Federal Civil Practice

The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal filed on behalf of the plaintiff, an LLC, after finding that the notice of appeal was signed by an individual who was not an attorney and, thus, could not represent any entity other than himself individually. The Seventh Circuit was not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that under Illinois corporate law any person may represent a corporation, noting that an LLC is not a corporation, the statutory references cited by the plaintiff did not “supersede the norm” that a member of the bar is required to represent a corporation in court, and that federal rules govern the procedures for litigation in federal court and under those rules only a member of the court’s bar can represent another person or entity in litigation. The Seventh Circuit also urged all lawyers to follow the court’s handbook regarding the use of typography. (BRENNAN and SCUDDER, concurring)

Plaintiff, John Doe, filed a lawsuit against his former university after he was expelled for alleged sexual assault, contending that the university discriminates against men. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant and plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals directed the parties to file supplemental briefs explaining plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym and the resulting memorandums raised facts indicating that the case might be moot. The Seventh Circuit remanded so that the district court could address both questions of mootness and anonymity. (ROVNER and ST. EVE, concurring)

In a bankruptcy case, the debtor made payments to the bankruptcy trustee under a proposed payment plan but the plan was never confirmed and the case was dismissed for unreasonable delay. The bankruptcy court then ordered the trustee to return the undisbursed payments without first deducting a statutory percentage fee as compensation. The trustee appealed and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires the Chapter 13 trustee to return the fee when the debtor’s plan is not confirmed. (SYKES and EASTERBROOK, concurring)

Plaintiffs, a group of gas stations, filed a lawsuit alleging that defendant violated a Wisconsin state law that prohibits selling gasoline for less than the statutorily defined cost and sought an injunction as well as damages. The defendant argued that it lowered its price to match a competitor’s price, as was allowed by the statute, and the trial court entered summary judgment in favor the defendant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err when it entered summary judgment because the defendant engaged in lawful competition as was allowed under state law. The appellate court further concluded that plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the element of causation. (LEE and PRYOR, concurring)

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Cook County provided inadequate dental care to pretrial detainees in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit court refused to certify the class and plaintiff appealed, despite the named plaintiff having voluntarily settled his claim. The circuit court vacated and remanded, concluding that the district court abused its discretion in denying class certification finding that if it followed the district court’s rationale then a class of detainees would never be able to certify as a class because medical care, by its nature, is individualized. (KIRSCH and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, concurring)

In a decision on rehearing, the circuit court revised it prior decisions in a case involving the question of whether a bankruptcy court can determine the amount of a debtor’s tax obligations when the debtor is unlikely to pay them. The Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court with instructions to determine whether related-to jurisdiction applied and, if so, whether to abstain from asserting jurisdiction in favor of the Tax Court. (SYKES and FLAUM, concurring)

District court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in a case where plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging a series of constitutional claims after the plaintiff’s decedent committed suicide in a county jail. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that there were no constitutional violations where the record did not support the inference that the defendant knew that the decedent faced a serious risk of harm and that the jail followed its own policies regarding suicide risk. (EASTERBROOK and SCUDDER, concurring)

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination against the corporation’s majority owner when the defendants declined to pay broadcast fees for the rights to carry the plaintiff’s two Indianapolis-based television stations. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendant, concluding that plaintiff failed to identify evidence permitting a jury to find that the decisions not to pay the broadcast fees reflected anything other than lawful business choices and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. (WOOD and LEE, concurring)

In a case where plaintiffs brought claims alleging unlawful pretrial detention, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not err when it concluded that the plaintiffs’ pre-trial detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment where there was probable cause for their detention. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the trial court did not err when it concluded that plaintiffs could not maintain an action for malicious prosecution where there was probable cause to detain them. (ROVNER and WOOD, concurring)

Dist. Ct. did not err in remanding to state court plaintiffs’ multi-consolidated lawsuit, seeking recovery against defendants-shooter, shooter’s father and gun manufacturer of gun used by shooter in Highland Park parade event. Plaintiffs alleged actions under Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act and Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Record showed that only three defendants moved for removal, and basis for remand order was provision in 28 USC section 1446(b)(B)(A),which requires consent of all defendants for removal, which did not occur here. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendants' arguments that necessity that all defendants agree to remove case did not apply, since: (1) defendant gun manufacturer qualified as entity acting under federal officer for purposes 28 USC section 1442(a)(1); or (2) instant removal was exempt from all-defendant consent under 28 USC section1441(c)(2) because federal issue was imbedded in underlying state-law claims.