Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s Bivens action, seeking monetary recovery from defendant-special agent with DEA, where plaintiff alleged that defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights when he used excessive force when arresting plaintiff at public hotel pursuant to arrest warrant. While Dist. Ct. held belief that instant action was sufficiently different from factual setting in Bivens so as to preclude plaintiff from pursuing instant Bivens action, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff could pursue instant action, where there was no meaningful distinction between plaintiff’s case and factual setting in Bivens. This is so, Ct. of Appeals concluded, where: (1) both instant case and Bivens concerned defendant’s use of alleged excessive force in arresting offender accused of violating federal drug laws; (2) defendants in Bivens and instant case concerned same kind of line-level federal narcotics officer; (3) both plaintiffs alleged that defendants used excessive force when making arrest; and (4) legal landscape of excessive-force claim is well-settled. Fact that arrest in Bivens took place at plaintiff’s home and was without warrant or probable cause, as opposed to instant arrest that took place at public hotel pursuant to arrest warrant and probable cause did not present “new context” of Bivens that would support dismissal of plaintiff’s action.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his First and 14th Amendment rights, by allowing Christian prisoners to practice their religion in open areas of prison and in group settings, while they limited plaintiff and other Muslim prisoners to practice their religion in their individual cells. While Dist. Ct. found that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, where plaintiff failed to identify relevant case law that would establish that such limitations on prayer within prison setting violated any Constitutional provision, Ct. of Appeals found that remand was required for parties to clarify record to determine what actions individual defendants took with respect to plaintiff’s claims. Moreover, case law would support plaintiff's claims of unequal treatment. As such, no qualified immunity finding could be made under this record. Moreover, defendants’ claim that security concerns necessitated instant prayer restrictions does not require different result, where said restriction must apply equally to all religious groups, and where plaintiff maintained that said restrictions were not applied equally.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing breach of contract action, after finding that plaintiff-resident of Arizona, lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant-California firm, even though defendant signed subject contract with plaintiff’s former law firm located in Chicago. Dist. Ct. could properly find that contract alone was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over defendant, especially where plaintiff’s own statements, indicating that he and defendant negotiated and executed contract in Arizona, and that he would perform on contract in or from Arizona negated plaintiff’s contention that defendant purposely availed itself of Illinois law when it contracted with plaintiff’s law firm. Also, while 28 USC section 1631 requires Dist. Ct. to transfer cause of action to appropriate Dist. Ct. ”in the interest of justice,” Dist. Ct.’s failure to transfer action to California Dist. Ct. did not require remand, where plaintiff never sought such transfer in Dist. Ct., and where plaintiff conceded that he had seven months after instant dismissal to re-file action in California Dist. Ct., but had failed to do so.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-officials within in Sheriff’s Dept.’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-Deputy Sheriff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his First and 14th Amendment rights by retaliating against him for seeking Sheriff’s office by attempting to demote him, criticizing him to others, as well as increasing police patrols in plaintiff’s neighborhood and for generating investigation to seek his termination for failure to list 2007 sexual assault charge (that was ultimately expunged) on his application for Deputy Sheriff. Defendant’s criticism of plaintiff to otters did not support instant retaliation claim since said criticisms were simply type of criticisms that came with territory of plaintiff’s running for office. Moreover attempt to demote plaintiff came prior to knowledge of his candidacy. Dist. Ct. could also properly find that plaintiff’s claim of increased police patrol of plaintiff’s neighborhood was not supported by record. Also, defendants’ recommendation to terminate plaintiff, which came three months after defendants' knowledge of plaintiff’s candidacy, was too attenuated to support retaliation claim, and defendants’ recommendation that plaintiff be terminated due to plaintiff’s dishonesty in failing to note 2007 arrest on his job application was belief supported by record.

Ct. of Appeals vacated Dist. Ct.’s granting of defendant’s summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ actions that were consolidated in multidistrict litigation, where plaintiffs alleged that they were injured by defective vena cava filter device manufactured by defendants. Ct. of Appeals found that Dist. Ct. lacked diversity jurisdiction to act on said complaints, because neither plaintiff could establish $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. Under “legal certainty” test plaintiffs’ allegations about amount in controversy control unless court concludes to legal certainty that face of pleading demonstrates that plaintiff cannot recover jurisdictional minimum or that proofs show that plaintiff never was entitled to recover said amount. Under relevant state laws, neither plaintiff could make required showing, where, at time they had filed their complaints: (1) both plaintiffs alleged only that they suffered asymptomatic IVC perforation of their veins that was caused by defective filter; (2) neither plaintiff could allege in good faith that they experienced pain or other compensable symptoms arising out of defective filter or that they were at risk of future injury; and (3) relevant state courts would find that $75,000 verdict for either plaintiff would be excessive under instant circumstances.

