Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest and detain him on murder and attempted murder charges. While plaintiff claimed that police coached and otherwise falsified several identifications of him as culprit, Ct. of Appeals found that police had probable cause to arrest defendant on said charges, where: (1) seven individuals independently identified plaintiff as culprit; and (2) defendant did not allege that the identifications from these individuals were falsified or coached. Ct. of Appeals further noted that plaintiff had failed to point to any evidence to establish that said identifications were so incredible such that no officer could believe that said witnesses were telling truth.

Four groups of over 170 different plaintiffs brought similar claims alleging that they were allegedly harmed by presence of lead in paint generated by defendants. Dist. Ct. entered into case management order that essentially broke plaintiffs up into said groups that allowed two groups of plaintiffs to proceed to trial. Dist. Ct. granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on issue of negligent failure to warn, and, on appeal, Ct. of Appeals, held that defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ strict liability, failure to warn about dangers of lead claims, based on plaintiffs existing knowledge of said dangers. Accordingly, Dist. Ct. could properly grant defendants’ summary judgment motion on duty to warn issue with respect to second group of plaintiffs, where: (1) said group had conceded their negligence claims during initial round of summary judgment motions; and (2) Dist. Ct. could deny said group’s motion to reconsider based on “new” claim of presence of lead dust, where said claim could have been brought in first round of summary judgment motions. Also, third group of plaintiffs could be bound under law of the case doctrine with respect to prior duty to warn summary judgment rulings, since claims by instant group were part of the same case as second group of plaintiffs, and since once a court decides upon rule of law, that decision should govern same issues in same case. However, with respect to fourth group of plaintiffs who filed individual cases, Dist. Ct. erred in applying issue preclusion doctrine to preclude them from litigating duty to warn issue, where there was no privity between said plaintiffs and prior groups of plaintiffs, and where there was no agreement to be bound by prior rulings and where said group lacked control over litigation decisions made by prior groups of plaintiffs.

After granting defendants’-operators of women’s volleyball club motion for summary judgment in class action, alleging that defendants fraudulently concealed prior claims of sexual abuse against one defendant-owner of club, Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing sanctions of $20,998.10 in plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and $5,000 for in civil penalties for two defendants for attempting to coerce potential class action members to opt out of case during certification period. Record supported Dist. Ct.’s finding that defendants sent emails with intent to encourage potential class action members to opt out of class and to have instant class action dismissed Moreover, record showed that defendant’s counsel had received one such email and misrepresented to Dist. Ct. that defendants had not done so. Also record showed that Dist. Ct.’s calculation of attorney’s fees was not improper and was based on defendants' misconduct, where said calculation need only be based on “rough justice”, and where Dist. Ct. attempted to arrive at figure for charges only relating to fees generated by defendant’s misconduct by going over proposed fees on line-by-line basis. Dist. Ct. could also properly impose instant civil penalties to address unacceptable litigation conduct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his 1st , 8th and 14th Amendment rights by: (1) filing false assault charge against him (that was eventually dismissed) in retaliation for complaining against one defendant’s removal of plaintiff from kitchen assignment; (2) not allowing him to present live testimony in his disciplinary hearings involving assault charge; (3) imposing unequal punishment on assault charge; and (4) imposing cruel and inhumane conditions on his restrictive housing assignment. Ct. of Appeals found no 1st Amendment violation or discrimination based on his race, where plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendant-officer who generated assault charge knew that plaintiff was innocent of said charge or treated other inmates more favorably. With respect to plaintiff’s 8th Amendment claim, Ct. of Appeals found no violation, where defendant failed to present evidence that any defendant had control over plaintiff’s housing conditions. With respect to plaintiff’s due process claim, Ct. of Appeals found no violation since plaintiff was entitled to only informal due process with respect to instant disciplinary hearings, which was satisfied, where plaintiff was allowed to present written statements from his witnesses and was allowed to present his own oral testimony.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on grounds of improper claims-splitting plaintiffs’ section 1983 and Title VII claims that challenged defendant’s executive order during COVID-19 pandemic that required personnel in primary and secondary schools to be tested regularly unless they had been vaccinated against it. Record showed that: (1) plaintiffs had previously filed in state court similar lawsuit seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief, and they subsequently filed instant federal lawsuit seeking monetary relief for same conduct; and (2) by time of instant dismissal, state court action had been dismissed as moot because executive order had been rescinded. As such, dismissal of instant lawsuit was appropriate, where Illinois law permits only one lawsuit concerning any single set of events, no matter how plaintiffs choose to allocate legal theories or remedial requests, and here, all legal theories or remedial requests related to instant test or vaccinate order that arose from one set of operational facts. Also, all of plaintiffs’ theories and remedies could have been resolved in state court lawsuit.

