Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s qui tam action under False Claims Act, alleging that defendant tendered false certifications when obtaining monetary grants under Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, where defendant certified that it had equal employment opportunity program, and that it had implemented said program. While defendant had written plan and had implemented equal opportunity and affirmative action program that had differed somewhat from written plan, implemented plan comported with federal requirements and was in substantial compliance with submitted written plan. Moreover, plaintiff failed to present evidence that individuals who wrote grant applications knew that defendant was implementing program that differed from written plan.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiffs’ section 1983 actions alleging that defendant used torture tactics to extract statements from them that were used in their criminal trials, where defendant’s conduct occurred well before applicable 2-year limitations period for filing section 1983 actions. Moreover, plaintiffs could not use continuing violation doctrine to render instant complaints timely since each of defendant’s alleged torture episodes constituted concrete act that triggered separate limitations period. Ct. further rejected plaintiff’s contention that equitable tolling applied since plaintiffs were aware at time of alleged torture that they had been injured and by whom. Ct. also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that there lawsuits were timely since suing defendant at earlier time would have been futile, since plaintiffs cannot decide for themselves that any lawsuit would have been futile and thereby give themselves extra years to file their lawsuits.

Plaintiff-co-presidents of organization of atheists and agnostics lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit challenging on 1st Amendment grounds “parsonage exemption” under section 107(2) of Internal Revenue Code that excludes value of employer-provided housing benefits from gross income of “minister of the gospel.” While plaintiffs received housing allowance from instant organization, they failed to exclude said income on their tax returns, and neither plaintiff filed claim for refund after payment of taxes. As such, plaintiffs’ lawsuit amounted to nothing more than generalized grievance about constitutionality of section 107(2), which was insufficient to support their standing to bring instant action.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid cause of action plaintiff’s qui tam claim under False Claims Act, alleging that defendant over-billed Medicaid by submitting on behalf of dual-eligible customers bills for prescription drugs at higher Medicaid rates, even though defendant had initially submitted said bills to customers’ private insurance companies, which paid for said drugs at lower rates. Under False Claims Act, plaintiff was required to show that defendant’s claims to Medicaid were “false” or “fraudulent,” and he could not make such showing where, although Medicaid is only liable to extent that private insurance company had not paid said bills, instant bills at Medicaid rates were not “false” under State Medicaid Manual, where regulations contemplated that Medicaid would get billed for amounts beyond what it technically owed and would bear ultimate responsibility for not paying said bills when any over-billing occurred.

In action to compel defendant-reinsurance company owned by Uruguay to arbitrate action by plaintiff-insurance company alleging that defendant owed plaintiff $2,352,464.08 under reinsurance contracts, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s answer to complaint due to defendant’s failure to post security under Illinois Unauthorized Insurers Process (UIPA) to cover instant claim. Plaintiff conceded that Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) generally applied to defendant, and FSIA barred application of UIPA to defendant since security required by UIPA qualified as “attachment” under FSIA. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendant was not obligated to arbitrate parties’ dispute, since contract in which plaintiff purchased instant claim did not include right to demand arbitration.

Dist. Ct. erred in assessing attorney fees under 42 USC section 1988 against City in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-police officer used excessive force while detaining plaintiff at police station, where jury awarded plaintiff $1 in compensatory damages and $7,500 in punitive damages against police officer. While plaintiff sought such fees under section 9-102 of Ill. Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, section 9-102 granted City discretion in choosing to indemnify plaintiff for attorney fees generated in plaintiff's action against police officer, which it was not required to do in instant case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-University’s motion for summary judgment in section 1981 action alleging that defendant improperly disaffiliated plaintiff-Jewish Chabad House from its campus and directed University’s food supplier to terminate its contract with plaintiff’s Rabbi due to defendant’s hostility to Chabad sect of Judaism. Plaintiff’s allegation of religious discrimination is not covered under section 1981, and record otherwise showed that basis for disaffiliation from University was based on complaints of under-aged drinking/alcohol abuse at plaintiff’s House. Fact that certain University staff did not take same measures against other student organizations did not require different result, since said organizations were distinguishable in that they were not managed by adults, and since alleged leniency by University staff occurred at time different decision-maker was in charge.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity in section 1983 action by plaintiff-Nigerian national, alleging that defendants failed to comply with Article 36 of Vienna Convention in Consular Relations, which requires “authorities” to inform plaintiff of his right to have his own consular officials alerted to his arrest or detention. While defendants failed to comply with Article 36 notification obligation after plaintiff was arrested and charged with drug offense, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, where case law was unclear as whether instant defendants, who arrested, transported and interrogated plaintiff within three-hour period had any duty to ascertain plaintiff’s nationality and then inform him of his Convention rights.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants (police officer and others) engaged in malicious prosecution of plaintiff on theft and fraud charges, where plaintiff was eventually found not guilty of said charges. Plaintiff failed to allege predicate constitutional violation in support of his 14th Amendment malicious prosecution claim, and plaintiff otherwise had no constitutional right not to be prosecuted without probable cause. Moreover, plaintiff failed to state viable 4th Amendment malicious prosecution claim, where any “seizure” of plaintiff ended when prosecution began, and where plaintiff’s allegations concerned conduct that occurred after said arraignment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant (provider of rental DVDs) violated Video Privacy Protection Act, when it disclosed to third-party defendant’s customer database to assist third-party when third-party fielded calls from defendant’s customers at customer service call center. Defendant’s actions fell within statutory exception for disclosures incident to “request processing” related to its rentals of DVDs.