Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting on grounds of qualified immunity defendants-police officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 class action alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights by arresting plaintiffs during large protest march that was initially conducted without proper permit, but was allowed to proceed down certain Chicago streets before defendants precluded marchers from advancing down other streets. Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity where record failed to show that defendants gave instant plaintiffs sufficient notice of revocation of permission to demonstrate prior to their arrests. Moreover, plaintiffs could proceed against defendant-City where plaintiffs alleged that police superintendent, as City's policymaker with respect to making mass arrests, made decision to allow officers to make instant arrests.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-debt collector's motion for summary judgment in action alleging that document purporting to be actual copy of credit card statement that was attached to defendant's lawsuit seeking to collect on plaintiff's debt violated section 1692 of FDCPA where plaintiff alleged that said document was misleading to state court judge. FDCPA regulates communications directed at consumer, but does not cover allegedly misleading communications directed to state court judges.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-state caseworkers’ motion for summary judgment after finding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs-parents’ constitutional rights by removing plaintiffs’ son from their home for weekend after defendants received report of child abuse from plaintiffs. Defendants had probable cause to temporarily remove child from plaintiffs’ home where plaintiff-father had prior substantiated report of child abuse with different child, and where defendant had medical report indicating that child’s bruises were consistent with forcible grabbing by adult. Fact that one defendant-case worker did not believe that child was in imminent danger was irrelevant where reasonable caseworker could have concluded that child was in imminent danger.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff's motion to amend complaint by substituting corporate affiliate of named defendant even though substitution motion was filed after expiration of statute of limitations period. While Dist. Ct. found that proposed amendment could not relate back to date of original complaint because plaintiff had failed to identify proper defendant prior to expiration of statute of limitations, only relevant inquiry under Krupski, 130 SCt 2485, is whether new defendant should have known that plaintiff, had it not been mistaken, would have sued it instead of suing named defendant, and whether delay in plaintiff's discovering mistake impaired new defendant's ability to defend itself. In instant case, new defendant was aware of lawsuit where original and new defendants shared corporate offices and was aware that it should have been named in original lawsuit because of plaintiff's employment relationship to new defendant. Fact that motion to amend was filed six years after original complaint did not require different result where new defendant was aware of mistake shortly after original complaint was filed, but did nothing to alert plaintiff of mistake.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were unreasonable in gathering and retaining from defendant's property evidence concerning crime allegedly committed by plaintiff's tenant. Defendants' use of jackhammer instead of less destructive instrument to remove concrete from plaintiff's garage was not unreasonable to carry out purposes of search warrant where defendants had belief that concrete slab was being utilized to hide evidence. Moreover, plaintiff had no viable cause of action under Takings Clause of 5th Amendment where instant property was retained or damaged under state's police power.

In appeal of grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment in action under False Claims Act, Ct. of Appeals summarily affirmed judgment after noting that plaintiff's opening brief contained approximately 4,000 words over 14,000-word limit set forth in FRAP 32(a)(7)(B), and that plaintiff's counsel had misrepresented that brief had conformed to applicable word limit. While Ct. also found that appeal had no merit, Ct. cautioned that similar flagrant violation of page limitation rule could result in dismissal of appeal.

Ct. of Appeals denied petitioner's petition seeking mandamus relief to remove Dist. Ct. judge, who eventually entered order sanctioning petitioner for $1,772.99 in contempt proceeding, where petitioner had failed to remove certain website postings that Dist. Ct. had found to be defamatory in underlying action seeking removal of said postings. While petitioner appropriately sought mandamus relief where petitioner was not party in underlying action, and where petitioner alleged that Dist. Ct.'s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, mandamus relief was ultimately inappropriate where: (1) petitioner failed to seek stay of contempt proceeding; (2) Dist. Ct. had completed contempt proceeding while mandamus proceeding was still pending; and (3) instant appearance of impropriety was too attenuated to justify mandamus relief to require new contempt hearing.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendant-DCFS case worker was entitled to qualified immunity in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff's right to familial association concerning care and upbringing of plaintiff's children by placing said children with plaintiff's parents and requiring that plaintiff have only supervised visits with her children. While plaintiff argued that defendant's action violated state law and internal DCFS procedures, said violations did not demonstrate violation of clearly established constitutional due process right where plaintiff was still in relationship with boyfriend who had been accused of abusing one of plaintiff's four children, and where plaintiff had voluntarily agreed to placement of her children with her parents on two prior occasions. Fact that defendant may have violated DCFS regulations did not, by itself, demonstrate violation of clearly established constitutional right so as to defeat defendant's claim of qualified immunity.

In civil RICO action alleging that Gov. Blagojevich, Friends of Blagojevich and owner of two racetracks participated in scheme in which Gov. Blagojevich took bribes in exchange for influencing state legislature to pass Horse Racing Act of 2006 and 2008 that required certain casinos to pay 3% of their adjusted gross revenue to Horse Racing Equity Trust Fund for benefit of owner's racetracks, Dist. Ct. erred in finding that Gov. Blagojevich was not entitled to legislative immunity since instant RICO action broadly implicated his role in legislative process. Ct. rejected plaintiffs-casinos' arguments that legislative immunity was limited to section 1983 actions, or that state immunity law, as set forth in Jorgensen, 811 NE2d 652, which precluded Gov. Blagojevich from asserting legislative immunity under Illinois Constitution under certain circumstances, applied to instant lawsuit. However, RICO action could still proceed against remaining defendants. Additionally, with respect to plaintiffs' count seeking constructive trust on proceeds of Home Racing Fund, Ct. found that Tax Injunction Act did not serve to block Dist. Ct. from imposing constructive trust on proceeds disbursed from Horse Racing Fund since instant casino surcharge was not tax for purposes of said Act. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officials' motion for summary judgment alleging qualified immunity in section 1983 action by plaintiffs-jail employees alleging that defendants subjected them to harsh investigation and sanctions arising out of defendants' investigation into incident involving prison break-out in retaliation for plaintiffs' affiliation with political rival of Sheriff. Dist. Ct. improperly found that defendants had waived qualified immunity issue by making only three-paragraph mention of issue in their opening brief in summary judgment motion where opening brief supplied adequate notice of issue, and where defendants expounded upon issue in reply brief. Moreover, remand was required to allow Dist. Ct. to have opportunity to make determinations of disputed facts and resolve issues concerning materiality.