Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that plaintiff’s 4^th Amendment rights were violated when defendants-employees of private security company changed locks on plaintiff’s apartment pursuant to directive from administrator at city housing authority that owned apartment building. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity under Filarsky, 566 U.S. 377, where supervising governmental officer at public housing agency issued directive to change said locks. Fact that defendants were employees of private company did not require different result, although result would be different if defendants had worked independently of any ongoing direct supervision by housing agency.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment filed by defendants-members of Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission in plaintiff-wholesale beer and wine distributor’s action alleging that Indiana statute’s prohibition on beer wholesaler from also becoming liquor wholesaler violated plaintiff’s equal protection rights. While plaintiff need not show existence of comparator that received more favorable treatment in order to establish instant equal protection claim, plaintiff's claim was still without merit, since Indiana’s policy of separating beer and liquor wholesalers satisfied rational basis test, since policy fostered legitimate state interest in discouraging alcohol consumption by making alcohol distribution more expensive. Ct. rejected under Tuan, 533 U.S. 53, plaintiff’s contention that instant policy failed rational basis test, even though plaintiff argued that there might have been more direct and effective way for Indiana to increase liquor prices through taxation.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in imposing $7,500 sanction against plaintiff’s counsel for filing frivolous multi-count complaint, alleging that defendant violated RICO, federal antitrust laws, and Illinois Employee Classification Act, as well as committed tort of false representation arising out of alleged breach of Independent Contractor Operating Agreement calling for plaintiff to perform trucking services on behalf of defendant. Said Agreement called for parties to arbitrate dispute arising out of said Agreement, and plaintiff’s counsel failed to present any plausible defense to defendant’s demand that instant dispute be arbitrated, and further filed objectively baseless motion in opposition to defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, even though plaintiff argued that arbitration clause did not apply since: (1) defendant had materially breached Agreement; (2) plaintiff’s status as transportation worker precluded arbitration of instant dispute; and (3) parties had failed to agree on specific arbitrator as required under Agreement. Also, plaintiff’s counsel’s allegations regarding any RICO or antitrust claims or violations of Illinois law for work performed in Nebraska were wholly without merit.

Plaintiff was precluded from appealing adverse decisions with respect to Dist. Ct. order denying its Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as matter of law that was filed during trial of instant insurance dispute in which defendant had argued that it had no duty to indemnify plaintiff in underlying insurance claim due to plaintiff’s failure to timely notify it of said claim, and that said claim pre-dated issuance of relevant policy. Plaintiff failed to renew its motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict under Rule 50(b), which was required in order to proceed to instant appeal. Fact that Dist. Ct. had granted defendant’s Rule 50(a) motion on same issue or that instant matter had not been submitted to jury did not relieve plaintiff of its obligation to file Rule 50(b) motion after its Rule 50(a) motion had been denied. Ct. made similar ruling with respect to plaintiff’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s denial of its Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as matter of law against defendant-insurance broker, whom plaintiff claimed had failed either to advise it about relevant claim submission process or to follow through on plaintiff’s instruction to more timely inform defendant about existence of underlying insurance claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action, alleging that plaintiff-prisoner’s due process and 8^th Amendment rights were violated, when defendants improperly designated plaintiff as individual on extended supervised release status (as opposed to parolee status), where said misclassification subjected plaintiff to 90-day confinement without prior hearing due to his violation of term of parole. While plaintiff’s actual status as parolee would not have subjected him to instant 90-day confinement sanction, but would have subjected him to some other punishment, plaintiff could not prevail in his lawsuit, where three of four defendants were unaware of plaintiff’s true parolee status, or that plaintiff had been misclassified, so as to establish required finding that said defendants acted with deliberate indifference, as opposed to mere negligence. As to fourth defendant, while plaintiff presented evidence that his attorney had notified said defendant that plaintiff had been misclassified, said defendant was not decision-maker with respect to plaintiff’s confinement and had not played any role in imposition of instant extended supervision sanction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion to dismiss on timeliness grounds plaintiff’s section 1983 action, where, although plaintiff’s original complaint against “unknown police officers” was filed within applicable limitations period, plaintiff’s amended complaint, that included actual names of two officers whom plaintiff claimed were involved in car chase that resulted in shooting death of plaintiff’s son, was filed beyond applicable limitations period. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that amended complaint was timely under notions of either equitable tolling or equitable estoppel, since: (1) plaintiff was aware of actual names of two officers allegedly involved in shooting incident three weeks before expiration of limitations period; and (2) plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendant-City had induced her into failing to file amended complaint within limitations period.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action against defendants-County and County’s Health Dept. and Bd. of Health, alleging that defendants' revocation of plaintiff’s license to install septic systems deprived him of due process, because said revocation occurred without notice and without hearing. While Dist. Ct. believed that section 1983 relief was unavailable because state law provided plaintiff with adequate remedies, record failed to show that any state-court action could compensate plaintiff for income he allegedly lost when his license was terminated, even though state-court action could reinstate his septic license. Moreover, allegations in plaintiff’s complaint satisfied factors set forth in Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, which requires that plaintiff be given some process prior to deprivation of his property, where: (1) plaintiff had strong private interest in his ability to earn livelihood; (2) record demonstrated high risk that someone like plaintiff could have his license revoked without warning since instant ordinance vested broad discretion in county officer to determine when septic installer violated vague rules; and (3) nothing in record suggested that septic problems associated with plaintiff were so serious or urgent to justify instant summary action taken by defendants.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s conversion action, alleging that defendant-professional football team improperly refused to renew 94 season tickets that plaintiff had purchased from third-parties, and therefore, according to plaintiff, defendant had converted said tickets without compensating him. Defendant’s contract with purchasers of said tickets indicated that defendant had reserved right to reject any order, transfer or renewal of its tickets. Thus, although plaintiff had expectation that defendant would renew said tickets, plaintiff had no right to said renewal because defendant had not sold said right to anyone.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him with adequate supplies of toothpaste, mail supplies and laundry detergent during his stay at three different prisons. Plaintiff failed to show that defendant Warden was personally aware about plaintiff’s gum disease or otherwise had need for additional toothpaste beyond standard amount given to prisoners. Moreover, plaintiff could not establish viable retaliation claim, where plaintiff conceded that defendants did not give to any inmates plaintiff’s requested postage for non-legal related correspondence. Also, plaintiff’s claim, that Dept. of Corrections was liable for its policies of providing inadequate amounts of toothpaste, mail supplies and laundry detergent, could not be addressed in instant section 1983 complaint, since Dept. was not “person” that could be sued under section 1983.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing instant class action alleging violation of Telephone Consumer Protection Act, where defendant made $3,600 deposit with Dist. Ct. under Rule 67 and argued that said deposit on behalf of plaintiff’s class representative satisfied any potential monetary claim representative had with respect to his individual lawsuit, and thus served to moot representative’s individual claim. Instant unaccepted offer to settle case, accompanied by payment intended to provide full compensation into registry of court under Rule 67 did not moot representative’s claim, especially where: (1) deposit into court registry did not give plaintiff unfettered access to said money; and (2) plaintiff was attempting to obtain recovery on his own claim, as well as recovery as class representative that was not addressed in instant deposit.