Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiff $2,000 in additional attorney fees generated during contested fee petition under 42 USC section 1988. Plaintiff accepted defendants’ Rule 68(a) settlement offer in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, and while defendants argued that terms of settlement offer precluded plaintiff from obtaining any fees generated after date of acceptance of settlement offer, terms of settlement offer required defendants to allow judgment to be taken against them in “total amount of reasonable attorney fees.” As such, instant fee award was permissible since Dist. Ct. had found that plaintiffs incurred $2,000 in fees that were generated when responding to defendants’ unreasonable challenges of plaintiff’s fee request.

Record failed to contain sufficient evidence to support ALJ’s denial of portion of claimant’s application for Supplemental Security Income seeking benefits prior to her 55th birthday, based on claimant’s diagnosis of fibromyalgia and spinal disk disease. Claimant’s treating physicians and three consultative physicians found that claimant had difficulty walking and gripping objects, and record otherwise failed to present sufficient grounds for ALJ to disbelieve opinion of one treating physician, where ALJ relied on said physician’s lack of detailed notes to support his opinion. Ct. further observed that ALJ: (1) failed to consider key medical evidence that supported physician’s opinion that claimant suffered from significant spinal disease that affected her limitations on gait, gripping and ability to rise up from seated position; and (2) failed to estimate number of jobs claimant would be able to perform in nation as whole, as opposed to jobs in claimant's region. Ct. also noted that there was nothing in record to show how vocational expert calculated number of jobs to which he testified.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s False Claims Act action, alleging that defendant submitted false claims seeking from Medicare reimbursement of drug prescriptions, where defendant made gifts to customers in order to retain their business, and where such practice had practical effect transferring cost of co-pay from customer to govt. Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege acts of fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b) and failed to identify any specific customer who had received kickback/return of his or her co-pay. Moreover, plaintiff failed to allege that defendant knew at time it made any claim to Medicare that said claim was actually false. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in dismissing plaintiff’s retaliation claim, where plaintiff adequately alleged that he was terminated for making internal complaint regarding defendant’s practice of giving gifts to retain customers.

Dist. Ct. erred in approving settlement of class action that challenged defendant’s marketing of glucosamine pills that were designed to assist people with their bone/joint disorders, where settlement required defendant to pay $5.63 million, with $1.93 million of said figure going to class counsel, but only $865,284 going to class members. Fees awarded to class counsel were excessive, where it represented 69 percent of total going to class counsel and class members. Moreover, record showed that notice of lawsuit going to potential 4.72 million class members actually discouraged said members from filing claim. Dist. Ct. also erred in approving: (1) $1.13 million of settlement figure as cy pres award to non-class member entity, where there was no showing that it was not feasible to provide compensation to consumers of defendant’s glucosamine; and (2) reversion clause in settlement that transferred any court-ordered reduction in fees to defendant, as opposed to class members.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants conducted search of defendant’s home in unreasonable manner, while executing arrest warrant for third-party in defendant’s home that resulted in plaintiff's death during confrontation with defendants. While instant nighttime execution of warrant might be viewed as unreasonable under certain circumstances, especially since defendants were only seeking third-party/burglar as well as his stolen property, plaintiff failed to authenticate expert’s report on issue of reasonableness of County’s policy so as to allow plaintiff to proceed against defendant-County. Moreover, defendants-officers were entitled to qualified immunity, where they were merely following orders/County’s policy when executing warrant during nighttime hours, and where there was no case law that specifically precluded defendant’s actions.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing portion of plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-Warden was deliberately indifferent to wet stairs outside shower area of prison that plaintiff claimed was hazardous. Although plaintiff slipped on said stairs and injured his back, said stairs were not sufficiently dangerous so as to support 8th Amendment claim. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment in portion of plaintiff’s action claiming that prison doctor was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs by failing to obtain second MRI on plaintiff’s back, since plaintiff’s disagreement with prison doctor as to appropriate course of medical treatment is insufficient to establish 8th Amendment claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s qui tam action under False Claims Act, alleging that defendant tendered false certifications when obtaining monetary grants under Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, where defendant certified that it had equal employment opportunity program, and that it had implemented said program. While defendant had written plan and had implemented equal opportunity and affirmative action program that had differed somewhat from written plan, implemented plan comported with federal requirements and was in substantial compliance with submitted written plan. Moreover, plaintiff failed to present evidence that individuals who wrote grant applications knew that defendant was implementing program that differed from written plan.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiffs’ section 1983 actions alleging that defendant used torture tactics to extract statements from them that were used in their criminal trials, where defendant’s conduct occurred well before applicable 2-year limitations period for filing section 1983 actions. Moreover, plaintiffs could not use continuing violation doctrine to render instant complaints timely since each of defendant’s alleged torture episodes constituted concrete act that triggered separate limitations period. Ct. further rejected plaintiff’s contention that equitable tolling applied since plaintiffs were aware at time of alleged torture that they had been injured and by whom. Ct. also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that there lawsuits were timely since suing defendant at earlier time would have been futile, since plaintiffs cannot decide for themselves that any lawsuit would have been futile and thereby give themselves extra years to file their lawsuits.

Plaintiff-co-presidents of organization of atheists and agnostics lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit challenging on 1st Amendment grounds “parsonage exemption” under section 107(2) of Internal Revenue Code that excludes value of employer-provided housing benefits from gross income of “minister of the gospel.” While plaintiffs received housing allowance from instant organization, they failed to exclude said income on their tax returns, and neither plaintiff filed claim for refund after payment of taxes. As such, plaintiffs’ lawsuit amounted to nothing more than generalized grievance about constitutionality of section 107(2), which was insufficient to support their standing to bring instant action.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid cause of action plaintiff’s qui tam claim under False Claims Act, alleging that defendant over-billed Medicaid by submitting on behalf of dual-eligible customers bills for prescription drugs at higher Medicaid rates, even though defendant had initially submitted said bills to customers’ private insurance companies, which paid for said drugs at lower rates. Under False Claims Act, plaintiff was required to show that defendant’s claims to Medicaid were “false” or “fraudulent,” and he could not make such showing where, although Medicaid is only liable to extent that private insurance company had not paid said bills, instant bills at Medicaid rates were not “false” under State Medicaid Manual, where regulations contemplated that Medicaid would get billed for amounts beyond what it technically owed and would bear ultimate responsibility for not paying said bills when any over-billing occurred.