Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in finding plaintiff’s counsel in contempt of court, as well as fining him $500 and revoking his pro hac vice status, after counsel filed Notice of Lien on behalf of plaintiff in underlying lawsuit seeking return of plaintiff’s leased property in defendant’s hotel, even though Dist. Ct. believed that counsel had no good-faith basis for seeking either construction lien or filing lis pendens to protect said disputed property. Because counsel was punished for out-of-court conduct, any alleged contempt was indirect, and if instant sanctions were criminal in nature, they were improper since Dist. Ct.: (1) failed to give counsel notice that he was being charged with criminal contempt; and (2) failed to ask govt. to prosecute said contempt. Moreover, instant sanctions were also improper if classified as civil contempt because Dist. Ct. failed to point to any Order that counsel violated when he filed Notice of Lien. Also, instant lien could be viewed as proper construction lien to extent plaintiff sought return of hotel fixtures, and record suggested that counsel had followed appropriate procedures for filing lis pendens with County Register of Deeds.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-newspaper’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ action under Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) seeking damages under circumstances where defendant obtained their birth date, height, weight, hair color and eye color from Ill. Secretary of State motor vehicle records and published said information in newspaper article that criticized homicide investigation lineup in which plaintiffs had participated. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that instant published information did not constitute “personal information” for purposes of DPPA, or that DPPA’s prohibition on acquiring and disclosing personal information from driving records violated defendant’s freedom of speech rights under First Amendment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison and prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 and ADA/Rehabilitation Act actions alleging that defendants failed to accommodate his disability by providing him with suitable wheelchair, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to all but two of his relevant grievances, and that defendant had not been denied access to prison facilities within meaning of ADA or Rehabilitation Act. While plaintiff argued that Dist. Ct. should have granted his request to conduct Peavy hearing to determine whether he had exhausted his administrative remedies prior to acting on summary judgment motion, record showed that plaintiff had failed to follow Dist. Ct.’s order with respect to procedure for filing request for Peavy hearing. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s summary judgment motion where: (1) plaintiff could not pursue section 1983 action against prison or Commissioner in his official capacity since neither are “persons” for purposes of section 1983; and (2) plaintiff could not establish either ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim, since plaintiff’s allegation that he was inconvenienced through lack of suitable wheelchair did not amount to complete denial of services.

Magistrate Judge lacked jurisdiction to act on and dismiss plaintiff’s pro se “motion to establish court’s jurisdiction” that had been filed after parties had stipulated to dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff’s discrimination claim against defendant-union. Although parties had consented to Magistrate Judge acting on case prior to initial dismissal, Magistrate Judge lacked jurisdiction to act plaintiff’s motion since: (1) plaintiff’s motion was essentially motion to enforce terms of settlement, which was outside scope of original consent for Magistrate Judge to act on case; and (2) plaintiff’s motion was essentially new cause of action that required separate consent by parties in order for Magistrate Judge to act on matter.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officers violated his due process rights by fabricating evidence in order to obtain burglary charges to which plaintiff was eventually acquitted. Due process is not implicated where, as here, defendant was released on bond shortly after his arrest and was eventually acquitted of all criminal charges at trial. Moreover, plaintiff could not assert viable Brady violation arising out of defendants’ alleged failure to reveal their alleged misconduct to prosecutors, where defendants were under no constitutional obligation to create truthful exculpatory evidence for plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated their 4th Amendment rights, when one defendant officer, without search warrant, peered though window of plaintiff’s home and told 14-year-old in home that he “had to” search premises and then proceeded to search garage for alleged stolen trailer and lawn mowers. Search of plaintiffs’ garage was protected by 4th Amendment, and search conducted without warrant is per se unreasonable subject to only few exceptions. Moreover, Dist. Ct. erred in finding that 14-year-old had given consent because she “complied” with officer’s statement, where: (1) complaint did not allege that defendants asked for consent to search; and (2) officer’s statement that he “had to” search premises was not request for consent. Ct. further suggested that officer may have overstepped bounds of 4th Amendment by staring through window to communicate with 14-year old, and that 14-year-old may not have possessed either actual or apparent authority to allow search of her parent’s home.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-former employer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff-former employee’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s due process and equal protection rights when defendant forced him to quit his job after being accused of stealing City funds and then failing to rehire him after he was acquitted of all criminal charges and after plaintiff was placed on “do not hire” list. Plaintiff’s due process claims based on his forced resignation, as well as alleged stigma on his reputation were time-barred, where: (1) instant lawsuit was filed more than 2 years after his termination and after theft charges were posted on defendant’s website; and (2) plaintiff could not rely on any discovery rule to extend limitations period. Moreover, plaintiff failed to allege viable due process claim arising out of defendant’s failure to rehire him since plaintiff failed to allege existence of constitutionally protected property interest in his reinstatement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion to dismiss filed by one defendant-police officer in section 1983 action alleging that said officer violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by detaining her at her residence for 37 minutes after said officer received word that plaintiff had recently attempted suicide. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that officer could only detain plaintiff if he had personally witnessed suicide attempt, and although plaintiff seemed calm at time officer arrived at scene, information that officer had received about potential fragility of plaintiff’s mental state supported his decision to detain plaintiff for said period of time. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting another officer’s motion to dismiss, where record showed that: (1) said officer took plaintiff to hospital in spite of her calm demeanor and filled out petition for involuntary judicial admission that wrongfully suggested that plaintiff had been examined by physician and falsely stated that plaintiff told him that she was thinking of suicide; and (2) officer’s actions resulted in plaintiff having to stay in hospital for three days.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs-prisoners’ action alleging that defendants-prison officials’ seizure of their fans and typewriters from their cells after plaintiffs had purchased said items from prison commissary violated Takings Clause of U.S. Constitution and constituted breaches of contract with plaintiffs. Under Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172, plaintiffs could not proceed on said claims until they exhausted available state remedies in form of action filed with Illinois Ct. of Claims. However, instant dismissal should have been without prejudice to plaintiffs seeking remedy with Ct. of Claims.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing without prejudice lawsuits filed by Holocaust survivors and heirs of Holocaust victims against Hungarian railway and national bank seeking compensation for property seized from plaintiffs during Holocaust. While defendants-national railway and national bank could be sued in U.S. under exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act if plaintiffs could demonstrate that they had exhausted any available Hungarian remedies, plaintiffs failed to show that Hungarian courts were clearly sham or inadequate forums. Fact that Hungarian courts lacked class action mechanism or that return to Hungary posed potential security concerns for plaintiffs did not require different result. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds plaintiffs’ lawsuit against private bank, where relative convenience of parties and practical difficulties of dealing with Hungarian documents and Hungarian law favored trial in Hungary, especially where cases against national railway and national bank were now going to be held in Hungary.