Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-Indian bank’s motion to dismiss instant breach of contract action for lack of jurisdiction under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) , even though plaintiff-U.S. citizen and Illinois resident of Indian origin alleged that defendant retroactively changed terms of his bank account that was established by bank in India. Under FSIA, there is presumption that foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities are immune from lawsuits filed in U.S. courts, and plaintiff failed to establish exception to said presumption for acts committed outside territory of U.S. in connection with commercial activity elsewhere, and where said act caused direct effect in U.S. In this regard, plaintiff failed to show that defendant’s alleged breach of contract, which occurred in India, caused direct effect in U.S., where: (1) plaintiff did not allege that his lawsuit related to any bank account held with U.S.-based branch of defendant’s bank; and (2) plaintiff failed to point to any evidence that U.S. was site of contract’s performance. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s actions had direct effect in U.S., where: (1) defendant operated three branches in U.S.; (2) defendant advertised its accounts to U.S. citizens; and (3) defendant’s actions caused plaintiff’s mental agony and enormous loss of his pension.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing two similar lawsuits against defendants-corporate entity and operator of website that posted advertisements for sale of firearms, even though plaintiffs-legal representatives of two estates asserted that defendants were negligent in causing decedents’ deaths, where decedents were killed by individuals, who had purchased firearms in private sales from other individuals, who had purchased firearms from individuals, who had posted sale of said firearms on defendants’ website. In this regard, plaintiffs maintained that defendants designed website to encourage and assist individuals in circumventing federal and state laws regulating firearms. Dismissals were appropriate, where plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence would state causation claim for negligence that would directly contravene Wisconsin statures that regulate firearm sales, since said regulations pertained to firearm sales made by firearm dealers and not to private sellers of firearms, and since online website was not firearm dealer. Also certain of plaintiffs’ negligence allegations failed to establish viable tort claim, since plaintiffs failed to plead that harm to decedents would have not occurred but for defendants’ alleged negligence. Too, one Dist. Ct. erred in finding that plaintiff established personal jurisdiction over individual defendant, who was resident of Pennsylvania and who played role in design of website, where plaintiff failed to allege that said individual played role in deciding that corporate defendant would solicit business from Wisconsin residents.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-debt-collector’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing plaintiff-debtor’s action under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging that defendant’s second dunning letter violated FDCPA, where it failed to validate plaintiff’s debt (after she had sent letter to defendant seeking said validation) and improperly required that she send second letter seeking said validation. While plaintiff alleged that she became confused and alarmed after receiving second letter, and while Dist. Ct. based dismissal on finding that plaintiff’s confusion and alarm were insufficient injuries to establish requisite standing to bring instant action, Ct. of Appeals held that plaintiff adequately alleged injury-in-fact to support her standing to bring instant lawsuit, where plaintiff asserted that she incurred $3.95 additional postage for sending second request for validation of her debt. As such, plaintiff adequately pleaded concrete harm to underlying interest covered by FDCPA that concerned money damages caused by alleged misleading communications contained in second dunning letter.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action, alleging that defendants violated his due process rights by depriving him of liberty interest in future employment, when: (1) defendants wrongly designated him as “not in good standing” upon his retirement from Illinois State Police, which precluded him from obtaining concealed-carry license due to his status as retired police officer; (2) said designation limited his rights to carry concealed weapon under federal and state law; and (3) if prospective employers learn of his designation, he would be disqualified from future positions in law enforcement and private security. Although plaintiff asserted that his not-in-good-standing designation was not justified, as, according to plaintiff, he was not target of federal criminal investigation either at time he was placed on probation or at time he retired, he still could not prevail on instant due process claim, because he lacked evidence that defendants had actually disclosed his designation to potential employer or had foreclosed plaintiff future job prospects, where plaintiff had not presented evidence that he could not have applied for concealed=carry license as private citizen under Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act. Moreover, plaintiff failed to present evidence that any law enforcement or private-security employer had ever denied, or would deny, him position because of said designated status.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion seeking to prevent U.S. Dept. of Treasury from offsetting from plaintiff’s $1,495,689.50 restitution order $75,000 settlement that plaintiff had obtained from defendant-U.S. government in plaintiff’s Federal Tort Claims Act action. Dist. Ct. could properly find that government could offset plaintiff’s settlement money, even though defendant unsuccessfully argued that: (1) 18 USC section 3664 prohibited use of offset to enforce restitution obligation; (2) instant offset was improper because restitution funds were owed to plaintiff’s victims in his criminal conviction and not to government; (3) offset is only available for delinquent debts, and he was current on his payment plan; and (4) there was no language in restitution order that mandated that settlement funds received by plaintiff be applied to restitution order.

