Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment by defendants-certain health professionals employed by or under contract to prison in section 1983 action alleging that said defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s scoliosis condition in his spine by failing to assign him lower bunk, medical mattress, back brace or orthopedic shoes. Record showed that plaintiff had no medical need for any of these devices, and that his medical condition was not serious enough to warrant them. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting motion for judgment with respect to defendant-nurse, who refused plaintiff’s request to stay overnight in prison’s Health Care Unit due to back pain, and instead wheeled plaintiff back to his cell and told him to climb into his upper bunk bed on his own even though plaintiff indicated that he could not do so and wound up injuring himself while trying to climb into upper bunk bed.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed as moot appeal by plaintiffs-employee and employee’s union of Dist. Ct.’s order granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant’s termination of employee violated her due process rights where employee signed complete settlement and release of her claim prior to oral argument. While terms of agreement allowed for appeal to continue as “declaratory judgment action only,” employee could not continue to prosecute the appeal where she no longer had personal stake in lawsuit. Moreover, union lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit in its own right since complaint did not allege any injury to union, and although union initially had associational standing to bring instant lawsuit and file appeal, employee’s settlement rendered union’s appeal moot where employee had no personal stake in lawsuit and union did not have any other union member who had any similar redressable claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid cause of action plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that she was deprived of protected liberty interest without due process when defendants-DCFS officials issued protection plan that essentially closed plaintiff’s day-care (during investigation of complaint that plaintiff had failed to supervise children for period of time) without providing plaintiff with hearing prior to establishing terms of plan. Due process does not require said hearing where plaintiff’s participation in protection plan was voluntary, and where plaintiff could opt out of plan at any time. Moreover, plaintiff was not entitled to subsequent hearing once plan was implemented where plaintiff had voluntarily agreed to stop operating day-care. Fact that ALJ ultimately expunged any DCFE “indicated finding” against plaintiff, or that defendants took 60 days beyond established limit to complete its investigation of complaint did not require different result.

Ct. of Appeals denied defendants' petition for rehearing en banc that sought reversal of original panel decision that found that Illinois statute prohibiting most individuals from carrying concealed guns was unconstitutional. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in directing defendant-Dept. of Justice to turn over 440 internal memorandums and emails from legal staff representing EPA and Corps of Engineers generated during CERCLA lawsuit seeking environmental cleanup costs from plaintiffs and other entities after plaintiff sought said documents pursuant to FOIA, and after Dist. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that said documents/emails were protected by attorney work product privilege. Although plaintiff sought said documents to determine whether said federal agencies colluded so as to understate any contribution by said agencies to pollution of Superfund site, work product privilege applied where U.S., as opposed to said agencies, was real party in CERCLA action, and information in nature of attorney work product exchanged among Dep’t.’s lawyers is not information exchanged among adverse parties, and thus was privileged from disclosure to plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant improperly failed to award plaintiff $20 million in additional disaster relief under Stafford Act. While plaintiff alleged that additional award was warranted because defendant was required to cover replacement cost of damaged hospital equipment, as opposed to cost of said equipment less depreciation, defendant could properly determine that depreciated cost is appropriate measure of loss in absence of any statute requiring defendant to award relief based on replacement cost. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that replacement cost was required since: (1) medical regulators required that plaintiff replace damaged equipment with new equipment; and (2) one of defendant’s employees promised reimbursement for cost of new equipment.

In action by plaintiff alleging that defendants-police officers used excessive force when arresting him that caused him to injure his finger, and that defendants further denied him medical attention that caused him to have said finger amputated, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that plaintiff used heroin on day of his arrest where said evidence was relevant on issue as to level of plaintiff’s pain and suffering that arose out of defendant’s alleged conduct. Moreover, said evidence was not unfairly prejudicial where record contained other properly admitted evidence of plaintiff’s drug use. Also, while prosecutor improperly tied defendant’s use of heroin to his actions on day of arrest (since said evidence was admitted only on damages issues), any error did not require reversal where plaintiff’s objection to single comment was sustained, and Dist. Ct. gave sufficient curative instruction.

Ct. of Appeals granted plaintiffs’ motion for injunction seeking to preclude govt. from enforcing mandate under Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to provide contraception and sterilization procedures in self-insured, group health plan provided by secular corporation owned by plaintiffs to its 1,148 employees, where plaintiffs alleged that contraceptive mandate violated teaching of their Catholic faith and violated Religious Freedom Restoration Act. While Dist. Ct. denied plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction, Ct. of Appeals granted instant motion, after finding that: (1) plaintiffs’ use of corporation to provide group health plan did not preclude plaintiffs from asserting violation of RFRA; (2) govt. failed to establish that requiring religious objectors to provide cost-free contraception coverage is least restrictive means of increasing access to contraception; and (3) plaintiffs established both reasonable likelihood of success on merits, as well as irreparable harm if no injunction were entered. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-police officer’s decision to shoot plaintiff after plaintiff discharged firearm in New Year’s Eve celebration violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights where Dist. Ct. found that defendant’s guilty plea to reckless conduct charge arising out of same incident judicially estopped plaintiff from denying that he pointed gun at officer prior to officer shooting plaintiff. Judicial estoppel did not apply where defendants could not show that plaintiff “prevailed” in prior criminal matter by pleading guilty to criminal charge where he received two-year probation term, as well as two-day jail sentence on said charge. Moreover, collateral estoppel did not apply because allegation in charged offense that plaintiff pointed gun at officer was not necessary to establish reckless conduct charge where other allegation that defendant shot firearm in air could have supported said guilty plea. Also, while Illinois courts allow defendants to introduce evidence of guilty plea, plaintiff has opportunity to explain and contradict facts underlying guilty plea.

In action alleging that defendants breached lease for nursing home by failing to pay certain rent and/or fund replacement reserve, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in striking opinion of plaintiff’s expert regarding value of future rent lost to plaintiff as result of instant breach where basis of expert’s opinion did not follow any of three recognized methodologies for making such assessment under Indiana law. Moreover, plaintiff’s motion to submit additional evidence on issue of fair rental value of nursing home that was filed six months after close of discovery was untimely. Dist. Ct. also did not err in considering affidavit of attorney in support of plaintiff’s fee request, even though said attorney indicated in affidavit that his opinion was based on his “belief,” where affidavit, when taken as whole, demonstrated that attorney had personal knowledge of facts presented in affidavit.