Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiffs’ section 1983 action alleging that defendant denied them due process by engaging in regulatory harassment of plaintiff’s strip mall that resulted in plaintiffs’ loss of potential tenants and ultimate foreclosure when plaintiffs failed to make certain mortgage payments on strip mall. Applicable limitations period was two years from accrual of claim, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that instant claim accrued at time plaintiffs still had possession of strip mall, i.e., at time foreclosure action had been filed or when receiver had been appointed to take control of strip mall approximately 2.5 years prior to filing of instant action. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ argument that their claim did not accrue until state court had entered final judgment on foreclosure action, after observing that plaintiff had confused concept of eventual consequences of constitutional violation with knowledge of constitutional injury that starts limitations clock.

Magistrate Judge erred in dismissing pro se plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant denied him due process when dismissing his race discrimination claim, where although plaintiff had consented to Magistrate Judge deciding instant action, Magistrate Judge dismissed case as part of screening process under 28 USC section 1915(e), after plaintiff had sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but before defendant had been served with instant complaint, and thus before defendant had given Magistrate Judge consent to act on instant complaint. As such, remand was required since Magistrate Judge lacked authority to dispose of plaintiff’s case on screening or otherwise in absence of consent from defendant. Ct. further observed that: (1) dismissals under 28 USC section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) must be treated as full-fledged dismissals on merits; and (2) Dist. Ct. on remand would be free to take Magistrate Judge’s decision as report and recommendation and proceed accordingly. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs’ requests to certify two subclasses in class action alleging that defendant’s policies and practices caused class members awaiting their release from jail to be detained for unreasonably long period of time. As to first proposed subclass of class members, who were required to wait up to 72 hours prior to their release pursuant to defendant’s policy, Dist. Ct. improperly believed that members awaiting up to 48 hours would be presumptively reasonable under McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, since standard set forth in McLaughlin, which concerned delays in presenting arrestees for judicial determination of probable cause, did not apply where members of proposed subclass suffered delays after legal authority for their detention had ceased. Moreover, as to second subclass of class members who suffered delays up to 72 hours pursuant to inadequate computer system used by defendant, Ct. of Appeals rejected Dist. Ct.’s finding that proposed class members of said subclass were unidentifiable.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for want of prosecution plaintiffs-prisoners’ section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials improperly prolonged their incarcerations. Record showed as to one plaintiff that said plaintiff failed to: (1) keep in contact with recruited counsel; (2) attend series of scheduled hearings; and (3) file any pleading to counter Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss case for want of prosecution. As to other plaintiff, record showed that said plaintiff failed to: (1) attend witness deposition; (2) respond to opposing counsel’s communications regarding pretrial memorandum; (3) comply with court orders requiring him to submit witness list, exhibit list or objections to defendants’ pretrial submissions; and (4) obey Dist. Ct. order to remain during final pretrial conference. Dismissals were proper, where both plaintiffs caused repeated and substantial noncompliance with deadlines.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s request for issuance of preliminary injunction to enjoin defendant-County from enforcing its policy that required plaintiff to obtain its permission to conduct on Courthouse steps rally to advocate legalized marijuana. Plaintiff demonstrated likelihood of success in instant First Amendment action, where defendant conceded that its policy was not viewpoint neutral, and where plaintiff showed that events held at Courthouse steps were not governmental speech, since defendant lacked editorial control of individual speakers appearing at said events. As such, since events sponsored/allowed by defendant are private speech, defendant’s policy violated First Amendment under state of instant record.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in action alleging that plaintiff sustained neurological and psychological damages arising out of his exposure to fumes from glue manufactured by defendant. Basis for ruling was finding that plaintiff had failed to identify expert witness who could establish that said exposure had caused plaintiff’s injuries. Dist. Ct. properly rejected plaintiff’s claim that six of his treating physicians were experts who could establish causation issue, since: (1) plaintiff failed to disclose said physicians as experts as required under Rule 26(a)(2)(A); and (2) plaintiff failed to file required report that disclosed basis of physicians' opinions. Ct. further noted that evaluations generated by said physicians that provided only bare declaration that said glue caused plaintiff’s injuries were useless.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-hospital officials’ motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds plaintiff-physician’s action alleging that defendants initiated sham peer-review process that led him to seek other employment and then failed to confirm with prospective employers that he was member of hospital staff in good standing. Record showed that plaintiff had previously filed related action against different member of hospital staff, alleging that said defendant defamed him by making false statements to plaintiff’s prospective employers that suggested that plaintiff had been subject to some type of non-disciplinary action related to his professional conduct. All three elements of res judicata were present, where: (1) prior action resulted in order dismissing case with prejudice for failure to state valid cause of action, which qualified as final judgment on its merits; (2) both causes of action arose out of series of statements made by both sets of defendants around time plaintiff resigned and sought other employment, which, according to plaintiff, made it difficult for him to get another job; and (3) both sets of defendants were in privity where legal interests in said defendants were aligned, especially where plaintiff had pleaded that defendants in instant case were vicariously liable for series of alleged defamatory letters written by defendant in prior case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds plaintiffs’ lawsuit alleging trespass, conversion and unjust enrichment arising out of defendants’ possession of hotel located in Belgrade, Serbia, where plaintiffs alleged that hotel actually belonged to them under circumstances where Yugoslavian govt. had wrongfully seized hotel from their relatives in 1945. Defendants informed Dist. Ct. that they would submit to jurisdiction of Serbian Restitution Agency (SRA), which was empowered under Serbian law to determine plaintiffs’ rights to hotel. As such, instant dismissal was proper, where Serbian law was likely to play large role in adjudication of plaintiff’s case. Moreover, no aspect of plaintiff’s dispute had any relation to Illinois, and plaintiffs failed to show how SRA was inadequate forum to resolve their claims.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff-prisoner’s Rule 60(b) motion to set aside Dist. Ct.’s dismissal for want of prosecution of plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-prison guard used excessive force against him. Instant dismissal was based on plaintiff’s failure to file response to defendant’s interrogatories, and Dist. Ct. denied plaintiff’s requests for recruitment of legal counsel, after finding that instant case was not unduly complex and relied largely on plaintiff’s personal knowledge of facts. However, plaintiff's subsequent motion to reinstate case should have been granted, where: (1) plaintiff cited to his mental impairment and low 66 I.Q.; and (2) Dist. Ct. attached too much weight to plaintiff’s failure to serve responses to defendant’s interrogatories since said interrogatories were written above plaintiff’s intellectual level and since said interrogatories constituted form of harassment where defendant had access to documents that contained information that would have answered his inquiries. Also, Dist. Ct. should have granted plaintiff’s request to recruit legal counsel given his mental impairments and his efforts to pursue his case despite said impairments.

Plaintiffs-police officers’ appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order dismissing on merits their section 1983 action, alleging that defendant’s order directing police officers to cover their tattoos violated their 1^st Amendment rights, was moot. Subsequent to issuance of said Dist. Ct. order, police union filed grievance against defendant that resulted in arbitrator’s order that found that said tattoo order violated applicable collective bargaining agreement. As such, instant appeal was moot since plaintiffs had obtained all relief that they sought in instant lawsuit as result of grievance arbitration. Moreover, plaintiffs were entitled to have Dist. Ct. order vacated.