Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 4 counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse.Court did not violated Defendant's constitutional rights under confrontation clause by admitting child victim's videotaped statement into evidence at trial. Child victim was available for cross-examination at Defendant's jury trial as necessary to satisfy confrontation clause. Although victim did not testify in court as to all alleged acts of abuse by Defendant, that did not render his testimony inadmissible under confrontation clause. Victim was present for cross-examination as to her out of court statements. (HOLDRIDGE, concurring; SCHMIDT, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed robbery and sentenced as a habitual criminal to natural life. Court properly dismissed Defendant's pro se Section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment. Defendant was charged with armed robbery with a firearm but convicted of armed robbery with a dangerous weapon. Court properly applied preamended statute of armed robbery with a dangerous weapon. A person can be found guilty of armed robbery if committing robbery while armed either with a firearm or "other" dangerous weapons. A firearm is itself a dangerous weapon. (REYES, concurring; HALL, specially concurring.)

Defendant was charged with 2 counts of DUI. Court properly granted Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Evidence shows that Defendant's acceding to officer's direction to exit the car and perform field sobriety tests was not consensual. At the point where Defendant submitted to the direction to exist car to perform field sobriety tests, there was a seizure unsupported by a reasonable, articulabel suspicion.(BIRKETT and SPENCE, concurring.)

Court properly denied Defendant's motion to quash search warrant and suppress evidence. Police officer had filed complaint for warrant to search a person, a vehicle, and Defendant's residence. Complaint included affidavit of officer, averring that he purchased cocaine from Defendant in an undercover capacity on 3 different occasions. Affidavit sufficiently connected Defendant's drug activity to Defendant's residence, and judge had substantial basis to find probable cause to issue warrant for Defendant's residence. Officers' constant surveillance showed that Defendant left the residence and sold cocaine to officer without making any stops before the transaction, and Defendant was seen using a vehicle registered to the residence to conduct a separate drug transaction. (LYTTON, concurring; O'BRIEN, dissenting.)

Section 122-1(f) of Post-Conviction Hearing Act permits a defendant to file a successive postconviction petition only if the defendant can demonstrate cause and prejudice, by alleging facts to explain why claims being asserted could not have been raised in initial postconviction petition. Whether this prima facie showing has been made is a question of law to be independently determined by the circuit court. Defendant failed to show cause and prejudice for not raising his claims, including his claim of actual innocence. (KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and THEIS, concurring.)

Court erred in dismissing Defendant's pro se Section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment. Court denied Defendant due process in granting State's motion to dismiss Defendant's Section 2-1401 petition without allowing Defendant notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. Court's failure to allow Defendant to respond was inherently prejudicial and undermined integrity of proceedings, and matter must be remanded for further proceedings without consideration of merits of Defendant's petition.Fines were improperly imposed by circuit clerk, and are thus vacated. (TURNER and APPLETON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery with a firearm after jury trial. Prior to being allowed to represent himself, Defendant was admonished under Rule 401(a) but was incorrectly informed of potential maximum sentence of the charged offense. Despite court’s incorrect statement as to potential sentence, court substantially complied with Rule 401(a), and Defendant made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of counsel prior to being allowed to proceed pro se. Defendant did not show that State prevented grand jury from returning a meaningful indictment by misleading or coercing it. Evidence was sufficient to prove that codefendant possessed a firearm, as defined in FOID Act, during the robbery. Court did not err by not admitting codefendant’s statement to detective, because Defendant did not seek its admission after codefendant invoked his 5^th amendment right not to testify. (KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant received sentence of life without parole for a murder he committed at age 17. Defendant’s original sentencing hearing complied with U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 holding in Miller v. Alabama, as court considered Defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics, including specific factors. Defendant advised his attorney that he did not want to offer any mitigating evidence, and thus court had no evidence to consider on any statutory factors in mitigation. Circuit court properly denied Defendant’s motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition. (KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and BURKE, concurring.)