Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials subjected him to unlawful arrest in Aldi’s parking lot on charge of driving without valid license. While Dist. Ct. believed that plaintiff’s lawsuit was precluded by Heck, 512 US 477, since defendant had pleaded guilty to charge that stemmed from instant arrest, plaintiff could proceed on his lawsuit, where finding that defendant was subject to unlawful seizure would have no bearing or relevance to validity of his guilty plea and/or factual basis for his ensuing conviction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss instant mandamus action by plaintiff-physician seeking to compel defendant to process his Medicare claims that he had submitted for reimbursement, but were being held up for processing due to fact that plaintiff had been indicted on Medicare fraud charges. Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to consider instant mandamus action, since plaintiff had failed to exhaust all of his administrative remedies within Dept. of Health and Human Services prior to filing instant mandamus action. Ct. further observed that because instant claims were submitted by individual who was under indictment for Medicare fraud, said claims were not “clean claims” that were subject to any mandatory time frame for making payments to plaintiff.

In section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendant-prison medical director was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs that concerned an alleged stomach infection, as well as certain keloids on his body, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for issuance of preliminary injunction that would have required defendant to immediately refer plaintiff to “suitable doctor.” Laboratory results supplied by plaintiff indicated that plaintiff did not have stomach infection, and medical records indicated that plaintiff’s keloids were small and were being treated by prison doctors. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s section 1983 action, alleging that he was denied medical care for bullet wound to his abdomen. Although plaintiff had failed to file formal grievance with prison officials regarding said wound, record showed that plaintiff orally informed certain prison officials about his wound, and that said officials told plaintiff not to file formal grievance because plaintiff’s problem with his wound would be resolved informally. As such, plaintiff was not required to file formal grievance prior to filing instant action, where said prison officials invited his noncompliance with grievance procedure.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs-Native American Tribes’ motion under Rule 60 (b0(5) to relieve them from 1991 final judgment in action in which plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged state statute that prohibited members of Tribes from hunting deer at night on land outside of Tribes' reservations that Tribes had ceded to U.S. govt. in 1800s. Plaintiffs supported motion by arguing that additional deer meat was needed for subsistence and religious purposes due to increased unemployment and health issues facing Tribe members, and record did not support defendant’s claim that: (1) night-time deer hunting ban was necessary measure to protect public safety; or (2) said ban was least restrictive alternative to accomplish public health and safety. Ct. remanded matter to allow defendant opportunity to submit additional evidence to support its claim that night-time deer hunting posed serious safety problem that would justify continuation of 1991 judgment.

Ct. of Appeals assessed $50,000 as Rule 38 sanction arising out of third-party’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s dismissal of its proposed federal antitrust counterclaims. Ct. found that said appeal was frivolous, since third-party plaintiff’s appellate arguments essentially established violation of Rule 11, where third-party plaintiff argued that: (1) its counterclaims were so weak that they were insufficient to raise federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 29 USC section 1331 so as to allow Dist. Ct. to act on said counterclaims; and (2) its own claims and procedural maneuvers that were asserted/used in Dist. Ct. were baseless. Also, Ct. imposed said sanctions on third-party plaintiff, its owner and its counsel.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked reasonable suspicion to stop plaintiff in his vehicle, when defendants attempted to detain third-party whom defendants believed was subject of felony arrest warrant. Record showed that plaintiff, third-party and others were on front porch of home when defendants approached said group, and when plaintiff and others began to scatter. As such, defendants had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle since they could have reasonably believed that third-party was in said vehicle. Fact that defendants handcuffed plaintiff to secure scene did not transform stop into full-blown arrest, where record suggested that defendants were attempting to protect themselves while apprehending third-party who was suspect in murder case. Moreover, defendants had probable cause to subsequently arrest plaintiff when they later learned that plaintiff was driving stolen vehicle. Also, plaintiff could not proceed on claim that defendants improperly allowed unsworn facts to form basis of arrest report, where record showed that no named defendant played any role in generating said report.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that Wisconsin statute requiring voters to obtain and produce photo ID at polls was unconstitutional and in entering injunction to prohibit enforcement of said statute. Instant statute was similar to Indiana photo ID statute that U.S. Supreme Ct. upheld in Crawford, 553 US 181, and Dist. Ct.’s disagreement with Crawford Ct.’s holding, that goals of prevention of voter impersonation on election day and preservation of public confidence in integrity of elections justified photo ID requirement, was insufficient to support issuance of instant injunction. Ct. also rejected Dist. Ct.’s finding that instant statute violated Voting Rights Act and observed that: (1) it was easier in Wisconsin to obtain photo ID than in Indiana; and (2) any inconvenience in gathering required documents to obtain photo ID did not qualify as substantial burden on right to vote.

Ct. of Appeals reaffirmed its recent order to stay Dist. Ct.’s entry of injunction that prohibited enforcement of Wisc. statute requiring voters to produce photo IDs in order to vote, where defendants-state officials requested issuance of stay for purpose of allowing it to enforce photo ID requirement in this fall’s election. Defendants established strong likelihood of success on merits, where Wisc. statute was similar to Indiana statute that was upheld by U.S. Supreme Ct. in Crawford, 553 US 181. Moreover, Wisc. was entitled to enforcement of its law until statute’s validity has been finally determined. Ct. further rejected plaintiffs’ claim that voters will be unable to obtain photo IDs by time of November election, by observing that said voters already have had more than three years to obtain said IDs from date of statute’s enactment. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in issuing injunction that blocked State of Wisconsin from conducting judicially supervised criminal investigation into question as to whether certain persons violated state’s campaign-finance laws by coordinating fundraising efforts with independent group that was raising and spending money on particular issues. Instant injunction contravened Anti-Injunction Act, which prohibits Dist. Ct. from issuing injunction to stay state-court proceeding unless expressly authorized to do so or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to effectuate its judgment. Moreover, Dist. Ct. should not have intervened in state-court matter where: (1) plaintiff in instant case had received relief in state court by obtaining order that stopped investigation as matter of state law; (2) investigation pertained to criminal matter; (3) Dist. Ct. failed to consider principles of federalism, comity and equity prior to issuing injunction; and (4) legal uncertainty as to definition of “coordination” precluded finding that instant investigation was done in bad faith.