Federal Civil Practice

In proceeding in which jury found in favor of defendant on claim that defendant breached clause in settlement agreement that precluded defendant from disclosing reason for plaintiff's departure as employee of defendant, Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding defendant $563,021.39 in attorney fees and costs as prevailing party pursuant to terms of settlement agreement. Fact that application for fees lacked any description of work performed was not fatal where: (1) instant case was not statutory fee-shifting case where such detail is required; and (2) record showed that said fees were commercially reasonable given fact that defendant had actually paid said fees. Ct. also rejected plaintiff's claim that fee-shifting provision of agreement did not apply where instant lawsuit was filed in good faith, and where imposition of fees would be financial hardship to her.

In action alleging that defendants breached contract to provide software and give plaintiff first right of refusal regarding any sale of defendants' business, Dist. Ct. did not err in entering injunction that would allow defendants to sell business to third-party with understanding that plaintiff could continue to use defendants' software for certain period of time while arbitrator resolved contract question regarding plaintiff's ability to purchase defendants' business. Dist. Ct.'s entry of injunction was supported by record after consideration of concerns registered by both parties, and Ct. of Appeals added limitations with respect to sale of business to third-party that would permit parties to effectively reverse sale should arbitrator grant plaintiff's request and enforce its right to purchase business.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's class action claim alleging violation of Telephone Consumer Protection Act where, although plaintiff's complaint was filed beyond applicable limitations period, plaintiff was potential class member in similar state-court class action that had been timely filed, but had been voluntarily dismissed before state court could resolve class certification question. Under American Pipe, commencement of prior class action suspends applicable statute of limitations period as to all asserted members of said class, and instant action was timely in light of said suspension. Ct. rejected defendant's argument that: (1) rule in American Pipe did not apply where first class action was voluntarily dismissed; or (2) dismissal of earlier class action precluded plaintiff from bringing anything other than individual claim.

In action against several defendants (all, but one which were citizens outside of Illinois) that had been removed to federal court alleging that defendants failed to warn plaintiff of dangerous side effects of Yazmin manufactured by affiliate of Bayer defendants and purchased by plaintiff at pharmacy operated by Illinois-based Niemann Foods, Inc., Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion to remand case back to state court after determining that defendant-Niemann had been fraudulently joined as defendant and dismissing Niemann from case in order to restore complete diversity. Learned intermediary doctrine served to preclude plaintiff from obtaining any recovery from Niemann since, in ordinary case, prescribing doctor qualifies as learned intermediary to adjudge drug’s suitability for particular patent and since pharmacies cannot be expected to warn their customers of possible defects and dangers of prescription drugs. Moreover, plaintiff failed to allege that Niemann had any knowledge that plaintiff had pre-existing condition that made instant drug contraindicated for her. Plaintiff also failed to establish that Niemann and other defendants had common defense that would require remand to state court for determination of merits of case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claim alleging that defendant-servicing agent of owner of apartment building violated FDCPA by misrepresenting status of plaintiff's rent-related debt to others during state litigation, which ultimately resulted in judgment in plaintiff's favor. Defendant did not owe plaintiff any duties under FDCPA since defendant was not debt collector as that term is used by FDCPA where: (1) defendant acquired authority to collect money on behalf of creditor/apartment building owner at time agency agreement was effectuated; and (2) plaintiff's debt arose after date of defendant's agency agreement.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that govt.'s writ of garnishment under 28 USC section 3205 was superior to debt owed to creditors by business entity where: (1) writ was issued against defendant's membership interest in business entity; (2) assets of business entity were liquidated to satisfy writ; and (3) local state law gave claims from creditors of entity priority over claims from entity's investors. Normally local state law proscribes what U.S. can collect as creditor, and Ct. of Appeals rejected govt. contention that section 3205 displaced state law once govt. obtained writ. However, remand was required because it not was clear from record that instant creditors (as opposed to company they controlled) would be directly entitled to portion of liquidated assets of business entity.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed on mootness grounds plaintiffs' appeal of Dist. Ct.'s denial of their request for preliminary injunction prohibiting defendant from enforcing minimum 12,500 signatures requirement for mayoral candidates in February 22, 2011 election. Issue was moot because election has occurred, and plaintiffs' proposed injunction could no longer affect their rights. Ct. further found that capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to mootness doctrine did not apply.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed on jurisdictional grounds plaintiff-insurance company's appeal of Dist. Ct.'s determination that plaintiff owed duty to defend defendant under commercial general liability policy in underlying negligence action under circumstances where Dist. Ct. failed to act on several related counterclaims filed by defendants. While Dist. Ct. entered its judgment under Rule 54(b) that would normally allow for immediate appeal, predicates for entering judgment under Rule 54(b) were not present where remaining issues in counterclaims, including counterclaim seeking relief under section 155 for plaintiff's alleged vexatious refusal to defend defendant in underlying lawsuit, necessarily encompassed merits of duty-to-defend issue. Thus, Dist. Ct.'s determination was not final until resolution of counterclaims.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights by denying their August 2009 request to stage protest on behalf of union where record showed that plaintiffs had abandoned said claim by responding to defendants' motion for summary judgment solely with allegations that concerned separate November, 2009 incident that occurred after date instant complaint had been filed. Ct. rejected plaintiffs' claim that both incidents constituted single wrong committed by defendant and further found that Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs' request to amend instant complaint to include alleged November, 2009 incident.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting on grounds of legislative immunity defendant-Governor's motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant vetoed line item in legislation that would have funded plaintiffs' captain positions within Dept. of Corrections under circumstances where, according to plaintiffs, veto was motivated by plaintiffs' attempt to organize with rival union. Governor was entitled to said immunity where: (1) veto constituted form of legislative act; (2) state officials believed that they would realize $17 million in savings by eliminating captain position; and (3) elimination of captain positions, as opposed to terminating specific individual, was field where legislators had power to act. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not abuse discretion in blocking defendants from taking Governor's deposition. Dist Ct. could also properly reject on lack of causation grounds plaintiffs' claim that other defendants retaliated against plaintiffs for their union activities by stripping them of their seniority when they transferred into different jobs after their captain positions had been eliminated.