Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to rescind his statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license, where defendant was charged with driving under influence of drugs. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that defendant’s statement to arresting officer that he was diabetic, as well as officer’s concession that he had no training or experience in DUI drugs, was enough to establish prima facie case supporting rescission, especially where trial court had denied govt.’s motion for directed finding in hearing on said motion. As such, Appellate Court found that: (1) officer would not have been able to form reliable opinion as to cause of defendant’s semi-conscious state at scene of arrest; and (2) govt. had failed to rebut instant prima facie case. In its petition for leave to appeal, govt. argued that other evidence at arrest scene, including presence of syringe, track marks on defendant’s arm and can that field-tested for presence of cocaine created indicia of defendant’s drug use. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress drugs found in defendant’s apartment, where police officer had obtained search warrant after officer used drug-detection dog to sniff doors in unlocked common hallway of apartment building, and where said dog alerted for presence of drugs while sniffing defendant’s front door. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that police had violated defendant’s 4^th Amendment rights when he entered common-area of hallway and conducted instant dog sniff, where said actions constituted warrantless “search” for purposes of 4^th Amendment. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly allowed defendant to represent himself during post-conviction hearing, under circumstances where: (1) defendant had refused to cooperate with two different assistant defenders; (2) defendant had obtained several continuances to unsuccessfully obtain private counsel; and (3) trial counsel had failed to warn defendant that his continued misconduct could result in waiver of his statutory right to counsel. Appellate Court, in reversing denial of defendant’s post-conviction petition and remanding matter for appointment of new counsel, found that trial court should have given said warning at time defendant was still represented by assistant defender and prior to time trial court allowed assistant defender to withdraw from case. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s pro se motion to reconsider denial of his post-conviction petition that had been filed on defendant’s behalf by privately retained counsel, where defendant attempted to raise new claims in his motion to reconsider. Appellate Court found that: (1) defendant was prohibited from raising new issues in motion to reconsider denial of his post-conviction petition and must instead file motion seeking leave to file successive post-conviction petition; and (2) defendant could not assert ineffective assistance of counsel claim at first stage of post-conviction process, even though defendant argued that original petition was frivolous. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that where, as here, there was disagreement between him and his retained counsel as to whether additional issues should be included in original post-conviction petition, counsel should have either included his proposed issues in original post-conviction petition or told him that he would be better off filing pro se petition if he wanted said issues to be considered by court.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call certain witness, where said petition failed to contain affidavit from said witness. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that dismissal of defendant’s post-conviction petition was proper, since 725 ILCS section 122-2 required that petition include affidavit from witness that indicated substance of witness’s proposed testimony. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant contended that failure to include witness’s affidavit was not fatal to his post-conviction petition, where other documentation would have supported his ineffective assistance of counsel argument.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied request by intervenors (newspaper and radio station) to open for public inspection 4^th and 5^th motions in limine filed under seal by defendant in criminal proceeding. Appellate Court found that: (1) instant motions in limine seeking exclusion of prejudicial and irrelevant evidence were subject to presumption of public access under First Amendment when trial court had granted defendant leave to file said motions in limine; and (2) trial court erred in finding that said presumption did not attach to instant motions. As such, Appellate Court remanded matter back to trial court for determination as to whether said presumption was rebutted by finding that request for disclosure was made for improper purpose.

This case presents question as to whether Appellate Court properly found that defendant forfeited any issues regarding whether trial court properly assessed Sheriff’s fees, deoxyribonucleic acid fee and Crime Stopper’s assessment, where defendant failed to raise said issue in trial court. Appellate Court found that plain-error doctrine did not apply so as to permit review of imposition of instant charges, since said charges were fees as opposed to fines. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that said imposition of fees was erroneous in light of his indigent status, and that Appellate Court could have granted him relief outside of plain-error doctrine as matter of promoting judicial economy.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly assessed defendant charges consisting of: (1) $190 “Felony Complaint Filed“; (2) $15 “Automation (Clerk);” (3) $15 “Documents Storage (Clerk);” (4) $25 “Court Services (Sheriff);” (5) $2 “Public Defender Records Automation;” and (6) $2 “State’s Attorney Records Automation.” Appellate Court concluded that said charges were essentially “fees” (because they represented part of cost incurred in prosecuting defendant) that were not subject to defendant’s $5-per-day presentence custody credit. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that said charges were intended to finance various aspects of court system, as thus were fines that were subject to his $5-per-day presentence custody credit.