Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff on murder charge, where defendants based plaintiff’s arrest on statements from two witnesses identifying plaintiff as culprit from videotape of crime scene. While plaintiff claimed that it was unreasonable for defendants to believe that any witness could have credibly identified him from poor quality of video, defendants could have reasonably found that said identifications were credible, where witnesses knew plaintiff in some capacity and had allegedly spent time with plaintiff on day of incident. Moreover, plaintiff’s alibi claim appeared to be weak. Fact that identifications proved to be wrong was irrelevant to probable cause finding. Also, plaintiff failed to show that his 47-hour detention prior to his probable cause hearing was unreasonable.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiff alleging that defendants violated his 4th Amendment rights by ordering that his blood be drawn for evidentiary purposes following his arrest for driving under influence of alcohol, where defendants had no warrant to draw plaintiff’s blood. Although Ct. in McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), held that natural dissipation of alcohol from person’s bloodstream, without more, does not constitute per se exigency, defendants were still entitled to qualified immunity where case law, prior to McNeely, was not clearly established on issue as to whether natural dissipation of alcohol from bloodstream constituted per se exigency that would excuse lack of warrant, and where Wisc. law had adopted per se exigency rule in blood-alcohol cases.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s RICO action, alleging that defendants (operator of plaintiff’s gas station and supplier of gas for said station) acted together to defraud plaintiff out of his gas station by failing to pay for gasoline purchased on behalf of plaintiff’s gas station, where gas station was ultimately foreclosed on after plaintiff had failed to pay $65,000 judgment arising out of gasoline debt. While Dist. Ct. found that Rooker-Feldman Doctrine deprived it of jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s claim since plaintiff was essentially seeking to overturn state-court foreclosure order, Rooker-Feldman Doctrine did not block instant lawsuit, where plaintiff sought damages for activity that he alleged predated state foreclosure action and caused injury independent of it. On remand, Dist. Ct. must make determination as to whether res judicata applied to preclude plaintiff’s RICO action to extent that RICO action was compulsory counterclaim that should have been asserted in prior debt-collection action.

Dist. Ct. erred in entering injunction in instant nationwide federal class action that enjoined class members from pursuing Missouri statewide class action that raised similar claims against defendants. Record showed that statewide class action was scheduled for trial in May of 2015, while settlement of instant federal class action was not scheduled for fairness hearing until June 23, 2015. As such, entry of instant injunction violated Anti-Injunction Act (Act) since: (1) although statewide action might serve to derail settlement in federal action, Dist. Ct. failed to explain how entry of injunction was necessary in aid of Dist. Ct.’s jurisdiction in federal class action; and (2) instant parties have not contended that judgment in statewide action could threaten Dist. Ct.’s ability to adjudicate federal class action. Moreover, Act provides only limited opportunities for federal intervention into parallel state-court actions and leaves to state court question as to whether it would be prudent to allow federal court to initially resolve similar claim.

Ct. of Appeals affirmed jury’s verdict in favor of defendant in section 1983 action alleging that defendant terminated plaintiff from her position in County Auditor’s office in retaliation for her political support of Barack Obama, where plaintiff challenged sufficiency of evidence supporting jury’s verdict, and where plaintiff had failed to file with Dist. Ct. any post-verdict motion raising said issue as required under Rule 50(b). Party’s failure to comply with Rule 50(b) forecloses any challenge to sufficiency of evidence on appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing $1,000 sanction on debtor’s counsel for submitting frivolous pleadings in Dist. Ct. Record showed that bank had filed state-court foreclosure action against debtor, and that after debtor filed for bankruptcy protection, counsel for debtor filed frivolous claims against bank alleging that mortgage paperwork produced by bank had been fraudulently altered. Moreover, Dist. Ct. properly affirmed Bankruptcy Court’s finding in favor of Bank on its proof of claim regarding said mortgage, after finding that mortgage documents were enforceable, and could further find that instant sanction was appropriate where: (1) counsel’s documents contesting said claim were vexatious, unfocused and “nigh-unintelligible;” and (2) counsel filed other frivolous pleadings after being warned not to do so.

Ct. of Appeals imposed $2,500 sanction on plaintiff’s counsel, after finding that counsel had filed frivolous appeal and had displayed conduct unbecoming member of bar. Record showed that counsel, in representing client who was party in state-court property foreclosure action, filed baseless pleadings that claimed that bank was fraudulently attempting to foreclose on said property, and then removed case to federal court without providing any colorable basis for Dist. Ct. obtaining jurisdiction over instant state-court matter. Ct. also noted that counsel had engaged in pattern of antagonistic behavior in other cases and had engaged in unnecessarily antagonistic conduct in this case, when she accused state-court judge and court reporter of fraudulently manipulating transcripts, as well as accused Dist. Ct. judge of pursuing campaign of libel against her and accused opposing counsel of actionable civil fraud and racketeering. Ct., though, suspended sanctions until time counsel submitted any future inappropriate filings.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding plaintiff’s counsel in contempt of court, as well as fining him $500 and revoking his pro hac vice status, after counsel filed Notice of Lien on behalf of plaintiff in underlying lawsuit seeking return of plaintiff’s leased property in defendant’s hotel, even though Dist. Ct. believed that counsel had no good-faith basis for seeking either construction lien or filing lis pendens to protect said disputed property. Because counsel was punished for out-of-court conduct, any alleged contempt was indirect, and if instant sanctions were criminal in nature, they were improper since Dist. Ct.: (1) failed to give counsel notice that he was being charged with criminal contempt; and (2) failed to ask govt. to prosecute said contempt. Moreover, instant sanctions were also improper if classified as civil contempt because Dist. Ct. failed to point to any Order that counsel violated when he filed Notice of Lien. Also, instant lien could be viewed as proper construction lien to extent plaintiff sought return of hotel fixtures, and record suggested that counsel had followed appropriate procedures for filing lis pendens with County Register of Deeds.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-newspaper’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ action under Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) seeking damages under circumstances where defendant obtained their birth date, height, weight, hair color and eye color from Ill. Secretary of State motor vehicle records and published said information in newspaper article that criticized homicide investigation lineup in which plaintiffs had participated. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that instant published information did not constitute “personal information” for purposes of DPPA, or that DPPA’s prohibition on acquiring and disclosing personal information from driving records violated defendant’s freedom of speech rights under First Amendment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison and prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 and ADA/Rehabilitation Act actions alleging that defendants failed to accommodate his disability by providing him with suitable wheelchair, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to all but two of his relevant grievances, and that defendant had not been denied access to prison facilities within meaning of ADA or Rehabilitation Act. While plaintiff argued that Dist. Ct. should have granted his request to conduct Peavy hearing to determine whether he had exhausted his administrative remedies prior to acting on summary judgment motion, record showed that plaintiff had failed to follow Dist. Ct.’s order with respect to procedure for filing request for Peavy hearing. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s summary judgment motion where: (1) plaintiff could not pursue section 1983 action against prison or Commissioner in his official capacity since neither are “persons” for purposes of section 1983; and (2) plaintiff could not establish either ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim, since plaintiff’s allegation that he was inconvenienced through lack of suitable wheelchair did not amount to complete denial of services.