Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. properly denied as untimely plaintiff’s motion under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) to reopen time to file appeal of Dist. Ct.’s dismissal of plaintiff’s cause of action under circumstances where plaintiff filed said motion approximately 90 days after entry of dismissal order. Ct. of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s argument that said motion was timely since: (1) he was out of country when dismissal order was entered; and (2) he did not “receive” dismissal order for purposes of Rule 4(a)(6) until he opened envelope containing dismissal order. Moreover, while Dist. Ct. erred in finding that order was “received” on date it was mailed to plaintiff, instant denial of plaintiff’s motion to reopen was still proper since plaintiff failed to show that instant motion was filed within 21 days of date order was delivered to plaintiff’s home.

Ct. of Appeals denied petitioner’s “unopposed” motion to transfer appeal to District of Columbia Circuit. Under 28 USC section 2112(a), Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation will chose circuit court by lot where multiple petitions are filed, and petitioner cannot use unopposed motion to bypass procedures under section 2112(a) for selecting circuit court as long as instant petition remained on file.

In action by plaintiffs-class of prison inmates challenging procedures used by defendants to assign prisoners to Tamms super-max prison, Dist. Ct. erred in entering injunction that incorporated highly specific notice and hearing system that allowed inmates to contest said assignments. Under Prison Litigation Reform Act, any injunctive relief to remedy due process violation must be narrowly drawn, and inmates were entitled to only informal procedures to seek review of certain decisions made by prison officials.

In action filed in Wisconsin alleging intentional misrepresentation by defendant-Arizona resident arising out of defendant’s failure to build condominium unit in Mexico by certain time as promised by defendant, Dist. Ct. erred in finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant even though contract for sale of condominium was signed in Mexico. Record showed that defendant generated several emails, phone calls and letters to plaintiff in Wisconsin for purposes of encouraging plaintiff to pay additional installments on condominium as part of alleged scheme to deceive plaintiff, and that said contacts were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction on instant claim. Ct. noted that result might have been different had plaintiff asserted breach of contract action where all relevant acts pertaining to generation of contract took place outside of Wisconsin.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials and West Illinois Task Force’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants wrongfully seized plaintiff’s backhoe without warrant. Eleventh Amendment precluded plaintiff’s lawsuit against Task Force since Task Force qualified as state entity based upon control over Task Force exercised by Ill. State Police. Moreover, plaintiff failed to establish viable section 1983 action against individual defendant where record showed that plaintiff consented to instant seizure when seizure occurred two months after plaintiff told said defendant “if its stolen, go ahead and take it.” Also, plaintiff’s ability to use tort law to obtain any remedy for defendant’s post-seizure distribution of backhoe to third-party precluded plaintiff's alternative due process claim pertaining to post-seizure distribution of backhoe.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing under Rooker-Feldman Doctrine plaintiff-attorney’s section 1983 action alleging that Ill. Supreme Ct.’s order suspending him during pendency of ARDC proceeding (that charged plaintiff with wrongfully converting more than $100,000 in client’s real-estate escrow funds) violated plaintiff’s due process rights. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that Rooker-Feldman Doctrine did not apply because instant suspension did not constitute final judgment and further found that instant interim suspension constituted final judgment that could only be reviewed via petition for certiorari with U.S. Supreme Ct.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s untimely motion to reconsider Dist. Ct.’s dismissal of his case where said motion was filed one day after applicable 28-day deadline set forth in Rule 59(e). Moreover, Dist. Ct. erred in entering nunc pro tunc order that purportedly made motion to reconsider timely and then denied on merits said motion, where record indicated that plaintiff had not in fact filed motion to reconsider within 28-day period. However, plaintiff’s untimely Rule 59 motion to reconsider must be treated as timely Rule 60(b) motion to which plaintiff could seek appeal. Ct., though, noted that review of denial of any Rule 60(b) motion was limited and directed plaintiff to show cause why Dist. Ct.’s denial of plaintiff’s request to reopen instant litigation should not be affirmed summarily given deferential standard of review of Dist. Ct.’s order.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of standing plaintiff’s claim alleging that $20,000 grant from Ill. Dept. of Commerce and Economic Opportunity to entity called Friends of the Cross to restore large Latin cross violated First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, where, under Hein, 551 US 587, plaintiff had failed to allege or show that said grant had come from specific legislative act. Record showed that legislature appropriated non-specific $5 million pool of money from which individual legislator directed Dept. to give money to Friends of the Cross, and that said directive from legislator to distribute money from non-specific pool of money precluded plaintiff from obtaining standing to file instant lawsuit. Moreover, plaintiff could not seek return of money even if he had standing to bring lawsuit since money had already been given to Friends of the Cross by time instant lawsuit had been filed.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by arresting plaintiff on drug charge without probable cause, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion for new trial based on claim that three of defendants’ witnesses violated Dist. Ct’s order precluding references to certain 911 calls that implicated plaintiff in drug sales. Record showed either that plaintiff waived any issue by failing to timely object to witness’ reference to 911 call, or that another witness’ reference to 911 call was too brief to constitute substantial influence on jury, or that different reference to 911 dispatch was adequately addressed by curative jury instruction. Additionally, Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that he was entitled to new trial based on improper comments made about plaintiff by defendant’s counsel during sidebar, since Dist. Ct., which also rejected plaintiff’s argument, was in best position to gauge any effect of said comments on jury.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying motions to dismiss filed by defendants-prosecutor and certain police officials in section 1983 actions alleging that defendants conspired to frame plaintiffs for two murders by manufacturing false evidence that was used by defendant-prosecutor to generate guilty verdicts that were eventually overturned via post-convictions proceedings, where defendants claimed that they were entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity. Ct. found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider appeals by police officials who claimed qualified immunity since said defendants' appeal concerned only "sufficiency of evidence" argument to counter Dist. Ct.'s finding that material question of fact existed that would preclude granting of defendants' motion. Ct. also found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider appeal by defendant-prosecutor that he was entitled to absolute immunity for time period prior to plaintiffs' being charged with murders since material factual dispute existed as to moment when probable cause developed so as to change defendant's status from individual investigating murders to individual prosecuting said crimes. Ct. also held that prosecutor who manufactures false evidence when acting in investigatory role can cause due process violation in same vein as police officer accused of same conduct even though prosecutor could claim absolute immunity by subsequently using said false evidence at trial.