Dist. Ct. did not err in requiring defendant to bear costs of providing notice to plaintiff’s proposed nationwide class members under circumstances where: (1) plaintiff had initially sought, but was denied proposed certification for nationwide class action in plaintiff’s lawsuit alleging violation of Telephone Consumer Protection Act, but allowed plaintiff to certify class of only Illinois residents; (2) Dist. Ct. based said limitation on U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bristol Myers Squibb Co.,182 U.S. 244; (3) Dist. Ct. then granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff's class of Illinois residents; (3) during pendency of instant case, Ct. of Appeals, in Mussat, 953 F.3d 441, held that Bristol Myers did not apply to case of nationwide class action filed in federal court under federal statute; and (4) instant Dist. Ct. reopened its decision to limit class to Illinois residents, ultimately certified nationwide class and granted summary judgment in favor of nationwide class. While ordinary rule requires plaintiff to initially bear cost of notice to class, especially where liability has yet to be determined, Dist. Ct. could impose said costs on defendant, where: (1) Dist. Ct. had already made defendant liable on merits of case after it had certified class of Illinois residents, but before class certification and necessary notice had been given to non-Illinois residents; and (2) Dist. Ct. could thus place notice costs on defendant once defendant’s liability on merits had been established. Ct. further observed that defendant could seek to recover said notice costs should it prevail on merits of case on appeal.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s (superintendent of juvenile detention center) motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ (juveniles housed in said center) section 1983 action, alleging that defendant’s decision to allow Fox TV to film segment of Empire television series at said center violated their constitutional rights, where said decision resulted in subjecting them to more severe restrictions during said filming than what they would have incurred without filming said segment. Because alleged wrongful conduct pertained to decisions that arose within scope of defendant’s authority as superintendent, defendant was entitled to dismissal of instant lawsuit because he was immune from instant lawsuit under Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 5/1. Ct. further observed that officer suit exception did not apply, where, as here, plaintiffs sought only monetary damages and did not seek to enjoin defendant from any ongoing violations of statutory or constitutional law.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid claim, plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants’ actions in enforcing against him registration duties for certain sex offenders violated his constitutional rights. Record showed that Illinois passed statute in 2011 that required anyone convicted of felony after July 1, 2011 to register as sex offender if that person had been previously convicted of sex offense or had been previously required to register as sex offender. Plaintiff qualified for coverage under said statute, where he pleaded guilty in 1996 to aggravated criminal sexual abuse, which also required that he resister as sex offender for 10-year period, and where plaintiff was convicted of felony in late 2011. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that 1996 plea deal gave him wholesale exemption from complying with 2011 statute. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him through threats of arrest for failure to register as sex offender because he had lodged prior complaints against defendants, since defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for failure to comply with 2011 statute. Ct. further rejected plaintiff’s contention that enforcement of 2011 statute against him constituted 8th Amendment violation as cruel and unusual punishment, since 2011 statute properly applied to him.

Dist. Ct. properly dismissed two counts of plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action against defendants-prison officials, where record showed that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his internal administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit.. However, with respect to third count, where plaintiff alleged that prison guards beat him, record showed that: (1) plaintiff had failed to attach Regional Director’s response to his grievance and had thereafter filed instant lawsuit; and (2) plaintiff subsequently received said response after instant lawsuit had been filed. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies because he should have treated his failure to receive response as non-response and then appealed his grievance to General Counsel, relevant regulations did not cover instant circumstance where response was actually generated but not timely delivered to plaintiff. Ct. of Appeals further found that remand was required for Pavey hearing to determine circumstances surrounding tardy delivery of said response and to determine truth of plaintiff’s claim that prison guard told him that he would not get said response. Ultimately, plaintiff’s claim could proceed if there was determination that any internal appeal was not available to plaintiff, where Bureau of Prisons declined to share its written response with plaintiff.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s finding that defendant committed fraud against plaintiffs, as well as its assessment of compensatory and punitive damages totaling $1.3 million, arising out of defendant’s actions in withdrawing and keeping for itself over $3 million from letters of credit that were meant for plaintiffs. While defendant asserted that it could not be liable for fraud because it was not plaintiffs’ agent or their fiduciary, and thus did not have duty to alert plaintiffs that it had changed instructions about who would control letters of credit, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant’s prior five years of business dealings with plaintiffs created “special relationship,” which supported both existence of duty to disclose to plaintiffs instant change in letters of credit, as well as jury’s verdict