Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s copyright infringement action, where plaintiff asserted that defendant had used certain documents in bond offerings without plaintiff’s permission, where plaintiff had copyrighted said documents. Plaintiff was not entitled to copyright protection with respect to said documents, because plaintiff’s documents lacked sufficient originality for valid copyrights. Record showed that plaintiff’s documents were very similar to documents that had previously been prepared by Idaho Housing and Finance Association, and remaining non-trivial language that had been added by plaintiff in documents, which included short phrases and functional language, could not be copyrighted. As such, plaintiff could not pursue instant copyright infringement action against defendant or anyone else.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’ s action, alleging that defendant tortiously interfered with plaintiff’s contracts with third-parties when it manipulated price of ethanol downward, which caused plaintiff to receive less money on said contracts. Dist. Ct., in attempting to apply Nebraska law to plaintiff’s lawsuit, concluded that: (1) plaintiff could not proceed as alleged in instant complaint because plaintiff had failed to identify third-parties with whom it had contracts with which defendant had interfered; and (2) plaintiff could not use theory of its claim, i.e. section 766A of Restatement (Second) of Torts, where section 766A claims had not yet been recognized as cognizable by Nebraska Supreme Court. Dist. Ct. further observed that had it determined that Nebraska law recognized section 766A claims, it would have allowed plaintiff to amend its complaint and attach specific contracts. Ct. of Appeals, in vacating Dist. Ct.’s order, found that Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff must plead more than generalized allegation that it had valid third-party contracts that were affected by defendant’s alleged manipulation of ethanol market. However, remand was required, because, although Nebraska Supreme Court has not resolved whether plaintiff could use section 766A theory to proceed on tortious interference with contract claim, Dist. Ct. should have examined Nebraska case law to determine how Nebraska Supreme Court would rule on said issue. Moreover, on remand, Dist. Ct. may want to certify question to Nebraska Supreme Court.

Dist Ct. did not err in finding that defendant had engaged in fraud and breached contract to sell house to plaintiffs, and jury did not improperly award plaintiffs $905,000 in damages arising out of said fraud. Record showed that at time contract to purchase house was generated, defendant represented that closing would be on October 3, 2016, that house was gutted and scheduled for extensive renovations, that plaintiffs had until August 15, 2016 to obtain mortgage for house, that renovations would be completed in six months, and that house had all proper permits. However, at all relevant times, house was subject to stop work order because defendant had not obtained said permits. When plaintiffs could not obtain mortgage by deadline, plaintiffs sought return of their $117,500 earnest money, but defendant refused, and plaintiff filed instant lawsuit. Jury could properly find that defendant’s fraud causally related to plaintiffs’ damages, especially where its failure to timely renovate house due to existence of stop work order precluded plaintiffs from obtaining mortgage. Also, defendant’s refusal to return earnest money prevented plaintiffs from obtaining another house. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting statement from defendant’s representative that referred to plaintiffs (married males) as “fruit cups,” where said statement was relevant on plaintiffs’ claim that said statement was made with homophobic malice towards them. Fact that plaintiffs did not ultimately prevail on their punitive damages claim did not retroactively render “fruit cups” comment irrelevant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants- prison center and prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in deceased plaintiff’s section 1983 and Americans with Disabilities’ actions, alleging that: (1) defendant prison guard failed to protect plaintiff from attack by another prisoner where inmate blinded plaintiff in one eye; and (2) prison officials failed to accommodate plaintiff’s blindness in one eye by moving plaintiff closer to healthcare center for treatment. With regard to plaintiff’s failure to protect claim, plaintiff failed to establish that defendant-guard was aware of risk that other inmate posed to plaintiff prior to instant attack, and record showed that plaintiff had complained to guard only about horseplay incidents involving other inmate and never expressed fear for his safety. Fact that inmate had prior disciplinary history did not require different result. As to plaintiff’s ADA claim, plaintiff failed to establish any intentional discrimination on part of defendants, where record showed that plaintiff had not alerted defendants regarding difficulties about access to healthcare facilities or need for any accommodation. Plaintiff also conceded that he was able to go anywhere in prison facility and was able to access any prison program.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that plaintiff’s continued civil incarceration under state’s Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (SVPCA), violated his constitutional rights, where plaintiff has been so incarcerated for over 16 years. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff could not proceed with instant lawsuit under Heck, 512 U.S. 477, where: (1) plaintiff sought not only monetary damages but termination of his incarceration under SVPCA; (2) under Heck, section 1983 cannot be used to contest fact or duration of confinement, unless conviction or disciplinary sanction that led to confinement had been previously invalidated on appeal or on collateral attack; and (3) plaintiff’s civil confinement under SVPCA has not been invalidated and instant action squarely challenged validity of his civil confinement. Fact that plaintiff is no longer in prison setting, but on home confinement does not require different result. As such, plaintiff must wait until he receives favorable termination of his civil confinement through different proceeding before he can proceed with his current lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison authorities’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-pre-trial detainees’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants’ placement of cameras in semi-private toilet areas of holding cells in courthouses in county violated plaintiffs’ 4th Amendment privacy interests and intruded upon their seclusion under Illinois state law. Applicable rules prohibited prison personnel from viewing individual’s private underclothing, buttocks, genitals or female breasts while he/she/they were showering or changing clothes unless said individuals qualified for strip search. Ct. of Appeals found that three of four plaintiffs lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit, where they could not identify which holding cell they had occupied or assert that they had occupied holding cell that had camera. With respect to merits of claim, Ct. of Appeals found that use of cameras in courthouse holding cells was reasonable, since it was limited in nature and was justified based on security reasons. Also, plaintiff could not proceed on her intrusion by seclusion claim, where she asserted only general anguish and embarrassment from being recorded while using holding cell toilet.

