Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked exigent circumstances to justify warrantless entry into her apartment and subjected her to unreasonable seizure by taking her to local hospital against her will and then subjected her to excessive force that resulted in fracturing of her wrist on way to hospital. Defendants’ entry into plaintiff’s apartment was reasonable where defendants were aware that plaintiff had recently threatened to commit suicide. Moreover, decision to forcibly take plaintiff to hospital was reasonable based on prior report of suicide threats and observation of plaintiff, who appeared intoxicated and who indicated that she had taken anti-depressants. Also, plaintiff was not subjected to excessive force where plaintiff offered considerable resistance to leaving her apartment, and where defendants used techniques designed to subdue non-compliant individual and prevent escalation.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison doctors’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by failing to order MRI to address and diagnose pain in his shoulder. Defendant-physician held belief that plaintiff’s pain stemmed from arthritis, such that MRI would not assist him in diagnosis and treatment of plaintiff. Moreover, plaintiff could only potentially show that physician’s treatment of him was negligent, which is insufficient to establish instant 8th Amendment claim. Plaintiff also failed to show that medical standards called for use of MRI to determine whether diagnosis of arthritis based on x-ray films may be mistaken.

Dist. Ct. erred in sua sponte dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s action alleging that defendants-prison officials improperly used cruel and unusual punishment and infringed on plaintiff’s religious liberty, where dismissal was based on finding that plaintiff’s complaint was too lengthy and unintelligible. Record showed that substantive portion of complaint was only 28 pages and covered seven causes of action. Moreover, fair reading of complaint indicated that allegations were sufficiently clear.

In class action seeking to enforce Fair Labor Standards Act arising out of wages paid to 2,341 technicians hired to install and repair home satellite dishes, Dist. Ct. did not err in entering order that de-certified class after finding that necessity to conduct 2,341 separate damages hearings as part of class action would be impractical. Record showed that each technician was paid on per piece basis, and thus had different experiences with respect to hours worked and overtime paid. Fact that plaintiffs selected 42 individuals as “representatives” of all 2,341 technicians did not cure multiplicity problem where criteria for said selection was not divulged to Dist. Ct., and where record would not support general claim that all 2,341 technicians performed roughly same amount of regular and overtime work.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiffs to false arrest on charges of disorderly conduct, assault and obstruction of justice arising out of incident in which one plaintiff uttered threats to officers attempting to restrain said plaintiff’s dog that ultimately resulted in both plaintiffs being arrested and tasered by defendants. Defendants had probable cause to arrest one plaintiff, who uttered threats of physical violence to animal control officers, on charges of assault and disorderly conduct, and defendants were shielded by qualified immunity with respect to other plaintiff’s arrest on charge of obstruction of justice where reasonable minds could differ as to whether conduct of said plaintiff in yelling at defendants and failing to comply with their order to stop approaching them constituted attempt by said plaintiff to help other plaintiff resist arrest. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting summary judgment with respect to one plaintiff’s excessive force claim where record indicated that one defendant tasered said plaintiff second time after said plaintiff had stopped resisting defendant.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in Title VI, as well as section 1981 and 1983 claims alleging that defendant-police chief refused to add plaintiff to City’s preferred list of companies providing towing services on account of his race. While jury found that race was “a” motivating factor based on evidence that police chief frequently used racial slurs when speaking about plaintiff and other African-Americans, jury could also properly find that defendant would not have added plaintiff’s towing services to list even if race played no role in defendant’s actions where: (1) defendant did not add any towing service, including prospective towing service owned by white individual, during relevant time period; and (2) defendant was aware of report that plaintiff had overcharged his customers. Fact that jury found that race played “a” motivating factor in plaintiff’s non-selection did not automatically entitle plaintiff to some form of relief.

Ct. of Appeals found that Indiana statute that prohibited most registered sex offenders from using social networking websites, instant messaging services and chat programs was unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. While said statute was content neutral, it was not sufficiently tailored to serve state’s interest in protecting minors from harmful online communications since it also prohibited substantial amounts of protected speech. Ct. further observed that state was free to draft different statute that addressed state’s concern without offending First Amendment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering class certification order appointing plaintiff’s law firm as class counsel in action alleging violation of Junk Fax Prevention Act, even though defendant alleged that said counsel committed ethical misconduct in investigating claims of instant lawsuit. Ct. found that while counsel may have breached promise of confidentiality with third-party by using certain data to identify targets of additional lawsuits, and that certain ethical misconduct could potentially be sufficient to deny class certification request, conduct of instant counsel did not require denial of class certification since any misconduct committed by counsel did not jeopardize Dist. Ct.’s ability to reach proper outcome of case. Ct. similarly held that counsel’s sending of misleading solicitation letters and his tender of $5,000 to another third-party (without showing of any conditions attached to said payment) were insufficient to require denial of class certification request since neither incident cast doubt on counsel’s ability to act as fiduciary of class members.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to act on defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that essentially challenged FINRA “Taping Rule” that required security firms, which employed plaintiff and others who had worked within past three years with prior “Disciplined Firms,” to establish certain monitoring procedures for tracking telemarketing activities of said individuals. Plaintiff’s lawsuit was moot because plaintiff (who had not sought any monetary relief) was no longer on Taping Rule list by time Dist. Ct. had granted defendant’s motion to dismiss case, and because Dist. Ct. could not grant him any other remedy since he was now off said list. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that his lawsuit was not moot because his current securities firm had terminated him in effort to avoid expense of required monitoring procedures set forth in Taping Rule.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison official’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that prison’s requirement that plaintiff-prisoner pay $2 co-payment for necessary dental care violated his 8th Amendment rights. Record showed that plaintiff had at least $2 in his prison account at time he needed dental care, and Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that imposition of even modest fee for medical services constitutes per se 8th Amendment violation under circumstances where prisoner has resources to make said payment.