Criminal Law

After jury trial, Defendant was convicted of, inter alia, aggravated domestic battery. Fifteen years prior to incident, Defendant and victim (who had known each other for 20 years) dated for 2 years and at time of incident were friends. After a night of drinking together, and having sex, victim slept over at Defendant’s home, and Defendant stabbed and strangled victim the next morning. Legislature’s decision not to include a time limit on former dating relationships, when applied to facts of this case, was reasonable and rationally related to statutory purpose of curbing domestic violence. Definition of family or household members in Section 12-0.9 of Criminal Code did not violate substantive due process as applied to Defendant. It was reasonable to place victim within protection of aggravated domestic battery statute. (KARMEIER, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, based on his failure to possess a FOID card, and was sentenced to 24 months probation. Court admitted a “Certification” from a state employee, which stated that a search of State’s records revealed that Defendant did not possess a FOID card.Because Defendant affirmatively stated that he had no objection to admission of “Certification”, no 6^th amendment (right to confront witnesses) error by court in admitting it. No ineffective assistance of counsel in defense counsel’s decision not to object to “Certification”, as it was a matter of trial strategy. Any alleged error as to admission of “Certification” was invited by Defendant’s own trial tactics, as defense counsel repeatedly stated Defendant had no objection to its admission. (McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1^st degree murder of his wife; he brutally beat her after learning of her affair with a former coworker. Defense counsel’s cross-examination of expert witnesses as to type of injuries victim suffered and possible effects of cocaine in exacerbating injuries show that defense counsel engaged in reasonable investigation of case and possible defenses. On cross-examination, Defendant denied that he and wife had exchanged “sexy pictures” text messages, which opened the door to questioning by State on cross-examination and was relevant to Defendant’s truthfulness, as evidence showed that Defendant and his wife had done so in immediate days before their fight. (NEVILLE and MASON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Where a defendant fails to raise a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, court need not and should not conduct a Krankel hearing. A trial court may discuss the impact a drug offense has on the community without subjecting the defendant to double enhancement.  (APPLETON and KNECHT, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with 4 counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against 6-year-old girl. After a 3-day trial, jury, after less than 3 hours’ deliberation, communicated to court, through bailiff, that it was at an “impasse”. Without notifying State and defense, judge directed bailiff to instruct jury to continue deliberating. After total 5 hours deliberation, with many interruptions, foreman reported in open court that jury was still at an impasse. Court denied State’s and Defendant’s request to give People v. Prim instruction for juries in disagreement, and court sua sponte declared a mistrial. Defense counsel had made clear his request that trial continue, so pro forma objection to mistrial was not necessary. Judge’s ex parte jury communication led to precipitous declaration of a mistrial without considering available alternatives, and deprived Defendant of his fundamental rights and prejudiced Defendant. As judicial indiscretion, rather than manifest necessity, prompted the mistrial, reprosecution is barred. No manifest necessity for declaration of mistrial. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Court entered 2^nd-stage dismissal of amended postconviction petition. Petition fails to show Defendant was prejudiced by advice his trial counsel rendered; thus, independent claims of ineffective assistance must fail. As Defendant failed to allege grounds by which it is reasonably probable he would have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, his claim of ineffective assistance for trial counsel’s failure to file motion to withdraw his guilty plea must fail. Fines which circuit clerk improperly imposed Defendant are vacated; record is devoid of order authorizing imposition of fines. (STEIGMANN and APPLETON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated discharge of a firearm. Defendant had fired a handgun at 2 cars traveling nearby, while he was a passenger in a car. Defendant testified at trial that he fired only in self-defense, as he did not know that those 2 cars were driven by off-duty police officers, and after 1 officer fired a gun at his car. There was no evidence, except Defendant’s testimony, that either officer ever fired or even pointed a gun. Sentence was not excessive. Court did not “double-count" the act of Defendant firing the gun, but aggravated his sentence specifically to deter others from repeating Defendant’s actions. Plain language of statute indicates that Defendant must serve at least 85% of his 10-year sentence. (NEVILLE and PIERCE, concurring.)