Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging various 8th Amendment violations against defendant-prison due to fact that plaintiff had failed to pay $2.02 initial partial filing fee. While plaintiff’s prison account, from which fee would have been paid, had less than zero balance at time Dist. Ct. had ordered said payment, record showed that plaintiff had made various attempts to have prison authorities forward said amount to Dist. Ct., and law otherwise required prison authorities to process plaintiff’s request, where plaintiff had sued prison. As such, and in absence of evidence that plaintiff had intentionally depleted his trust account to avoid paying filing fee, plaintiff should not have been penalized where prison authorities had failed to forward $2.02 filing fee as directed by Dist. Ct. order.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to resolve plaintiff-insurance company’s interpleader action to determine ownership of insurance policy proceeds that were claimed by ex-husband of deceased insured. Plaintiff could not rely on 18 USC section 1335(a)(2) to supply jurisdictional basis of instant lawsuit, since plaintiff failed to deposit policy proceeds with Dist. Ct. upon filing of case. Moreover, although parties satisfied provisions of general diversity statute under Section 1332, where all parties were diverse and stakes of lawsuit exceeded $75,000, there was no justiciable controversy at time of lawsuit’s filing, where: (1) defendant-ex-husband was only claimant to said proceeds; and (2) at time of lawsuit's filing, Texas statute eliminated any risk of plaintiff being forced to pay proceeds to anyone other than ex-husband.

In action alleging that plaintiff incurred personal injuries arising out of her fall on sidewalk near entrance into defendant’s gas station convenience store, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request to introduce into evidence municipal ordinance requiring defendant to maintain minimum width of 36 inches for wheel-chair accessible walkways into its store. Although plaintiff’s fall occurred in area of sidewalk that was only 24 inches in width due to store display that had intruded onto sidewalk, Dist. Ct. could properly find that said ordinance was irrelevant where: (1) instant complaint did not assert violation of said ordinance; (2) ordinance was only intended to protect individuals in wheelchairs; and (3) plaintiff did not belong to class of persons that ordinance was intended to protect. Ct. also observed that customers of reasonable prudence would have appreciated risk associated with traversing narrow walkway and would have taken measures to protect against such risk.

Dist. Ct. properly found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s lawsuit, alleging that defendant, as federal fiduciary charged with managing plaintiff’s veterans’ benefits, breached its fiduciary duty to plaintiff, even though it complied with its obligations to Veterans Administration as plaintiff’s federal fiduciary. Instant complaint was really challenge to defendant’s appointment as plaintiff’s federal fiduciary and to instant distribution of veterans’ benefits, which could only be addressed by first filing action in Veterans Court and then appealing any adverse ruling to Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiff $2,000 in additional attorney fees generated during contested fee petition under 42 USC section 1988. Plaintiff accepted defendants’ Rule 68(a) settlement offer in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, and while defendants argued that terms of settlement offer precluded plaintiff from obtaining any fees generated after date of acceptance of settlement offer, terms of settlement offer required defendants to allow judgment to be taken against them in “total amount of reasonable attorney fees.” As such, instant fee award was permissible since Dist. Ct. had found that plaintiffs incurred $2,000 in fees that were generated when responding to defendants’ unreasonable challenges of plaintiff’s fee request.

Record failed to contain sufficient evidence to support ALJ’s denial of portion of claimant’s application for Supplemental Security Income seeking benefits prior to her 55th birthday, based on claimant’s diagnosis of fibromyalgia and spinal disk disease. Claimant’s treating physicians and three consultative physicians found that claimant had difficulty walking and gripping objects, and record otherwise failed to present sufficient grounds for ALJ to disbelieve opinion of one treating physician, where ALJ relied on said physician’s lack of detailed notes to support his opinion. Ct. further observed that ALJ: (1) failed to consider key medical evidence that supported physician’s opinion that claimant suffered from significant spinal disease that affected her limitations on gait, gripping and ability to rise up from seated position; and (2) failed to estimate number of jobs claimant would be able to perform in nation as whole, as opposed to jobs in claimant's region. Ct. also noted that there was nothing in record to show how vocational expert calculated number of jobs to which he testified.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s False Claims Act action, alleging that defendant submitted false claims seeking from Medicare reimbursement of drug prescriptions, where defendant made gifts to customers in order to retain their business, and where such practice had practical effect transferring cost of co-pay from customer to govt. Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege acts of fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b) and failed to identify any specific customer who had received kickback/return of his or her co-pay. Moreover, plaintiff failed to allege that defendant knew at time it made any claim to Medicare that said claim was actually false. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in dismissing plaintiff’s retaliation claim, where plaintiff adequately alleged that he was terminated for making internal complaint regarding defendant’s practice of giving gifts to retain customers.

Dist. Ct. erred in approving settlement of class action that challenged defendant’s marketing of glucosamine pills that were designed to assist people with their bone/joint disorders, where settlement required defendant to pay $5.63 million, with $1.93 million of said figure going to class counsel, but only $865,284 going to class members. Fees awarded to class counsel were excessive, where it represented 69 percent of total going to class counsel and class members. Moreover, record showed that notice of lawsuit going to potential 4.72 million class members actually discouraged said members from filing claim. Dist. Ct. also erred in approving: (1) $1.13 million of settlement figure as cy pres award to non-class member entity, where there was no showing that it was not feasible to provide compensation to consumers of defendant’s glucosamine; and (2) reversion clause in settlement that transferred any court-ordered reduction in fees to defendant, as opposed to class members.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants conducted search of defendant’s home in unreasonable manner, while executing arrest warrant for third-party in defendant’s home that resulted in plaintiff's death during confrontation with defendants. While instant nighttime execution of warrant might be viewed as unreasonable under certain circumstances, especially since defendants were only seeking third-party/burglar as well as his stolen property, plaintiff failed to authenticate expert’s report on issue of reasonableness of County’s policy so as to allow plaintiff to proceed against defendant-County. Moreover, defendants-officers were entitled to qualified immunity, where they were merely following orders/County’s policy when executing warrant during nighttime hours, and where there was no case law that specifically precluded defendant’s actions.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing portion of plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-Warden was deliberately indifferent to wet stairs outside shower area of prison that plaintiff claimed was hazardous. Although plaintiff slipped on said stairs and injured his back, said stairs were not sufficiently dangerous so as to support 8th Amendment claim. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment in portion of plaintiff’s action claiming that prison doctor was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs by failing to obtain second MRI on plaintiff’s back, since plaintiff’s disagreement with prison doctor as to appropriate course of medical treatment is insufficient to establish 8th Amendment claim.