Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for issuance of preliminary injunction in action seeking declaration that defendant’s ordinance prohibiting plaintiff from texting individual while driving violated her Due Process and 8^th Amendment rights. While plaintiff argued that defendant’s ordinance was preempted by Ill. statute that outlawed same conduct, record showed that defendant non-suited administrative proceeding that had resulted in $540 fine for said ordinance violation. As such, Dist. Ct. properly denied plaintiff’s request for issuance of preliminary injunction, since plaintiff had failed to show any irreparable harm, and plaintiff had adequate money damages remedy. Also, plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief, because: (1) plaintiff was unable to show any injury in fact to support any damages claim; and (2) plaintiff would have to violate Ill. statute of unquestioned validity in order to be subjected to any future injury. Plaintiff also could not establish due process claim, where she could not show any deprivation of property.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ section 1983 action alleging either that they were subjected to malicious prosecution on gun possession charges, that they were victims of false arrest or that defendants had violated their 4^th Amendment rights arising out of search of their home. Plaintiff could not prevail on malicious prosecution claim against defendant-police officer since: (1) criminal indictment on instant gun charges severed any causal connection between prosecution and defendant’s conduct; and (2) record failed to link any of defendant’s actions to indictment process. Moreover, plaintiff could not prevail on his 4^th Amendment claim alleging that certain defendants conducted search of his home that caused unreasonable property damage, where plaintiff was unable to identify which defendants had actually caused said damage. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s suggestion that all defendants should have been required to show that they did not cause any damage to his property. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison doctors’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his full tear in anterior cruciate ligament in his knee, under circumstances where said tear had been diagnosed in 2009, and where plaintiff was still waiting for surgery on said knee in 2014, when he filed instant lawsuit. While Dist. Ct. found that defendants’ prescribed treatment calling for pain medication, some physical therapy and various permits to alleviate stress to knee was adequate, Dist. Ct. ignored key evidence that would allow jury to find that defendants: (1) failed to follow outside medical advice on treatment for plaintiff’s knee and did nothing to assist plaintiff after noting that his knee condition had regressed; (2) ignored plaintiff’s claims that he had been approved for surgery; and (3) either failed to recommend any treatment for plaintiff or ignored plaintiff’s condition for long periods of time. Dist. Ct. also erred in granting defendant-warden’s summary judgment motion where plaintiff claimed that warden repeatedly took no action on plaintiff’s complaints concerning his knee.

Dist. Ct. erred in imposing $84,325 Rule 11 sanction against plaintiff for filing frivolous breach of contract action, under circumstances where plaintiff had no contract with defendant. Rule (11)(c)(2) requires party seeking Rule 11 sanctions to first serve proposed motion for sanction on opposing party and give opposing party at least 21 days to withdraw or correct offending pleading, and defendant failed to comply with procedure set forth in Rule 11(c)(2). Moreover, Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that it substantially complied with Rule 11(c)(2) when it sent two letters to plaintiff that contained both settlement demands and threats to file motion seeking Rule 11 sanctions if its demands were not met, since defendant’s Rule 11 threats did not offer plaintiff 21-day safe harbor to withdraw its contract claim. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman doctrine to consider plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that his six-day detainment arising out of defendants’ requirement that plaintiff have Lake County residence before he could be released on bail while being subject to electronic monitoring violated his 8^th and 14^th Amendment rights. Record showed that plaintiff had unsuccessfully litigated said bail bond requirement in state court on three separate occasions prior to filing instant lawsuit, and Rooker Feldman doctrine served to deprive Dist. Ct. of jurisdiction to consider instant lawsuit, where plaintiff essentially sought to set aside adverse state court judgments regarding his claim. Moreover, Ct. found that plaintiff’s claim of false imprisonment was inextricably intertwined with prior state court judgment, since there was no conceivable way to address plaintiff’s claim without overturning prior state court orders that kept plaintiff detained for lack of Lake County residence.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants had widespread custom or practice of using excessive force to require detainees such as plaintiff to change into jail-issued uniforms. While plaintiff provided testimony regarding her own experience with defendants, she presented only two statements by correctional officers, i.e., “we have to take their clothes away from them and give them their jumpsuit” and “we just take them off," that failed to support her claim that defendants had widespread practice of using excessive force. