Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action seeking monetary damages arising out of defendants’ alleged failure to provide plaintiff with access to prison library to conduct research into possible grounds to file motion to withdraw guilty plea. Plaintiff’s lawsuit was barred by Heck, 512 U.S. 447, since any favorable determination on plaintiff’s damages claim would necessarily imply invalidity of his conviction, and plaintiff had not yet obtained favorable termination of his conviction. Fact that plaintiff no longer has opportunity to file habeas petition to challenge his conviction did not mandate different result where record revealed no impediment that would have prevented him from seeking collateral relief to challenge his conviction during his period of incarceration.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying as untimely motion by four, currently-hired firefighters to intervene in class action that resulted in City being directed to hire other individuals who had been seeking employment as firefighters at same time as proposed intervenors sought and obtained employment as firefighters. Proposed intervenors, who had been hired as firefighters by 2006, knew or should have known by 2007 that they were no longer members of instant class action due to their changed status as hired firefighters, and yet waited until 2012 to seek instant intervention under perception that they too should receive remedy as result of class action. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that any remedy arising out of class action lawsuit should be reserved for those firefighter applicants, who never received employment under circumstances where proposed intervenors might not have been injured at all.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials used excessive force by deploying tear gas and flashbang grenades in attempt to gain access to plaintiff's apartment after plaintiff had notified police that he had gun and threatened to kill himself, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting evidence of plaintiff's psychological profile, as well as fact that plaintiff was facing potential 5-year prison sentence for recent substance abuse violations, even though defendants were not aware of said evidence at time of incident. Plaintiff's estate had opened door to introduction of said evidence by introducing evidence of plaintiff's mindset, and thus disputed evidence was relevant to counter estate's evidence that plaintiff was in good spirits near time of incident. Dist. Ct. did not err in granting judgment as matter of law on qualified immunity grounds as to defendant-police commanders with respect to their decision to use tear gas and flashbang grenades, where no case law precluded use of either device under circumstances where plaintiff posed danger to others. Fact that defendants used 12 times incapacitating level of tear gas did not require different result where plaintiff was still functioning within apartment. Finally, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting summary judgment with respect to defendants who shot and killed plaintiff where one defendant testified that he was in fear of his own life when plaintiff pointed gun at him.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeal by defendant-employer of Dist. Ct.'s order denying defendant's request for arbitration of plaintiff-union's lawsuit alleging that defendant violated terms of collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by laying off certain union members and generating sham asset sale of company as alleged ruse to avoid certain obligations under CBA. While defendant argued that Ct. of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider appeal under section 16(a)(1) of Federal Arbitration Act, record showed that defendant's employees were transportation workers performing occasional interstate projects, such that instant CBA was properly classified as contract for employment of interstate workers under section 1 of FFA, which, in turn precluded defendant from using FFA as basis for appellate jurisdiction of instant appeal.

District Courts erred in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiffs’ lawsuits seeking declaration that Ill. statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4)(iii), (10)(iii),-1.6(a)(3)(iii)) that prohibits, except for police and other excepted persons, individuals from carrying ready to use/concealed guns is unconstitutional under Second Amendment. Ct. found that Second Amendment’s right of citizens to use arms in defense of home, as recognized in Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), extended to right of self-defense outside of home, and that current Illinois law that allows individuals to be armed in their homes for purposes of self-defense and not allows them to carry guns in public for self-defense purposes is arbitrary since interest in self-defense is as great outside of home as it is inside of home. Ct., though, stayed its mandate for 180 days to allow Ill. Legislature to generate new gun law that contains reasonable limitations on carrying guns in public. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officer and City of Chicago’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-police officer violated plaintiffs’ 4th Amendment rights by arresting plaintiffs on charges of misdemeanor theft and felony property damages without warrant or probable cause. Officer had probable cause to make arrest on instant charges where: (1) neighbor accused plaintiffs of removing valve stem from neighbor’s car tire and keying said car; (2) neighbor and plaintiffs had history of disputes; and (3) neighbor showed officer videotape of neighbor’s car parked in area with limited access to general public where one plaintiff was seen bent down and looking at tire on neighbor’s car and other plaintiff was seen with keys walking past neighbor’s car. Moreover, officer did not violate 4th Amendment with respect to instant warrantless arrests where: (1) one arrest was made in common area outside condominium building where plaintiffs lived; and (2) neither plaintiff registered objection to officer following one plaintiff into condominium to arrest other plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. erred in remanding back to state court plaintiff's action alleging that defendant caused plaintiff to suffer mesothelioma by including asbestos in turbines it supplied to U.S. Navy, where defendant had removed said action via federal officer removal statute under 28 USC section 1442(a)(1). Defendant was entitled to said removal since defendant had colorable government contractor defense with respect to both use of asbestos and failure to warn theories of plaintiff's case where defendant alleged that: (1) defendant worked closely with Navy in supplying said turbines and was acting under color of federal authority; and (2) Navy approved precise turbine specifications that included use of asbestos, was fully aware of all hazards associated with asbestos, and controlled content and placement of any warnings.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment filed by defendants-prison officials and medical personnel in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s constitutional rights by detaining him for nine days after his arrest without formal charges being filed against him and by being deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by refusing to give him Oxycontin for his pain (that had been previously given to him by his physician) and substituting other non-narcotic pain medications. Record showed that defendant had probable cause hearing within 24 hours of his arrest and had initial hearing within three days of his arrest. Moreover, plaintiff could not establish constitutional violation where defendants released plaintiff on ninth day pursuant to terms of court order. Also, plaintiff failed to establish viable 8th Amendment violation where plaintiff failed to show that prison doctor’s switch of medication was substantial departure from accepted professional medical standards.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs’ request for class action certification of plaintiffs’ claims that defendant’s washing machines contained defect that caused mold to form in drum of washing machines. While Dist. Ct. found that class certification was improper because actual manufacturer of washing machines made certain design modifications that prevented plaintiffs from establishing common question of fact, Ct. of Appeals held that plaintiffs satisfied common question element where: (1) record indicated that manufacturer made only five design changes that related to, but did not eliminate mold; (2) all of plaintiffs’ claims contained basic question as to whether washing machines permitted mold to accumulate; and (3) Dist. Ct. could create subclasses should record eventually show existence of large differences in mold defects among five differently designed washing machines. Fact that most members of proposed class did not experience mold problems did not require different result.

In action alleging that defendants-U.S. Secretary of Defense (Rumsfeld) and others were personally liable for authorizing use in Iraq of harsh interrogation methods on plaintiffs, who had been accused of being enemy combatants, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-Rumsfeld’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Although plaintiffs were eventually released from custody and were found to be innocent of being enemy combatants by Detainee Status Board, federal law does not establish non-statutory, common law cause of action for damages against persons in military chain of command who either abusively interrogate or mistreat military persons or who fail to prevent improper detention and interrogation. Ct. further found that any lawsuit against Rumsfeld would be improper since: (1) there were no allegations that Rumsfeld personally participated in any alleged wrongful conduct; and (2) any knowledge of subordinates’ misconduct is insufficient to establish liability. (Dissent filed.)