Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant breached certain Housing Assistance Payments contracts by failing to approve annual rent increases, as required by federal law, and by requiring plaintiffs (who owned rental properties assisted by federal Section 8 program) to submit rent comparability studies as prerequisites to receiving rent increases. Although instant action asserted only state-law breach of contract claim, federal question jurisdiction under 28 USC section 1331 existed over instant action, where said action stated substantial federal issue that met 4-element jurisdictional test under Gunn, 133 S.Ct. 1059, and where instant action concerned important issues with respect to scope of federal Section 8 program.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his civil commitment as sexually violent person, where said commitment order occurred in 2008, and where defendant was not transferred to civil commitment facility until 2.5 years later when defendant completed his term of incarceration on parole violation. Defendant failed to establish any violation of federal constitutional law/due process arising out of his current civil commitment since: (1) defendant did not contest 2008 commitment order; (2) defendant did not establish that he no longer had mental disorder at time of 2010 transfer; and (3) Wisconsin has procedure for defendant to obtain his release by establishing that he no longer has relevant mental disorder that made it likely that he would engage in sexual violence.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 Monell, policy or practice claim against defendant-City that had been stayed while plaintiff pursued related section 1983 action alleging that defendant’s police officers violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights when they arrested him on traffic insurance card violation and delayed his appearance in court for probable cause hearing while investigating plaintiff for unsolved robberies, even though: (1) plaintiff had previously obtained $60,000 judgment against police officers in section 1983 action; and (2) defendant had informed Dist. Ct. that it would indemnify said police officers for any compensatory damages award, pay any nominal damage award against it and reimburse plaintiff for his reasonable attorney fees and costs. While Dist. Ct. justified dismissal based on its belief that plaintiff had already received all monetary relief that he could recover on instant Monell claim when defendant agreed to indemnify police officers in plaintiff’s claim against said officers, Dist. Ct. could not sua sponte dismiss Monell action without giving plaintiff opportunity to cure any defect or defend merits of claim. Moreover, Dist. Ct. improperly treated matter as though defendant had made Rule 68 offer of judgment and should have given plaintiff opportunity to pursue other relief against defendant as plaintiff had previously requested opportunity to do so.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendant terminated plaintiff due to his support of political opponent of defendant’s Town President, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion for sanctions under 18 USC section 1927, based on claim that plaintiff’s attorney had filed many post-verdict motions in action that was settled for less than half of initial verdict in favor of plaintiff, where Dist. Ct. could properly have concluded that loss to plaintiff and his counsel of $400,000 apiece when settlement replaced jury’s verdict was sanction enough. However, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s request for sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) based on failure of plaintiff’s counsel to report to Dist. Ct. fact that plaintiff had filed bankruptcy petition during pendency of instant section 1983 claim, since: (1) plaintiff’s counsel did not contest finding that her conduct violated Rule 26(g)(3); and (2) said finding mandated that some sort of monetary or other sanction be imposed

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss 2011 state-court action seeking to have defendant pay plaintiff money that defendant had received from deceased’s pension plan, where said action had been removed to federal court. Record showed that 2011 filing was in response to similar 1997 action, in which favorable summary judgment (that had been entered on behalf of plaintiff’s mother) was vacated because mother had died prior to entry of summary judgment, and while defendant argued that any voluntary motion to dismiss must include dismissal of 1997 action, such argument was unavailing since: (1) defendant originally argued that instant removal action pertained only to 2011 action that plaintiff had filed on behalf of his mother’s estate; and (2) instant removal action could only pertain to 2011 action, since 30-day deadline for removing 1997 action had long passed.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging various 8th Amendment violations against defendant-prison due to fact that plaintiff had failed to pay $2.02 initial partial filing fee. While plaintiff’s prison account, from which fee would have been paid, had less than zero balance at time Dist. Ct. had ordered said payment, record showed that plaintiff had made various attempts to have prison authorities forward said amount to Dist. Ct., and law otherwise required prison authorities to process plaintiff’s request, where plaintiff had sued prison. As such, and in absence of evidence that plaintiff had intentionally depleted his trust account to avoid paying filing fee, plaintiff should not have been penalized where prison authorities had failed to forward $2.02 filing fee as directed by Dist. Ct. order.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to resolve plaintiff-insurance company’s interpleader action to determine ownership of insurance policy proceeds that were claimed by ex-husband of deceased insured. Plaintiff could not rely on 18 USC section 1335(a)(2) to supply jurisdictional basis of instant lawsuit, since plaintiff failed to deposit policy proceeds with Dist. Ct. upon filing of case. Moreover, although parties satisfied provisions of general diversity statute under Section 1332, where all parties were diverse and stakes of lawsuit exceeded $75,000, there was no justiciable controversy at time of lawsuit’s filing, where: (1) defendant-ex-husband was only claimant to said proceeds; and (2) at time of lawsuit's filing, Texas statute eliminated any risk of plaintiff being forced to pay proceeds to anyone other than ex-husband.

In action alleging that plaintiff incurred personal injuries arising out of her fall on sidewalk near entrance into defendant’s gas station convenience store, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request to introduce into evidence municipal ordinance requiring defendant to maintain minimum width of 36 inches for wheel-chair accessible walkways into its store. Although plaintiff’s fall occurred in area of sidewalk that was only 24 inches in width due to store display that had intruded onto sidewalk, Dist. Ct. could properly find that said ordinance was irrelevant where: (1) instant complaint did not assert violation of said ordinance; (2) ordinance was only intended to protect individuals in wheelchairs; and (3) plaintiff did not belong to class of persons that ordinance was intended to protect. Ct. also observed that customers of reasonable prudence would have appreciated risk associated with traversing narrow walkway and would have taken measures to protect against such risk.

Dist. Ct. properly found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s lawsuit, alleging that defendant, as federal fiduciary charged with managing plaintiff’s veterans’ benefits, breached its fiduciary duty to plaintiff, even though it complied with its obligations to Veterans Administration as plaintiff’s federal fiduciary. Instant complaint was really challenge to defendant’s appointment as plaintiff’s federal fiduciary and to instant distribution of veterans’ benefits, which could only be addressed by first filing action in Veterans Court and then appealing any adverse ruling to Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.