Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing without prejudice lawsuits filed by Holocaust survivors and heirs of Holocaust victims against Hungarian railway and national bank seeking compensation for property seized from plaintiffs during Holocaust. While defendants-national railway and national bank could be sued in U.S. under exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act if plaintiffs could demonstrate that they had exhausted any available Hungarian remedies, plaintiffs failed to show that Hungarian courts were clearly sham or inadequate forums. Fact that Hungarian courts lacked class action mechanism or that return to Hungary posed potential security concerns for plaintiffs did not require different result. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds plaintiffs’ lawsuit against private bank, where relative convenience of parties and practical difficulties of dealing with Hungarian documents and Hungarian law favored trial in Hungary, especially where cases against national railway and national bank were now going to be held in Hungary.

Dist. Ct. erred in awarding successful claimant in underlying appeal of denial of his application for SSI benefits only $125 per hour statutory cap for attorney fees under Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), even though claimant’s attorney argued that claimant was entitled to $173.38 per hour in attorney fees based upon cost-of-living increase and on fact that claimant’s attorney and others charged at least $250 per hour for non-contingency legal work. While Dist. Ct. denied requested rate based in part on claimant’s failure to show that no competent attorney within relevant geographical area would take case at $125 per hour statutory cap, Ct. of Appeals, in altering its holding in Mathews-Sheets, 653 F.3d 560, found that EAJA claimant can establish request for cost-of-living adjustment for attorney fees by using Consumer Price Index, as well as proof that requested rate did not exceed prevailing market rate for performing relevant legal services.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, defendants’ appeal of judgment in breach of contract action, where Dist. Ct. entered order indicating that plaintiff was entitled to “$133,500 plus interest accruing and attorneys’ fees,” and where Dist. Ct. had not quantified prejudgment interest figure at time defendants had filed instant notice of appeal. Award of pre-judgment interest is component of plaintiff’s damages, and Dist. Ct. must quantify said damages before judgment can become final.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant breached certain Housing Assistance Payments contracts by failing to approve annual rent increases, as required by federal law, and by requiring plaintiffs (who owned rental properties assisted by federal Section 8 program) to submit rent comparability studies as prerequisites to receiving rent increases. Although instant action asserted only state-law breach of contract claim, federal question jurisdiction under 28 USC section 1331 existed over instant action, where said action stated substantial federal issue that met 4-element jurisdictional test under Gunn, 133 S.Ct. 1059, and where instant action concerned important issues with respect to scope of federal Section 8 program.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his civil commitment as sexually violent person, where said commitment order occurred in 2008, and where defendant was not transferred to civil commitment facility until 2.5 years later when defendant completed his term of incarceration on parole violation. Defendant failed to establish any violation of federal constitutional law/due process arising out of his current civil commitment since: (1) defendant did not contest 2008 commitment order; (2) defendant did not establish that he no longer had mental disorder at time of 2010 transfer; and (3) Wisconsin has procedure for defendant to obtain his release by establishing that he no longer has relevant mental disorder that made it likely that he would engage in sexual violence.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 Monell, policy or practice claim against defendant-City that had been stayed while plaintiff pursued related section 1983 action alleging that defendant’s police officers violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights when they arrested him on traffic insurance card violation and delayed his appearance in court for probable cause hearing while investigating plaintiff for unsolved robberies, even though: (1) plaintiff had previously obtained $60,000 judgment against police officers in section 1983 action; and (2) defendant had informed Dist. Ct. that it would indemnify said police officers for any compensatory damages award, pay any nominal damage award against it and reimburse plaintiff for his reasonable attorney fees and costs. While Dist. Ct. justified dismissal based on its belief that plaintiff had already received all monetary relief that he could recover on instant Monell claim when defendant agreed to indemnify police officers in plaintiff’s claim against said officers, Dist. Ct. could not sua sponte dismiss Monell action without giving plaintiff opportunity to cure any defect or defend merits of claim. Moreover, Dist. Ct. improperly treated matter as though defendant had made Rule 68 offer of judgment and should have given plaintiff opportunity to pursue other relief against defendant as plaintiff had previously requested opportunity to do so.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendant terminated plaintiff due to his support of political opponent of defendant’s Town President, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion for sanctions under 18 USC section 1927, based on claim that plaintiff’s attorney had filed many post-verdict motions in action that was settled for less than half of initial verdict in favor of plaintiff, where Dist. Ct. could properly have concluded that loss to plaintiff and his counsel of $400,000 apiece when settlement replaced jury’s verdict was sanction enough. However, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s request for sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) based on failure of plaintiff’s counsel to report to Dist. Ct. fact that plaintiff had filed bankruptcy petition during pendency of instant section 1983 claim, since: (1) plaintiff’s counsel did not contest finding that her conduct violated Rule 26(g)(3); and (2) said finding mandated that some sort of monetary or other sanction be imposed

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss 2011 state-court action seeking to have defendant pay plaintiff money that defendant had received from deceased’s pension plan, where said action had been removed to federal court. Record showed that 2011 filing was in response to similar 1997 action, in which favorable summary judgment (that had been entered on behalf of plaintiff’s mother) was vacated because mother had died prior to entry of summary judgment, and while defendant argued that any voluntary motion to dismiss must include dismissal of 1997 action, such argument was unavailing since: (1) defendant originally argued that instant removal action pertained only to 2011 action that plaintiff had filed on behalf of his mother’s estate; and (2) instant removal action could only pertain to 2011 action, since 30-day deadline for removing 1997 action had long passed.