Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoners’ section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his 8^th Amendment rights by placing him in solitary confinement for 10-year period beginning in 2006 based upon 1990 prison incident in which plaintiff killed guard dog and stabbed two correctional officers. Plaintiff’s complaints about his prison cell, which pertained to lighting, food, temperatures, sleeping arrangements, restricted time for showers and exercise, did not rise to level of extreme deprivation of basic human needs to satisfy 8^th Amendment standards. Moreover, plaintiff had opportunities to participate in programs to transition into prison general population. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in granting defendants’ summary judgment motion with respect to plaintiff’s due process claim in which plaintiff contended that defendant’s rote denial of 30-day administrative reviews of his solitary confinement status denied him due process. Record contained triable issue as to whether said reviews were meaningful, where: (1) defendants used in series of denials same uninformative language that provided no explanation as to why continued placement in solitary confinement was necessary; (2) defendant had long stretches in which he had no serious disciplinary problem; and (3) record contained dispute as to whether instant reviews took into account any updated circumstances in evaluating need for continued solitary confinement.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in awarding defendants their costs associated with their defense of plaintiff’s section 1983 and state tort actions arising out of plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution on aggravated assault charges when third-party attempted to repossess car belonging to plaintiff’s step-daughter. Record showed that defendant prevailed on all but plaintiff’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, and under Rule 54(d)(1), Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendants were “prevailing parties,” where plaintiff prevailed on only two of six claims against defendants, even though jury awarded plaintiff $30,000 on said claims. Moreover, plaintiff’s appeal on said issue amounted to nothing more than improper request for Ct. to reweigh discretionary factors that Dist. Ct. used to make said finding. Also, Dist. Ct. did not generally err in calculating award of plaintiff’s attorney fees at $164,395, which represented reduction from $450,268 sought by plaintiffs. Ten out of eleven objections to reductions made by Dist. Ct. were without merit, since they concerned either picayune matters involving claims of one and two-tenths of hour or concerned reasonable reductions based on plaintiff’s limited success. However, Ct. erred when it mistakenly double-discounted 77.9 hours of attorney time, where plaintiff had already reduced said hours in its initial fee request.

In action alleging that defendant terminated plaintiff in retaliation for plaintiff-employee’s statement that he was going to file worker’s compensation claim, Dist. Ct. did not err in finding for defendant on ground that plaintiff failed to prove any damages arising out of defendant’s alleged acts. Dist. Ct. had previously precluded pro se plaintiff from presenting any evidence other than his own testimony (due to plaintiff’s prior failure to respond to any of defendant’s discovery requests, as well as his failure to abide by deadlines to identify exhibits and witnesses), and plaintiff further failed to explain at trial how he determined that he had incurred $133,000 in damages, what he had been paid by defendant, or whether wages he had received from subsequent employers had reduced his claimed damages.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting motion for summary judgment filed by defendants-prison psychiatrist and psychologist in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical/mental needs by transferring him from prison mental health unit to prison’s segregation unit not because plaintiff was no longer in need of special mental treatment, but rather because plaintiff had complained about certain medical personnel. Decision based on easier and less efficacious medical treatment without exercising professional judgment can constitute deliberate indifference, especially where medical provider bases his or her treatment decision on personal animosity, and plaintiff’s testimony that defendants explicitly told him that he had been transferred in response to his complaints was sufficient to raise triable issue as to defendants’ motivation for plaintiff’s transfer. Fact that plaintiff’s complaints had been directed to other prison personnel or that plaintiff may not have suffered physical injury arising out of his transfer did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging against defendants-state court judges/commissioners, were biased against her when ruling against her during lengthy divorce and child-custody proceedings and had overlooked misconduct committed by her former husband, her son’s guardians ad litem, and her own attorney. Defendants were entitled to absolute immunity for their actions taken in their judicial capacities. Moreover, Ct. noted that plaintiff’s allegations of judicial bias were more appropriately addressed by Wisc. Supreme Ct.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing at screening stage under 28 USC section 1915A plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-prison dentist was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs when, while removing plaintiff's wisdom tooth, defendant sutured plaintiff’s gum with gauze while at least one half-inch piece of broken drill bit was still in plaintiff’s gum, and when said broken drill bit did not dislodge itself from plaintiff’s gum until 14 days after extraction of plaintiff’s wisdom tooth. While Dist. Ct. dismissed instant complaint based on its belief that allegations in complaint were “factually frivolous,” Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff’s allegations were plausible, where: (1) defendant was individual performing dental services on plaintiff at time drill bit broke; and (2) there was ample reason to believe that defendant sutured extraction site without having located missing portion of broken drill bit. Moreover, instant complaint adequately alleged deliberate indifference where plaintiff alleged that defendant sutured his gum without accounting for all broken pieces of drill bit.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant caused plaintiff to take antipsychotic drug (Risperdal) without plaintiff’s knowledge or consent. Record showed that plaintiff had expressly refused in writing to take Risperdal, and defendant had failed to either follow Illinois’s procedure for ordering plaintiff to take forced medication or inform plaintiff that he was still going to dispense Risperdal (along with other medications) despite plaintiff’s refusal. Moreover, record failed to contain any basis for compelled administration of anti-psychotic drugs, and plaintiff had not otherwise been found to be dangerous to himself or others.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-casino’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-customer’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant improperly detained her for over one hour and searched her purse, after defendant had accused her to stealing $20 bill that plaintiff had discovered on casino floor. Basis of casino’s summary judgment motion was its claim that plaintiff had settled her action against it by orally agreeing to settle claim for $100, and record showed that plaintiff had admitted in notarized letter that she had agreed to accept $100 in satisfaction of her claim. Fact that plaintiff had subjectively believed that she had three days to cancel her oral agreement was not supported by Indiana law.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-state appellate defender violated his constitutional right to represent himself on appeal, where defendant assigned legal counsel to represent him on appeal without: (1) determining whether plaintiff was indigent; (2) requesting his permission for appointment of counsel; or (3) asking him whether he wanted to appeal his conviction. Under Martinez, 528 U.S 152, there is no constitutional right to self-representation on appeal, since state’s interest in fair and efficient administration of justice outweighs plaintiff’s interest in his autonomy. As such, Constitution is not violated by requiring indigent defendant to accept appointed appellate counsel against his will. Moreover, plaintiff failed to explain how defendant’s practice of assigning appellate counsel immediately after trial (in which plaintiff was represented by appointed counsel) violated due process clause.

Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error in removing plaintiff-committed sex offender from his trial on section 1983 claim, where: (1) Dist. Ct. stated that its customary practice was to remove all incarcerated parties for purposes of transporting said parties back to their facilities; (2) instant removal came after closing arguments were made and after jury was sent to deliberate on plaintiff’s case; and (3) any removal of plaintiff could not have affected jury deliberations. Ct. further noted that plaintiff was represented by law students who were present when jury returned verdict in defendants’ favor. Fact that instant removal took place off the record did not require different result. Moreover, plaintiff was not entitled to new trial, even though his removal deprived him of his right to poll jury, since: (1) plaintiff had legal representatives to make any polling request on his behalf; (2) Dist. Ct. had instructed jurors that they were to render unanimous verdict, and all jurors signed verdict form; and (3) jury did not submit any questions to parties after they were sent to deliberate on matter.