Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his need for assignment to lower bunk bed under circumstances where plaintiff fell from his top bunk bed on two occasions, which ultimately led to him breaking his back on second fall. Record showed that neither defendant was responsible for bunk bed assignments. Moreover, Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that it was enough for him to allege that he told defendants that he had brain tumor which required lower bunk bed assignment, where: (1) plaintiff’s mere mention of brain tumor, without more, was insufficient to convey existence of serious medical condition; (2) instant defendants could not verify plaintiff’s claims; and (3) plaintiff had failed to complain to appropriate prison official who was in charge of bed assignments and who had access to database that contained information about said assignments. Also, plaintiff could not bring instant Bivens action based on claim that defendants did nothing in response to plaintiff’s complaint about someone’s conduct. (Dissent filed.)

Indiana statute, which regulated design and operation of out-of-state production facilities of manufacturers of “e-cigarettes” that included requirements for sinks, cleaning products and details of contracts with outside security firms, violated dormant Commerce Clause of U.S. Constitution, since it improperly regulated commercial activity outside of Indiana. Moreover, while Indiana could impose reasonable requirements on vaping products sold in Indiana, it could not attempt to achieve such goal by direct extraterritorial regulation of manufacturing processes and facilities of out-of-state manufacturers. As such, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in action challenging said statute.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-fingerprint expert’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant had violated Brady, 373 US 83, when he withheld fact that he lacked qualifications to perform latent fingerprint analysis when testifying that latent fingerprint at crime scene matched plaintiff’s fingerprint, where plaintiff was ultimately convicted of murder charge, which was subsequent overturned after another expert ruled out plaintiff as source of said fingerprint. Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity, since defendant’s failure to disclose his lack of training as latent print examiner could not be viewed as violation of any clearly established right, and since neither prosecutor nor defendant lawyers elected to ask defendant to identify differences between latent and known fingerprints or to explain his training in one discipline as opposed to another discipline. Also, to extent plaintiff’s allegation focused on defendant’s actual testimony and his preparation for said testimony, defendant was protected by absolute immunity.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiff-detainee in detention center for sexually violent offenders that defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s hydration needs during 5-day boil order that required detainees to microwave their drinking water. Record showed that plaintiff received 8-ounce carton of milk for all three meals during boil order, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff’s ability to have unlimited microwave-boiled water was sufficient option for plaintiff’s hydration needs. Also, plaintiff had failed to alert defendant about any of his claimed complications arising out of instant boil order, and thus, plaintiff could not show that defendant was deliberately indifferent to said complications.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison doctors’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by delaying treatment on his infected toenail and fractured jaw. Remand was required, where Dist. Ct. improperly refused plaintiff’s request for recruitment of legal counsel under circumstances where plaintiff had moved to Arizona prison, had limited access to legal materials, had limited education and no litigation experience and was in need of medical expert to establish his claim. Record also showed that plaintiff was never able to obtain full set of medical records regarding his jaw injury and was never able to retain counsel through his own efforts. Ct. further noted that plaintiff had raised potentially valid 8^th Amendment claim due to continuing nature of his jaw injury.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint under Mansfield Amendment, alleging that he was entitled to injunctive relief that would preclude defendant’s agents from colluding with Nigerian officials for purposes of abducting him on provisional warrant in order to stand trial on U.S. criminal charges. Dist. Ct. could properly base instant dismissal on its finding that Mansfield Amendment did not give plaintiff private cause of action. Moreover, plaintiff’s complaint failed on its merits, where: (1) plaintiff cited instance where Nigerian officials had attempted to arrest him on provisional warrant; and (2) Mansfield Amendment does not prohibit U.S. employees from actively participating in attempt by Nigerian agents to arrest him, as alleged in instant complaint.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of standing plaintiff’s lawsuit, alleging that defendant-cable company violated Cable Communications Policy Act by retaining plaintiff-former customer’s personal information eight years after plaintiff had canceled his cable subscription. While plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to establish violation of said Act, plaintiff lacked standing to pursue instant action seeking injunctive relief, where plaintiff failed to allege any plausible risk of harm to himself arising out of said violation, and where plaintiff failed to allege any injury arising out of any retention of his personal information, as complaint failed to contain any allegation that defendant actually leaked his personal information or that plaintiff incurred any financial loss arising out of said retention in period following cancelation of his cable subscription. Moreover, plaintiff could not establish any irreparable harm that would be necessary to obtain any injunctive relief.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s personal injury action as sanction for plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to provide defendant with legitimate discovery request, as well as counsel's failure to: (1) comply with provisions of case-management order requiring plaintiff’s counsel to inform defendant that future settlement talks could be productive or, alternatively, to respond to defendant’s notification that plaintiff had 120 days to provide defendant with certain medical records and any expert’s report; and (2) file any response to defendant’s motion to dismiss. While plaintiff’s counsel argued that his failure to respond to motion to dismiss constituted “excusable neglect” since he was on wedding-related vacation at time motion was filed, record showed that plaintiff’s counsel had essentially done nothing to advance case over 18-month period, including counsel’s failure to provide discovery responses that pertained to issue regarding whether plaintiff had ingested drug at issue in lawsuit. Moreover, plaintiff’s counsel failed to explain why other counsel in law office could not have been tracking case while lead counsel was on vacation.