 1 count of possession of burglary tools. Court’s refusal to instruct jury on lesser included offense of theft is reversible error. Evidence would permit the jury to rationally conclude that Defendant was guilty of theft but not of burglary; there was no direct evidence establishing Defendant’s entry into business’s property. Theft was included in the indictment such that the lesser offense of theft is “included”. (HUTCHINSON and SPENCE, concurring.)

Respondent was adjudicated a sexually violent person in 2009. Court properly denied, without an evidentiary hearing, Respondent’s petition for conditional release. Although Respondent did complete some additional therapy, he was still in 2^nd stage of a 5-stage program deemed necessary and appropriate. Court properly found that Respondent had not shown that it was no longer substantially probable that he would engage in acts of sexual violence were he released. (HUDSON and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated battery of a nurse. Evidence, even viewed in light most favorable to State, does not show that Defendant intended to cause bodily harm to nurse. Circumstantial evidence and Defendant’s conduct on evening in question do not support inference that Defendant intended to strike nurse. State provided insufficient evidence that Defendant had the requisite intent to cause bodily harm to nurse or to make physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with her. (NEVILLE, concurring; HYMAN, specially concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to residential burglary and 2 counts of aggravated battery. Defendant later moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that counsel had incorrectly advised him as to legal standards for residential burglary. Court erred in not appointing new counsel to pursue Defendant’s pro se claim of ineffective of counsel. None of the 3 certificates filed by counsel was strictly compliant with Rule 604(d). (SCHMIDT, concurring; WRIGHT, dissenting.)

Defendant pled guilty to 1 count of 1^st-degree murder, but later filed motion to withdraw his plea. Because December 2015 amendment to Rule 604(d) was procedural, it applies retroactively to Defendant’s case. As defense counsel’s August 2015 certificate did not state that counsel reviewed the report of proceedings from Defendant’s sentencing hearing, it failed to strictly comply with amended Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d). Remanded for opportunity to file a new motion to withdraw guilty plea and/or reconsider the sentence, and for a new hearing on Defendant’s postplea motion, and the filing of a corrected Rule 604(d) certificate.  Court erred in failing to award Defendant $5-per-day credit toward his fines for each day he spent in presentence custody.  Defendant is entitled to have $100 of his sentencing credit applied to fines, including the court-finance fee which is a fine. (TURNER and HARRIS, concurring.)