Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals found that Indiana statute that prohibited most registered sex offenders from using social networking websites, instant messaging services and chat programs was unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. While said statute was content neutral, it was not sufficiently tailored to serve state’s interest in protecting minors from harmful online communications since it also prohibited substantial amounts of protected speech. Ct. further observed that state was free to draft different statute that addressed state’s concern without offending First Amendment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering class certification order appointing plaintiff’s law firm as class counsel in action alleging violation of Junk Fax Prevention Act, even though defendant alleged that said counsel committed ethical misconduct in investigating claims of instant lawsuit. Ct. found that while counsel may have breached promise of confidentiality with third-party by using certain data to identify targets of additional lawsuits, and that certain ethical misconduct could potentially be sufficient to deny class certification request, conduct of instant counsel did not require denial of class certification since any misconduct committed by counsel did not jeopardize Dist. Ct.’s ability to reach proper outcome of case. Ct. similarly held that counsel’s sending of misleading solicitation letters and his tender of $5,000 to another third-party (without showing of any conditions attached to said payment) were insufficient to require denial of class certification request since neither incident cast doubt on counsel’s ability to act as fiduciary of class members.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to act on defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that essentially challenged FINRA “Taping Rule” that required security firms, which employed plaintiff and others who had worked within past three years with prior “Disciplined Firms,” to establish certain monitoring procedures for tracking telemarketing activities of said individuals. Plaintiff’s lawsuit was moot because plaintiff (who had not sought any monetary relief) was no longer on Taping Rule list by time Dist. Ct. had granted defendant’s motion to dismiss case, and because Dist. Ct. could not grant him any other remedy since he was now off said list. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that his lawsuit was not moot because his current securities firm had terminated him in effort to avoid expense of required monitoring procedures set forth in Taping Rule.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison official’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that prison’s requirement that plaintiff-prisoner pay $2 co-payment for necessary dental care violated his 8th Amendment rights. Record showed that plaintiff had at least $2 in his prison account at time he needed dental care, and Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that imposition of even modest fee for medical services constitutes per se 8th Amendment violation under circumstances where prisoner has resources to make said payment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-school officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant deprived plaintiff (12 year-old student) of his life while plaintiff was attending school function at time of his death from drowning in lake. While record showed that defendants may have been negligent by allowing plaintiff and others to go into lake without providing lifeguard, said negligence was insufficient to establish basis for liability in instant due process case, which otherwise requires showing that defendants committed reckless act that resulted in injury to plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ (County officials) motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity in section 1983 action alleging that defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s request for renewal of child care provider certificate based on their discovery that plaintiff had 1988 substantiated finding of child abuse violated plaintiff’s due process rights. At time of instant denial, no case law clearly established that defendants’ reliance on instant substantiated finding violated plaintiff’s due process rights where defendants had played no role in determination of substantiated finding.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that attorney work product exemption applied so as to deny plaintiff’s FOIA request for copy of report prepared by consultant hired by govt. to assess responsibility of plaintiff and other entities accused of contaminating Fox River in Wisconsin. Plaintiff agreed that consultant’s report qualified as work product, and fact that govt. disclosed certain portions of report in prior consent decrees involving other entities accused of instant contamination did not serve as waiver of all related material in report. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s claim that underlying factual material used to support author’s opinion in report was subject to disclosure under FOIA after noting that “factual” and “opinion” materials were both covered by FOIA work product exemption.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of venue plaintiffs’ class action alleging that defendants conspired to defraud plaintiffs by spending on other items plaintiffs’ money given to build time share properties, where dismissal was based on forum selection clause (calling for disputes to be resolved in Mexican court) contained in contracts signed by plaintiffs and by predecessor-in-interest to one defendant. While plaintiffs argued that neither defendant could enforce forum selection clause since neither defendant had signed instant contracts, Dist. Ct. found that both defendants could enforce said clause since: (1) one defendant was parent corporation of successor to entity that had signed instant contracts and thus could stand on same legal footing as said entity; and (2) other defendant could enforce clause on mutuality grounds where plaintiffs could enforce said clause against it due to allegations in complaint that both defendants had conspired to defraud plaintiffs.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant-ambulance service violated Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) by failing to stabilize plaintiff as she was about to give birth prior to sending her to hospital, and that said failure resulted in injuries to plaintiff’s baby. While “emergency room” for purposes of coverage under EMTALA could be defendant’s ambulance itself, Dist. Ct. could properly find under 2003 “clarification” of EMTALA regulation that plaintiff had not come to “emergency room” where, as here, ambulance was operating under direction of communitywide emergency medical service protocols.

Plaintiff was entitled to new damages hearing in section 1983 action alleging that he was subjected to wrongful conviction on attempted murder and armed robbery charges based on police officials’ misconduct in using suggestive photo lineup and unconventional solicitation of multiple statements to falsely implicate plaintiff in charged offenses. Jury awarded plaintiff only $73,125 in compensatory and $5,000 in punitive damages to cover plaintiff’s eight years of wrongful incarceration, and Dist. Ct.’s improper refusal to allow plaintiff ability to present evidence of actual innocence had likely impact on jury’s low damages award.