Federal Civil Practice

Record contained sufficient evidence to support Dist. Ct. finding in favor of defendant in fraud action alleging that defendant misrepresented his status as university professor when negotiating price for genetic sequencing data license, which defendant eventually used in private business venture, as opposed to academic research project. While plaintiff argued that it would have charged defendant much higher price for license had it been aware about true commercial purpose for said license, Dist. Ct. could properly find that any failure to disclose commercial purpose of data was not material where: (1) interactions by plaintiff with defendant did not reflect that plaintiff particularly cared to ascertain purpose of data; (2) plaintiff sought only non-exclusive right to use said data; and (3) at time defendant acquired instant license, plaintiff was undergoing financial difficulty that suggested that plaintiff would have sold license to defendant at negotiated price regardless of defendant's stated purpose for data.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer's motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant terminated plaintiff from his position as president of defendant in violation of his procedural due process rights after defendant learned of plaintiff's DUI arrest. Plaintiff failed to show that he had protected property interest in his job where plaintiff's employment contract gave defendant's Board discretion to terminate plaintiff's employment based on any conduct that Board considered as grounds for dismissal. Fact that instant employment contract required Board to pay plaintiff salary and benefits for time remaining on contract did not transform his contract to one calling for dismissal only for cause.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff's qui tam action under False Claims Act, alleging that plaintiff's employer submitted fraudulent bills to Medicare and Medicaid programs, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff's lawsuit was based on information already in public domain. While 2005 Inspector General's report already concluded that 57% of all chiropractors' claims to Medicare were for services that were not performed and another 16% of said bills were inflated, instant claim could still proceed since plaintiff's contention that defendants submitted intentionally false claims was based on plaintiff's own knowledge about defendant's practices that were not identified in said report.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiff-police officer to false arrest for unlawfully requesting criminal background check on private citizen. Defendants had probable cause to arrest defendant for said offense where: (1) defendants had received Ill. State Police report indicating that defendant had requested criminal background report on said private citizen; (2) plaintiff was ambivalent in response to question as to whether he had run background check on said private citizen; (3) plaintiff did not approve of citizen group that was critical of police dept. and was headed by said private citizen; (4) defendant had spied on said private citizen; and (5) at no time was said private citizen legitimate focus of any police investigation.

In prosecution on section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated plaintiff's civil rights when they arrested plaintiff on robbery charge to which plaintiff was eventually acquitted, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting testimony of plaintiff's treating physician, who gave testimony on behalf of defendants that plaintiff could have thrown gun found at arrest scene in spite of several gunshot wounds. Said testimony did not violate Rule 26(a)(2) where defendants disclosed their intention to call said witness, and where witness, as trauma surgeon, had sufficient knowledge to inform jury on issue of plaintiff's ability to throw gun or crawl at arrest scene. Moreover, defendants (who eventually prevailed at jury trial in instant case) were not required to file expert witness report under Rule 26 (a)(2)(B) because said physician was plaintiff's treating physician and was not retained by defendants.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-supervisor demoted plaintiffs from their temporary supervisor positions on account of their membership in Hispanic Democratic Organization (HDO) in violation of their First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs admitted in their Local Rule 56.1 response that someone other than defendant ordered that all individuals who had temporary assignments be returned to their former positions, and plaintiffs otherwise waived issue of defendant's personal involvement in demotion decision by failing to address in Dist. Ct. defendant's claim that he had no role in their return to their former positions. Alternatively, plaintiffs provided only speculation as to whether defendant was aware of their affiliation with HDO.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's constitutional rights by arresting him for attempting to cash forged Post Office money order without probable cause. While plaintiff argued that arresting officer intentionally disregarded readily available information regarding origin of money order, arresting officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff where different post office individuals, whom officer had reasonable belief of reliability, told officer that money order was fake because it did not appear to have appropriate water mark and had unfamiliar serial numbers. Fact that officer did not contact post office where money order was purchased was irrelevant since 4th Amendment imposes no duty to investigate plaintiff's defense as long as probable cause to arrest is present. Moreover, fact that plaintiff had to wait out in cold during investigation and bumped his head while being placed in squad car did not establish his excessive force claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials' motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action alleging that prison's medical staff had been deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's need for medical care for his stroke, where Dist. Ct. found that defendant had failed to exhaust his internal prison remedies. While Dist. Ct. erred in finding that plaintiff was required to attach evidence to his complaint to support his claim that his physical incapacitation prevented him from filing timely internal prison grievance, dismissal of instant complaint was still proper where plaintiff failed to present any evidence in response to instant summary judgment motion to support his claim that he had exhausted available administrative remedies by filing prison grievance as soon as it was reasonably possible to do so.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying witness’ motion under Rule 60(b) seeking to vacate earlier order finding that witness was in civil contempt for failing to abide by subpoena directing witness to provide testimony in underlying civil action even though witness claimed that he had never been properly served with copy of subpoena. Dist. Ct. could properly credit process server and neighbor to find that process server left copy of subpoena inside enclosed pouch at side door of witness’ residence while witness was at home and refusing to open door. Fact that subpoena was addressed to witness’ business and in care of witness, rather than to witness personally, did not invalidate subpoena where witness’s business was in form of proprietorship.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff-German entity's application to compel discovery of defendant-American entity for use in lawsuit between parties pending in German court. Record showed that plaintiff could not obtain discovery it needs from German court system, and defendant failed to show that German court would have refused to admit any evidence that plaintiff obtained through U.S. discovery. On remand, Dist. Ct. will be free to examine whether plaintiff's discovery requests are overly burdensome under Rule 26.