Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prosecutor and police officers’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants played various roles in bringing false criminal charges against plaintiff. Instant claim arose out of incident in which plaintiff was arrested for obstructing police officer when police came to plaintiff’s restaurant after receiving call from man living above plaintiff’s restaurant. Dist. Ct. found that police officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and under Imbler, 424 U.S. 409, Dist. Ct. properly found that defendant-prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity in his prosecutorial role that included decision to bring charges against plaintiff, and that 11^th Amendment barred plaintiff’s lawsuit against prosecutor in his official capacity. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in censoring plaintiff’s counsel for bringing instant action against prosecutor, where: (1) plaintiff failed to show that action against prosecutor was warranted by existing law or by non-frivolous argument for reversing existing law; and (2) counsel had indicated only that he had planned to challenge Imbler on appeal and had failed to provide substantive argument for doing so. Fact that counsel had attached to his objection to Magistrate’s censure recommendation counsel’s written brief from unsuccessful prior lawsuit that had raised similar issue did not require different result since counsel’s submission came too late.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s proposed section 1983 claim, alleging that defendant denied plaintiff its due process rights by refusing to release defendant’s judgment lien against plaintiff’s property until plaintiff paid defendant’s attorneys’ fees and costs associated with generation of lien. Record showed that upon plaintiff’s request, defendant provided payoff letter that demanded $5,655.16, which included $1,394.82 in attorneys’ fees and costs, and plaintiff thereafter paid full amount “under protest.” Dist. Ct., though, properly found that plaintiff had voluntarily paid disputed fees and costs (and thus was not deprived of any constitutionally protected property interest), where defendant merely refused to accede to demand by private party to immediately release lien to which plaintiff was not entitled. Moreover, Ct. noted that plaintiff was not coerced to pay anything, where plaintiff had option to: (1) pay principal and interest portion of lien and then seek release of lien under 735 ILCS 5/12-183(b); or (2) file declaratory judgment in state court raising instant issue. Ct. also doubted that plaintiff could successfully pursue class action under peculiar facts of case and further surmised that lawyers involved in case were only potential beneficiaries of instant action.

Petitioner lacked Article III standing to file instant appeal of order of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) that had essentially affirmed ALJ decision that had reversed FMCSA’s interim order that found that petitioner was imminent hazard and required that petitioner immediately pull its trucks off road. Issue that petitioner wanted to appeal. i.e., whether FMCSA properly overruled ALJ’s alternative finding that petitioner was entitled to relief because decision on petitioner’s appeal from interim order had not occurred within 10 days of said appeal, did not constitute actual controversy, where petitioner had received all of its requested relief, i.e., rescission of interim order, at time petitioner had filed instant appeal. As such, there was no longer any ongoing injury to petitioner that was addressable by Ct. of Appeals once interim order had been lifted.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-estranged wife’s motion to dismiss in plaintiff-estranged husband’s action under federal Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Act, alleging that defendant’s secret placement of auto-forwarding “rule” on plaintiff’s email account (in effort to catch plaintiff in instances of marital infidelity) constituted violation of said Act. While Dist. Ct. based its dismissal on finding that defendant had not contemporaneously received subject emails at time plaintiff had received them, record contained possibility that defendant had contemporaneously intercepted said emails, and record otherwise failed to establish at pleading stage of instant proceedings how auto-forwarding rule worked. Dist. Ct., though, properly dismissed plaintiff’s similar claim against defendant’s lawyer, who had provided copies of said emails pursuant to plaintiff’s discovery requests during pending divorce proceedings with his estranged wife, since plaintiff was aware of existence of said emails and had invited their production.  

Plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring instant action under Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), where plaintiff alleged that defendant-restaurant had violated FACTA by failing to truncate his credit card expiration date in copy of his payment receipt. Under Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. 1540, plaintiff failed to allege sufficient injury-in-fact arising out of printing of credit card expiration date on his receipt, and plaintiff otherwise failed to show that instant alleged violation of FACTA created any appreciable risk of harm, where no one but plaintiff ever saw non-compliant receipt. Moreover, Ct. noted that Congress specifically declared in Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act that failure to truncate card’s expiration date, without more, does not heighten risk of identify theft.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment by defendants-prosecutor, certain police officials and City of Bridgeport in instant section 1983 action alleging that said defendants subjected plaintiff to false arrest on felony aggravated battery charge arising out of incident in which plaintiff and individual associated with defendant-Mayor were involved in physical altercation. Defendant-prosecutor was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, and remaining defendants were entitled to summary judgment where: (1) plaintiff was arrested pursuant to arrest warrant, which would normally preclude any false arrest claim; and (2) plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendants supplied false information when obtaining arrest warrant. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-Mayor, Chief of Police and City’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 claim arising out of defendants’ alleged interference in plaintiff’s liquor store business and vandalism of his store, even though Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff had presented no evidence that defendants had treated other similarly-situated liquor establishments more favorably, where Ct. of Appeals held that: (1) plaintiff, in instant class of one equal protection action, need not present evidence of disparate treatment, where plaintiff held only Class B liquor license in town; (2) plaintiff had offered other evidence of discriminatory behavior from defendants pertaining to false claims by defendants that plaintiff was in violation of local liquor laws and to actions leading to unnecessary closing of plaintiff’s business; and (3) jury could find that there was no conceivable justification for defendants’ actions. Also, defendant-Mayor was not entitled to absolute immunity on claim that Mayor had failed to timely act on plaintiff’s license renewal, although Mayor would be entitled to said immunity on any decision to revoke or suspend liquor license.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s request to enjoin defendant from proceeding in Chinese lawsuit against plaintiff, where defendant asserted in Chinese lawsuit that plaintiff had violated terms of joint venture agreement by borrowing $300,000 on behalf of unsuccessful joint venture without defendant’s permission. Record showed that plaintiff had previously obtained in federal court $2 million judgment against defendant in action to recoup money plaintiff had spent repaying joint venture’s debts, and defendant could not pursue China lawsuit, where issue regarding responsibility for payment of joint venture’s debts had already been resolved. Moreover, while defendant argued that it should be allowed to pursue China lawsuit because instant claim was only permissive counterclaim that was not pursued in prior federal court action, such argument was without merit since defendant had pursued in prior federal court matter 12 other counterclaims, some of which raised issues of Chinese law. Thus, under merger doctrine, defendant was required to raise all of his counterclaims, including instant action, in prior federal court action, where instant action stemmed from same transaction/operative facts at issue in defendant's other counterclaims that were raised in prior federal action.

Dist. Ct. did not err in either dismissing or granting judgment in defendants’ favor in plaintiff’s section 1983 action against defendants-State and County officials, as well as local prosecutors and investigators, alleging malicious prosecution and federal conspiracy claims, when defendants initiated criminal action against plaintiff-lawyer in which plaintiff was accused of aiding and abetting one of her clients to defraud cemetery trust funds out of $22 million. Plaintiff’s claims against State officials in their official capacities were barred by 11^th Amendment, and plaintiff otherwise failed to identify County custom or practice that had caused plaintiff’s injuries. Moreover, plaintiff’s claims against defendant prosecutors were barred by prosecutorial immunity, where, as here, most of plaintiff’s allegations encompassed prosecutorial acts or omissions. Plaintiff’s allegations that said prosecutors made false and inflammatory statements in press releases that had announced plaintiff’s arrest were potentially actionable, although plaintiff had failed to identify any particular false statements in her complaint. Also, while State and County officials did not enjoy immunity from plaintiff’s malicious prosecution/conspiracy actions based on said officials’ individual capacities, plaintiff failed to identify any constitutional basis for her malicious prosecution claim and otherwise failed to allege that State or County officials played any role in institution of criminal charges against plaintiff or had supplied prosecutors with false evidence used to indict plaintiff. Too, plaintiff’s claim that defendants had inflicted reputation harm was insufficient to establish viable section 1983 action, when plaintiff failed to fit it within any constitutional doctrine. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for issuance of preliminary injunction in action seeking to force defendants-City and County officials to place plaintiffs' proposition seeking to establish mayoral term limits on November 2016 ballot. While plaintiffs established colorable 1^st Amendment claim, where defendants' rationale for denying plaintiffs' proposition on ballot was fact that, under Illinois Election Code, ballot already had maximum three propositions that had been placed on ballot due to prior City Council resolution, and where plaintiffs could argue that passage of resolution was attempt by defendants to “limit the debate,” Dist. Ct. could properly deny request for preliminary injunction because plaintiffs waited until August 8, 2016 to file petition, even though plaintiffs had been aware of resolution since June 23, 2016, and instant delay created significant harm to public given September, 2016 deadlines for distributing ballot overseas and to individuals seeking to vote by mail. Ct. further noted that plaintiffs would not suffer irreparable harm through denial of preliminary injunction, where plaintiffs would have opportunity to place subject proposition on February 28, 2017 primary ballot, which would be in time to have bearing on April 2017 mayoral election.
 

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in awarding plaintiff’s former attorneys full amount of fees contained in original contingent fee agreement, where said attorneys sought said fees under quantum meruit theory under circumstances where plaintiff had terminated said attorneys shortly before accepting defendant’s settlement offer that had been negotiated on behalf of plaintiff by his former attorneys. While said attorneys may ultimately receive entire contract fee, where, as here, they were terminated shortly before plaintiff had accepted instant settlement offer, remand was required because Dist. Ct. had failed to consider whether awarding full value of contingency fee was reasonable in light of five factors for determining fee award under quantum meruit theory, as set forth in DeLapaz, 917 N.E. 2d 93.