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s claim that challenged defendant’s policy requiring female detainees to wear either white underwear or no underwear at all that, according to plaintiff, violated her 4^th, 8^th and 14^th Amendment rights. Defendants’ sole rationale for such policy, i.e., precluding detainees from extracting ink from colored underwear to make tattoos, was not supported by any actual incident occurring at defendant’s jail. Moreover, record did not support Dist. Ct.’s view that such policy was in mainstream of practices followed by other prisons. As such, reasonable trier-of-fact could find that said policy was not rationally related to legitimate govt. objective and ran contrary to dignity of detainees, some of whom were forced to wear no underwear even during their menstrual cycle.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 5^th and 14^th Amendment rights by obtaining confession from him to murder charge, under circumstances where defendants had been aware that he had cognitive impairments, and where said confession was subsequently suppressed and murder charge dropped. Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, even though plaintiff argued that defendants had coerced his confession, since: (1) whether interrogation tactics are unconstitutionally coercive is inquiry that depends on specific facts of case; and (2) plaintiff failed to present any Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit precedent that puts constitutionality of defendants’ conduct “beyond debate.” Ct. further noted that in Cairel, 821 F.3d 823, it had recently rejected closely similar substantive due process claim based on interrogation of suspect with cognitive disability. Ct. also rejected defendant’s false arrest claim, where plaintiff conceded that defendants had probable cause to arrest him on obstruction charge, and where defendant was charged with murder at time defendant was still in custody on obstruction charge.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting motion for summary judgment filed by defendants-prison psychiatrist and psychologist in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical/mental needs by transferring him from prison mental health unit to prison’s segregation unit not because plaintiff was no longer in need of special mental treatment, but rather because plaintiff had complained about certain prison personnel. Decision based on easier and less efficacious medical treatment without exercising professional judgment can constitute deliberate indifference, especially where medical provider bases his or her treatment decision on personal animosity, and plaintiff’s testimony that defendants explicitly told him that he was transferred in response to his complaints was sufficient to raise triable issue as to defendants’ motivation for plaintiff’s transfer. Fact that plaintiff’s complaints had been directed to other prison personnel or that plaintiff may not have suffered physical injury did not require different result.

Plaintiff failed to state viable cause of action in claim alleging that defendants violated Illinois Consumer Fraud Act by producing eye drop product used to treat glaucoma, where said product had dosage that exceeded 16 microliters that plaintiff contended exceeded optimal size of dosage for treatment of glaucoma. Gist of plaintiff’s claim that price of eye drops is excessive because smaller dosage could be sold at lower price and still properly treat glaucoma, did not state valid claim for fraud, where: (1) plaintiff failed to allege that defendants colluded among each other to set price of eye drops; (2) plaintiffs could only assume that switch to selling smaller dosage of eye drops would decrease defendants’ profits; and (3) plaintiff failed to allege that defendants had misrepresented quality of their eye drops. Ct. further noted that FDA had previously determined that defendants’ product was safe and effective for treatment of glaucoma.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison medical provider’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiff-estate of deceased prisoner, alleging that defendant violated prisoner’s 8^th Amendment rights when prisoner died 37 days after he was initially incarcerated due to lack of medical care from defendant. Record showed that plaintiff suffered from serious medical conditions, including cancer, difficulty in swallowing, severe curvature of his spine, kidney disease and trouble walking, and record contained triable issue as to whether defendant’s failure to have policy in place to ensure that someone was responsible for coordinating plaintiff’s overall care violated his 8^th Amendment rights. Ct. further noted that defendant failed to generate medical treatment plan so that different members of prison’s medical staff could check plaintiff’s progress to detect problems in his oxygen and food intake, as well as his chronic renal disease. Dissent in case would affirm Dist. Ct.’s granting of summary judgment on ground that plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendant was deliberately indifferent to known risk that its policy (or lack of policy) would likely lead to constitutional violation, or that any lack of policy in plaintiff’s case was causation of his death.