Federal Civil Practice

Plaintiff lacked standing to appeal Dist. Ct. order denying his motion to certify class action in instant section 1983 lawsuit, where plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to provide him with judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of his arrest, and where plaintiff had accepted without qualification defendant’s $5,000 offer to settle plaintiff’s individual claim. Settlement amount excluded any attorney fees generated in plaintiff’s pursuit of class action, and, because settlement covered “all claims brought under this lawsuit,” plaintiff was not “aggrieved person” with personal stake in class action for purposes of standing to pursue instant appeal, where plaintiff failed to preserve for appeal any interest in class action incentive award and failed to demonstrate that he retained any interest in class action attorneys’ fees.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison medical personnel’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s tooth pain by refusing plaintiff’s request to have outside dentist extract his decayed tooth, where said refusal was based on money concerns. Defendant-prison dentist indicated that she was aware of anesthesia techniques that would have enabled her to successfully pull plaintiff’s tooth with minimal discomfort to him, and plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendant-prison dentist knew that her planned method of pulling plaintiff’s tooth either would be unsuccessful or would inflict more pain than alternative plan. Fact that outside dentist had previously pulled another tooth for plaintiff, after plaintiff had complained that local anesthetic administered by different prison dentist was ineffective in dulling his pain, did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison medical personnel’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent towards his pain following nine abdominal surgeries, as well as towards management of his diet and their alleged inattention to possible renal cell tumor. While defendants discontinued Vicodin prescription that had been ordered by outside doctor following plaintiff’s surgeries and substituted more Tylenol to treat plaintiff’s pain, medical records supported defendants’ claim that they attempted to manage plaintiff’s pain, and plaintiff otherwise failed to show that increased Tylenol did not alleviate his pain. Plaintiff also failed to show that defendants deprived him of adequate nutrition by failing to feed him eggs-only diet, as opposed to liquid diet, since: (1) defendants actively monitored plaintiff’s dietary needs following his surgeries; and (2) plaintiff was not entitled to dictate terms of his care. Moreover, plaintiff failed to show that defendants were indifferent with respect to their monitoring of his kidney condition, since plaintiff failed to show that blood and urine tests given to him substantially departed from accepted medical practices.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police detectives’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked justification under 4^th Amendment to stop and frisk him, where defendants explained that they did so based on tip from informant. Record showed that state court had granted plaintiff’s motion to suppress drugs found in his pocket pursuant to said stop and frisk and had dismissed all charges against plaintiff. Moreover, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment only after improperly making critical assumptions about facts that were unfavorable to plaintiff, when it concluded that: (1) informant had provided reliable information to defendants in past; (2) plaintiff made gesture to evade defendants; and (3) defendants had reasonable suspicion for purpose of detaining plaintiff and frisking him.

Ct. of Appeals denied Bankruptcy Trustee’s motion to dismiss his appeal and to remand case in light of Bankruptcy Ct.’s statement that it would approve settlement between parties, after parties had filed joint motion in Bankruptcy Ct. asking for indicative ruling as to whether it would approve their proposed settlement. While Trustee filed instant motion under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1, said Rule authorizes such relief only after Dist. Ct. has said it was inclined to grant motion that would otherwise be barred by pending appeal. As such, Trustee needs to obtain indicative ruling by Dist. Ct. in addition to instant indicative ruling by Bankruptcy Ct. before dismissal/remand of instant case can occur.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering judgment in defendants-prison officials’ favor in plaintiff-sex offender prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his 4^th Amendment rights by continuing to incarcerate him beyond his release date because plaintiff had refused parole requirement that he wear electronic-monitoring device, and because he had failed to secure residential-location that was in area where he could lawfully live because of his sex offender status. Under Morrisey, 408 US 471, state may rescind parole without hearing as long as it acts prior to when prisoner leaves prison, and no court has held that 4^th Amendment entitled sex offender to be released from prison, even though said individual would likely violate terms of his parole when he left prison due to lack of lawful place to live. Dist. Ct. also properly entered judgment in favor of defendant-warden in plaintiff’s action alleging that warden delayed returning plaintiff to outside medical clinic for diagnosis and treatment of heart condition, where plaintiff failed to contend that warden had anything to do with scheduling him for said treatment.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for want of prosecution plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, where instant dismissal was based on Dist. Ct.’s denial of plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis due to plaintiff’s failure to attach copy of his inmate trust account ledger to support said application. Remand was required where plaintiff explained that failure to attach ledger was based on prison staff’s refusal to give ledger to him, and Dist. Ct. improperly dismissed instant lawsuit without first evaluating plaintiff’s exculpatory explanation for his failure to attach ledger. Dist. Ct. also failed to address plaintiff’s post-dismissal contention that he never received order denying his application for in forma pauperis status and setting forth requirement to either pay full fee or to submit new application with copy of trust fund ledger.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order denying plaintiff’s motion to compel defendant to respond to certain discovery requests under circumstances where: (1) defendant was served with non-party subpoena in pending CERCLA lawsuit involving plaintiff and third-party; (2) defendant is entity allegedly conducting third-party’s defense of CERCLA claims; and (3) same Dist. Ct. judge that ruled on instant motion to compel was also assigned to resolve CERCLA claims. Collateral order doctrine did not apply so as to provide jurisdiction for Ct. of Appeals to resolve instant appeal, where, although resolution of motion to compel is ancillary to underlying CERCLA claims, plaintiff has opportunity to seek review of instant discovery issue once Dist. Ct. resolves CERCLA claims, since same Dist. Ct. judge would have acted on both matters. Ct. noted that other courts would have held that Ct. of Appeals would have jurisdiction under collateral order doctrine to consider instant appeal if Dist. Ct. that had not been assigned to underlying CERCLA lawsuit had ruled on instant discovery dispute.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants had failed to disclose under Brady impeachment evidence about how they obtained false statements from three jailhouse informants that were used to convict plaintiff on murder charge, where Dist. Ct. held belief that such evidence was already known to plaintiff. While plaintiff already knew that such evidence was false, he was unaware of detectives’ efforts to generate such evidence. As such, Brady applied. Also, Dist. Ct. erred in entering judgment on defendants’ behalf, in contravention to jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff in his claim that defendants had concocted false confession that was used to support plaintiff’s conviction, where: (1) plaintiff properly alleged due process violation based on contention that defendants’ manufacturing of false evidence was used to deprive him of his liberty; (2) fact that plaintiff had state-law remedy for malicious prosecution did not defeat his federal due-process claim against officers who had fabricated evidence; and (3) instant defendants did not have absolute immunity to authenticate their falsified evidence at trial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his need for assignment to lower bunk bed under circumstances where plaintiff fell from his top bunk bed on two occasions, which ultimately led to him breaking his back on second fall. Record showed that neither defendant was responsible for bunk bed assignments. Moreover, Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that it was enough for him to allege that he told defendants that he had brain tumor which required lower bunk bed assignment, where: (1) plaintiff’s mere mention of brain tumor, without more, was insufficient to convey existence of serious medical condition; (2) instant defendants could not verify plaintiff’s claims; and (3) plaintiff had failed to complain to appropriate prison official who was in charge of bed assignments and who had access to database that contained information about said assignments. Also, plaintiff could not bring instant Bivens action based on claim that defendants did nothing in response to plaintiff’s complaint about someone’s conduct. (Dissent filed.)