Dist. Ct did not err in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison officials violated his 8th Amendment rights by rendering deficient medical care, using excessive force and inflicting sexual assault. Record showed that plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit, and Dist. Ct. could properly have found that dismissal of the instant lawsuit was warranted as sanction for plaintiff’s submission of forged document in effort to establish excuse for having failed to exhaust said remedies. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s claim that dismissal of sexual assault claim was too severe of sanction, where Ct. of Appeals found that defendants spent over $8,000 to establish forged nature of document, and where plaintiff set in motion waste of defendants’ resources. Fact that plaintiff had no prior history of litigation misconduct did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison official’s motion to dismiss plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action, seeking monetary damages and alleging that defendant retaliated against him for filing grievance against defendant by placing him in cells with known violent prisoners. Dist. Ct., in construing plaintiff’s claim as First Amendment retaliation claim, properly found that, under Bivens doctrine, federal prisoners cannot recover monetary damages for violations of First Amendment rights. Moreover. Ct. of Appeals further found that plaintiff could not pursue Bivens claim for monetary damages for any Eighth Amendment claim against defendant for failure to protect him against acts of violence from his cell-mates arising out of defendant’s cell assignments. (Dissent filed.)

Plaintiffs, individuals who opposed hunting and generated documentary films of hunters for public’s education, filed instant pre-enforcement, First Amendment challenge to “hunter harassment” Wisconsin statute (Wisc. Stat. section 29.083(2)(a)(7)) that made it crime to interfere intentionally with a hunter by “maintaining a visual or physical proximity” to the hunter, by “approaching or confronting” the hunter, or by photographing, videotaping or otherwise recording activity of the hunter. Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment, after finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring as applied challenge to instant Wisc. Statute, and that plaintiffs’ facial challenge to Wisconsin statute failed on its merits. Ct. of Appeals, though, held that plaintiffs had standing to bring instant claim, even though they had not been charged with violation of said statute, where plaintiffs offered evidence of well-founded fear of prosecution for activities protected by First Amendment, but proscribed by instant statute. Ct. of Appeals also found that plaintiffs’ challenges were meritorious, where statute was both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. (Dissent filed.)

Several plaintiffs (individuals and gun-rights organizations) filed challenges in different District Courts to ban on certain assault weapons and high capacity magazines in Protect Illinois Communities Act, as well as in Cook County, City of Chicago and City of Naperville ordinances, where said challenges were based on claims that said bans violated Second Amendment plaintiffs’ right to “keep and bear Arms.” Certain District Courts granted plaintiffs’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction to bar enforcements of said Act and ordinances, while other District Courts denied said requests. Ct. of Appeals, though, in finding that AR-15s and other semi-automatic firearms covered by said Act and ordinances were either too akin to military-use firearms or too akin to other weapons not possessed for lawful purpose such as machine guns, such that said firearms were not “bearable Arms” for purposes of Second Amendment. As such, according to Ct. of Appeals, there was nothing under Second Amendment to prohibit defendants’ regulation of said firearms and high capacity magazines, and thus it affirmed the denial of plaintiff’s requests for preliminary injunction in certain District Court judgments and vacated the granting of said requests in other District Court judgments. Ct. of Appeals also emphasized that plaintiffs might ultimately prevail should record be more developed to show that firearms/ high capacity magazines at issue in Act and ordinances not be sufficiently comparable to military-use weapons or other weapons that are not possessed for lawful purposes. (Dissent filed.)