Plaintiff sued defendant to compel deposition testimonies of two of defendant’s employees (DEA agent and federal prosecutor), where defendant sought said testimonies to establish in underlying lawsuit that one of plaintiff’s doctors failed to disclose that he was under federal investigation in violation of his employment agreement. Defendant, which refused defendant’s request, was subject to its Touhy regulations that governed when it would disclose information or make its employees available for deposition. Dist. Ct., in denying plaintiff’s motion, could properly find that plaintiff had failed to show under applicable arbitrary and capricious standard that defendant unreasonably applied its Touhy regulations, where defendant explained that allowing said depositions would interfere with its law enforcement mission and jeopardize its ability to obtain cooperation in future investigations. Ct. of Appeals further noted that information sought by plaintiff could have been established through other evidence.

Plaintiffs-various State of Illinois employees, lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit, alleging that amendment to Health Care T=Right of Conscience Act, which allowed employers to enforce vaccine mandates in workplace to prevent contraction or transmission of COVID-19, violated their federal and state constitutional protections of free exercise of religion and equal protections of laws, under circumstances, where Dist. Ct. agreed with defendants that amendment did not change existing law and merely clarified existing law. Dist. Ct. also found, though, that plaintiffs could proceed with instant lawsuit because issues of fact remained unresolved on very same issues. In instant interlocutory appeal, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit once Dist. Ct. found that amendment did not change exiting law, since: (1) once Dist. Ct. found that amendment only clarified existing law, plaintiff could not show any harm flowing from enactment of amendment so as to support their standing to bring instant lawsuit; and (2) no harm, therefore, could be remedied by striking instant amendment. Thus, remand was required with directions to Dist. Ct. to dismiss instant lawsuit due to plaintiffs’ lack of standing.

Plaintiff filed instant action under 18 USC section 925A, alleging that federal felon-in-possession statute (18 USC section 922(g)(1)) violated his Second Amendment rights, where record showed that: (1) plaintiff had entered into 1998 guilty plea on felony mail fraud charge; (2) plaintiff had maintained otherwise clean record for 24 years; and (3) plaintiff wished to possess firearm, but section 922(g)(1) prevents him from possessing firearm due to his status as felon. Plaintiff also asserted that: (1) section 922(g)(1) violated Second Amendment because history supports disarming only dangerous persons with prior convictions for violent felonies, and his mail fraud conviction did not qualify as violent felony; and alternatively (2) history required individual assessment of danger that he posed before banning his possession of firearm. In its remand order, Ct. of Appeals noted that Dist. Ct., which dismissed plaintiff complaint, based its dismissal on “means-end” inquiry as set forth in Barr, 919 F.3d 437 and did not evaluate plaintiff’s claim under new standard set forth in Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111, which required Dist. Ct. to examine exclusively Second Amendment text and pertinent history of firearms regulations, when determining whether government satisfied its burden of affirmatively proving that its firearm regulation/statute was part of historical tradition that delineates outer bounds of right to keep and bear arms. Accordingly, Ct. of Appeals directed that Dist. Ct,. examine plaintiff’s claim under new standard. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion for new trial under Rule 59(e), even though: (1) plaintiff alleged in instant lawsuit that he suffered heart attack after taking Androderm that was manufactured by defendant; (2) hours after jury found in favor of defendant, plaintiff’s counsel received discovery documents that had been requested in similar, but separate lawsuit, that included FDA letter requiring defendant to conduct trial to study potential causal link between Androderm and high blood pressure; and (3) plaintiff asserted that defendant withheld said discovery until after completion of instant trial to protect its defense strategy against plaintiff. In order to succeed under Rule 59, plaintiff was required, among other things, to establish that new evidence would have probably produced new result. Moreover,. Ct. of Appeal found that plaintiff failed to establish that FDA letter would have produced new result in instant trial, where: (1) although defendant alleged that plaintiff’s high blood pressure was one of eight potential causes of his heart attack, significance of plaintiff’s blood pressure had already been undercut by plaintiff’s counsel throughout trial; and (2) removal of defendant’s blood pressure argument left seven other alternative factors, including plaintiff’s high cholesterol, smoking, overweight BMI, pre-diabetes, family history of cardiovascular diseases, rested leg syndrome, and sleep apnea as causes for plaintiff’s heart attack.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s False Claims Act action, alleging that defendant made materially false representations during course of certifying to HUD that certain borrowers were sufficiently creditworthy under Direct Endorsement Lender program for HUD to issue federal insurance to lenders issuing federal mortgage loans to said borrowers. While plaintiff, who formerly worked for defendant, alleged that she observed defendant act under “reckless and inappropriate underwriting practices” that resulted in defendant making false certifications to HUD that several loans met HUD’s minimum underwriting guidelines, plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that defendant’s alleged false certificates caused defaults in said loans. This is so, Ct. of Appeals held, where: (1) plaintiff failed to show that defendant had higher-than-average default rate for its federally-insured loans; and (2) plaintiff could not show, with respect to subject loans, that defaults that led to HUD paying money to lenders to account for said defaults, were caused by defendant’s false statements, as opposed to other, unrelated causes for defaults.