Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs-gun owners’ request to enjoin enforcement of defendant’s ordinance than banned possession of assault weapons (any semi-automatic gun that can accept large-capacity magazine), as well as large capacity magazine that can accept more than 10 rounds. While plaintiffs argued that said ordinance violated Second Amendment as construed under Heller, 554 US 570, record contained some evidence suggesting that subject guns were “dangerous,” and instant ordinance, consistent with Heller, otherwise allowed citizens to own variety of handguns that could be used for self-protection. Moreover, Ct. agreed with defendant that some categorical limits on kinds of weapons that can be possessed are proper, and further noted that similar ordinance has already been found not to violate Second Amendment by another Circuit Court of Appeals. Ct. also observed that close questions concerning relation among assault weapons, crime and self-defense are best resolved through political process, rather than through court system. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s action alleging that defendants violated Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act by denying plaintiff’s (member of Navajo Tribe) request for venison and use of multi-color headband during celebration of Tribe’s Ghost Feast, which defendants conceded was religious event. While Dist. Ct. found that absence of venison would not impose substantial burden on plaintiff’s religious exercise, summary judgment required Dist. Ct. to view all disputed facts in light most favorable to plaintiff, who indicated that venison played important role in Ghost Feast. Moreover, limited state of record failed to support defendants’ argument that increased expense at providing USDA-inspected venison was compelling reason to deny such request. Also, defendants failed to establish that plaintiff’s request for multi-colored headband related to their concern that such headband would act as signal of gang membership to other inmates.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging defendants lied about date of certain police dept. roll call announcement at which plaintiff-police officer was present, which formed basis of plaintiff’s prosecution on drug conspiracy charges that eventually resulted in plaintiff’s acquittal. Grand jury’s indictment on said charge was prima facie evidence of existence of probable cause that served to preclude plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, and record otherwise showed existence of probable cause where: (1) purported drug dealer had attempted to bribe other police officers; and (2) wire tap evidence indicated that plaintiff had made several calls to said drug dealer to either meet in person or to warn drug dealer about arrest of drug dealer’s associate. Moreover, record refuted plaintiff’s theory that he was set up by defendants after they had become aware that plaintiff had warned drug dealer about police surveillance that had been announced at said roll call. Also, plaintiff could not assert similar equal protection claim where: (1) such claim was mere rewording of unsuccessful malicious prosecution action; and (2) none of plaintiff’s comparable police officers were similarly-situated to plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on statute of limitations grounds plaintiffs’ class action alleging that defendants violated RICO through efforts to unlawfully market anticonvulsant medication (Depakote) for ineffective and unsafe “off-label” uses that had not been approved by FDA. While defendants argued that instant 2013 action fell outside applicable 4-year limitation period since it sought damages for injuries going back to 1998, when class members began reimbursing for off-label prescriptions for Depakote, Dist. Ct. erred in resolving statute of limitations issue prior to parties conducting any discovery. Moreover, record was unclear from contents of complaint as to when class members actually became aware that they were paying for off-label use of said drug, or when class members should have discovered that they had paid more for off-label uses of said drug than it otherwise would have had to pay in absence of any unlawful marketing scheme.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds plaintiff (15-year old female’s) section 1983 action, alleging that defendant, in responding to 911 call that involved plaintiff and three males, improperly left plaintiff, who was intoxicated, with said males under circumstances where defendant called off another police officer who had also responded to said call, and where plaintiff was subsequently sexually assaulted by one of said males. Plaintiff failed to identify any existing case law that would have required defendant to protect plaintiff against private violence under allegations of instant complaint. Moreover, plaintiff failed to state viable due process claim since: (1) State’s failure to protect individual against private violence does not generally establish any due process claim; (2) any state-created danger exception did not apply, if record showed that defendant merely stood by and did nothing to prevent private violence; and (3) defendant’s decision to leave plaintiff with said males placed her in no worse position than that in which she would have been placed had defendant not acted at all. Fact that instant dismissal occurred before any discovery took place did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ class action alleging that defendant-airline’s cancellation of flights, as well as its long delays for flights emanating from airports located in European Union Member States, violated certain regulations promulgated by European Parliament. Record showed that said regulations had not been incorporated into defendant’s contract for carriage so as to support any breach of contract claim, and relevant regulations, which required each EU Member State to designate appropriate body to handle enforcement of said regulation, implicitly limited judicial redress to courts of EU Member States.

In action brought by govt. seeking civil forfeiture of funds held by defendant that belonged to Abu al Tayyeb, who was suspected of providing financial and military support for al Qaeda, Dist. Ct. erred in granting summary judgment to instant claimants-insurance companies that had paid over $2.5 billion in property damage claims arising out of September 11 attacks, where said claimants asserted that they were entitled to said funds under Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA). Although claimants had standing to sue for said funds, they were not entitled to said funds under TRIA since at time instant claim was filed by claimants, said funds were not “blocked” funds, but rather were subject to license issued by Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and thus were outside ambit of TRIA where, as here, govt. had been given authority to control said funds through instant civil forfeiture action. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-prisoner’s 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials’ transportation of plaintiff from county jail to state prison while clothed in transparent jumpsuit that exposed plaintiff’s genitals and buttocks violated his 8th Amendment rights, where plaintiff alleged that use of transparent jumpsuit had no legitimate correctional purpose, but was instead used to humiliate and inflict psychological pain. Moreover, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s 4th Amendment claim on basis that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, where plaintiff’s transfer made it impossible to comply with jail’s specific grievance procedures. However, plaintiff could not prevail on merits of his 4th Amendment claim, where plaintiff’s status as convicted prisoner precluded him from establishing that wearing said jumpsuit constituted unreasonable search in absence of allegation that defendants had actually intruded into his body.

In personal injury action filed by debtor, in which debtor sought to substitute his Bankruptcy Trustee as plaintiff due to fact that debtor had failed to include instant action in his previously-filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, Dist. Ct. erred in finding that Trustee’s recovery in instant action could not exceed value of debts that had not been paid in debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Dist. Ct. did not find that debtor had deliberately hid instant action from his creditors in bankruptcy proceeding, and Dist. Ct.’s categorical rule that would limit recovery in all cases where debtor had failed to include litigation in bankruptcy petition could potentially hurt creditors under circumstances where limitation would reduce amount at stake to level which would induce Trustee to abandon subsequent litigation. As such, debtors, who in good faith erred by not including all litigation in bankruptcy petition, remain entitled to any surplus recovered in such litigation just as if said litigation had been originally listed in bankruptcy petition.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting on immunity grounds defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-reporter’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment right to freedom of press by denying his request for media credentials for Illinois House of Representatives and Illinois Senate, where defendants held belief that plaintiff’s employer was lobbyist, and where House and Senate had rule than banned lobbyists from having access to floor of each chamber that credentials would have given to plaintiff. Defendants were entitled to absolute legislative immunity, where instant denial concerned subject matter that was within defendants’ core legislative activities.