In action seeking recovery for damages caused by defendant’s 18650 battery that exploded in plaintiff’s pocket, record failed to contain sufficient evidence to support Dist. Ct.’s finding that it had specific personal jurisdiction over defendant. Record showed that defendant was corporation organized in Republic of Korea with its headquarters and principal place of business located there. Moreover, defendant has no offices, warehouses, other places of business, employees, or agents in Indiana, Also, defendant is not licensed in any state of U.S., including Indiana. Dist. Ct. found that defendant had sufficient contacts with Indiana to permit exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over defendant, and that there was sufficient nexus between defendant’s marketing of instant 18650 battery in Indiana and plaintiff’s injuries. Ct. of Appeals, though, held that remand was required because record did not contain sufficient facts to determine whether requirements of stream-of-commerce theory applied to support exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, i.e., whether defendant was aware that its battery was marketed in Indiana. Ct. of Appeals also observed that Dist. Ct. needed to answer question as to whether defendant knew or expected that its 18650 battery reached Indiana consumers and what efforts it took to control distribution of said battery.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated his 8th Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by denying him anesthesia when making two unsuccessful attempts at removing two-inch screw that plaintiff had inserted into his elbow. Record showed that plaintiff experienced pain when defendant attempted to remove embedded screw, and that defendant explained to plaintiff, when denying his request for anesthesia, that “You stuck a screw in your arm, not me, and this is a consequence of your actions.” Ct. of Appeals, in reversing Dist. Ct., found that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence regarding defendant’s culpable state of mind that could support finding of deliberate indifference, especially where record supported finding that defendant did not exercise any medical judgment when denying use of anesthesia, but rather based denial on personal animosity toward plaintiff based on desire to punish plaintiff or otherwise inflict or prolong pain.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed on mootness grounds appeal of Andrew Shalaby, who is California-licensed attorney, who was appealing Dist. Ct. order that revoked Shalaby’s pro hac vice admission in underlying lawsuit. While Shalaby contended that Dist. Ct.’s order violated his First Amendment rights and was based on legal and factual errors that generated reputational harm, record showed that parties in underlying lawsuit had settled matter, and that case had been dismissed. As such, dismissal of Shalaby’s appeal was appropriate, since there was no lawsuit to resume his pro hac vice status, and his interest in vindicating his reputation did not present Ct. of Appeals with claim of redressable injury.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s copyright infringement action, where plaintiff asserted that defendant had used certain documents in bond offerings without plaintiff’s permission, where plaintiff had copyrighted said documents. Plaintiff was not entitled to copyright protection with respect to said documents, because plaintiff’s documents lacked sufficient originality for valid copyrights. Record showed that plaintiff’s documents were very similar to documents that had previously been prepared by Idaho Housing and Finance Association, and remaining non-trivial language that had been added by plaintiff in documents, which included short phrases and functional language, could not be copyrighted. As such, plaintiff could not pursue instant copyright infringement action against defendant or anyone else.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’ s action, alleging that defendant tortiously interfered with plaintiff’s contracts with third-parties when it manipulated price of ethanol downward, which caused plaintiff to receive less money on said contracts. Dist. Ct., in attempting to apply Nebraska law to plaintiff’s lawsuit, concluded that: (1) plaintiff could not proceed as alleged in instant complaint because plaintiff had failed to identify third-parties with whom it had contracts with which defendant had interfered; and (2) plaintiff could not use theory of its claim, i.e. section 766A of Restatement (Second) of Torts, where section 766A claims had not yet been recognized as cognizable by Nebraska Supreme Court. Dist. Ct. further observed that had it determined that Nebraska law recognized section 766A claims, it would have allowed plaintiff to amend its complaint and attach specific contracts. Ct. of Appeals, in vacating Dist. Ct.’s order, found that Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff must plead more than generalized allegation that it had valid third-party contracts that were affected by defendant’s alleged manipulation of ethanol market. However, remand was required, because, although Nebraska Supreme Court has not resolved whether plaintiff could use section 766A theory to proceed on tortious interference with contract claim, Dist. Ct. should have examined Nebraska case law to determine how Nebraska Supreme Court would rule on said issue. Moreover, on remand, Dist. Ct. may want to certify question to Nebraska Supreme Court.