Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant's post-judgment motion seeking to vacate default judgment in Lanham Act action on grounds that Dist. Ct. lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant due to lack of contacts with State of Illinois. Case concerned defendant's Internet activity with respect to its matchmaking website that plaintiff claimed was confusingly similar to plaintiff's website, and record showed that defendant, which had no physical tie to Illinois, did not deliberately target or exploit Illinois market where defendant's Internet activity produced only 20 Illinois customers who used defendant's free services. Moreover, mere operation of interactive website by itself was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.

Plaintiff was entitled to reconsideration of his motion for new trial after jury found in favor of defendants-prison officials in section 1983 action alleging that defendants used excessive force during incident in which defendants claimed that plaintiff-prisoner had disobeyed their Order. Dist. Ct. used wrong legal standard when finding that although weight of evidence tended to favor plaintiff, it could not grant said motion where defendants' proffered testimonies were not such that reasonable persons could not believe them because they contradicted indisputable physical facts of laws. On remand, Dist. Ct. may grant plaintiff's motion if it believes that jury's verdict was merely against manifest weight of evidence.

Dist. Ct. erred in remanding class action back to state court that had originally been removed by defendants to federal court under Class Action Fairness Act. While plaintiffs asserted that remand was appropriate because amount in controversy in instant Ill. Wage Payment and Collection Act lawsuit concerning 538 Illinois employees did not meet $5 million threshold, defendants established that $5 million recovery was plausible given outcome of similar lawsuits elsewhere that involved fewer class members. Moreover, plaintiffs did not attempt to demonstrate that it was legally impossible for plaintiffs to recover $5 million threshold.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that Presidential proclamation authorized under 36 USC section 119 that designated first Thursday in May as national day of prayer violated Establishment Clause, where plaintiffs' organization and several of its members lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit. Section 119 imposes duties only on President and does not require any private person to do anything. Moreover, Ct. rejected plaintiffs' argument that their perception of exclusion arising out of said proclamation was tantamount to cognizable legal injury that was sufficient to confer standing.

Dist. Ct. erred in remanding back to state court instant action alleging violations of Ill. Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act arising out of defendant's use of software that, according to plaintiff, short-changed medical providers, where instant lawsuit had been removed to federal court under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). While plaintiff argued that stakes involved in instant action did not meet $5 million threshold for CAFA actions because it asked for only $2.9 million in compensatory damages and did not seek any punitive damages, Ct. of Appeals found that Dist. Ct. had jurisdiction over case since $5 million threshold was not impossible for plaintiff to recover where plaintiff had not disclaimed punitive damages in its complaint or otherwise disavowed punitive damages as matter of law. Moreover, Ct. observed that there was nothing in instant record that would preclude plaintiff from seeking punitive damages at later point in proceedings, and that $2.1 in punitive damages was possible should plaintiff subsequently decide to seek them.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of proper venue under Rule 12(b)(3), plaintiffs' lawsuit alleging common law fraud and violations of Ill. Franchise Disclosure Act arising out of plaintiffs' contract with defendants to operate five tax-preparation franchises where said contract contained clause requiring arbitration in Texas of all disputes with defendant, as well as clause requiring filing of any lawsuit in Texas state court if arbitration was unsuccessful. While Ill. Franchise Act voids all forum-selection clauses in franchise agreements, said Act specifically permits arbitration outside of Illinois, and thus plaintiffs should have submitted instant claim that they were fraudulently induced to sign franchise agreement to arbitrator. Fact that defendants had filed instant, venue-based motion to dismiss did not constitute waiver of their right to arbitration.

In action alleging that defendant-real estate agent fraudulently misrepresented work he and his partner contributed to various real estate transactions and misappropriated commissions when he terminated his relationship with plaintiff, Dist. Ct. did not err in limiting cross-examination of defendant’s partner, which, defendant claimed, would have demonstrated partner’s bias. Dist. Ct. allowed defendant to present evidence that partner was hostile to defendant, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that some proffered evidence had little probative value, while other proffered evidence constituted inadmissible hearsay. Moreover, with respect to defendant’s own claim that plaintiff owed him commissions under Ill. Wage Act, Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff’s Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as matter of law when finding that defendant was independent contractor. However, any error was harmless where jury found that defendant was not owed any commissions at issue in his Wage Act claim.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing without prejudice plaintiffs' Title VII action alleging discrimination in certain promotion decisions where basis of ruling was Dist. Ct.'s belief that contentions of instant three plaintiffs were too disparate to justify joint litigation. Record showed that plaintiff's cases presented common question regarding whether defendant's prison system discriminates against black employees when making promotions, which would have satisfied joinder requirements set forth in Rule 20(a)(1)(B). However, plaintiffs could not proceed on their claims since plaintiffs failed to appeal instant dismissal order and further failed to file amended complaints within applicable limitations period, which continued to run since instant dismissal was without prejudice. Ct. rejected plaintiffs' claim that Dist. Ct.'s extension of time to file new complaints (which plaintiff's counsel still failed to meet) served to extend applicable limitations period. Ct. of Appeals further sanctioned plaintiff's counsel for failing to promptly comply with various rule to show cause orders and for ignoring inquiries from clerk's office, and it also required plaintiff's counsel to send copy of instant opinion to plaintiffs so that they may consider whether to file malpractice lawsuit against counsel.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing certain counts and granting summary judgment as to other counts in plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action alleging that: (1) defendants-prison officials failed to process certain grievances and were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs while plaintiff was undergoing hunger strike; and (2) defendants failed to protect him against assaults from other inmates. Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his medical-care claims by failing to file internal grievance within 60 days from date of underlying incidents. Moreover, plaintiff failed to submit evidence that prison guards were aware of any specific threats of danger posed by other inmates. Also, plaintiff's First Amendment claim relating to defendants' forcibly termination of his hunger strike was properly dismissed since inmate does not have constitutionally protected right to refuse life-saving medical treatment.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting motion for certification of class action in lawsuit alleging that defendant's unsolicited fax to proposed class representative violated Junk Fax Prevention Act. Question remained as to whether instant class representative was suitable representative where record showed that representative signed form for online directory, which suggested that defendant and others could contact representative by fax, and where presence of said defense to instant lawsuit could destroy required typicality of class as well as adequacy of named representative. On remand, Dist. Ct. is free to designate another representative should it determine that instant representative is not proper class representative.