Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct, did not err in dismissing portion of plaintiff-former prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants improperly revoked his mandatory supervised release without evidence that he violated any term of supervised release and without adequate procedural protections. Plaintiff’s claim is barred by Heck, 512 U.S. 477, since his claim seeking monetary damages would call into question Prison Review Board’s order revoking his mandatory supervised release, where said order had not otherwise been set aside. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in dismissing portion of complaint that alleged that: (1) defendants deliberately or recklessly failed to effect his scheduled release from prison by failing to approve proposed host site by time of his scheduled release from prison; (2) defendants’ inactions forced plaintiff to serve his one-year mandatory supervised release period in prison, because they failed to properly investigate three proposed host sites; and (3) defendants ignored his grievances complaining about their failure to release him to proposed host site. Heck did not apply to this portion of plaintiff’s complaint, where: (1) some of plaintiff’s allegations did not pertain to revocation order because they concerned conduct that occurred after revocation order had been entered; and (2) plaintiff’s allegations did not undermine Board’s finding that plaintiff’s mandatory supervised release should be revoked because he lacked appropriate host site at time of plaintiff’s scheduled release from prison, but that plaintiff could be released upon approval of host site.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action in plaintiffs' class action, alleging that defendant’s acquisition of Ancestry.com (Ancestry) via stock acquisition purchase violated section 30 of Illinois Genetic Information Privacy Act (GIPA); and (2) said stock sale amounted to disclosure of “identity of any person upon whom genetic test is performed or [disclosure] of results of genetic tests in manner that permits identification of subject of test.” Although Ancestry had allegedly paired plaintiffs’ genetic tests with personally identifiable information, Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiffs’ complaint failed to allege how instant stock acquisition of Ancestry amounted to any compulsory disclosure, where complaint merely alleged that defendant had received protected information, but failed to plead facts indicating that defendant had compelled Ancestry to disclose any genetic information.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in action alleging that Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (Act) violated their equal protection rights by requiring that they register as sex offenders under said Act only because they have duty to register as sex offender in another jurisdiction. Record showed that plaintiffs were Indiana residents who committed sex offenses either before enactment of said Act or before amendment to said Act that covered their specific offenses. While Dist. Ct. held belief that requiring registration of pre-Act sex offenders who have registration obligations in another jurisdiction was not rationally related to legitimate state interests, Ct. of Appeals held that instant registration requirement for plaintiffs satisfied rational basis review, because State has legitimate interest in seeking to register as many sex offenders as state constitution permits, and because instant requirement is rationally related to advancing that interest.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of Article III standing plaintiff-debtor’s action, alleging that defendant-debt collector violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, when it sent two collections letters, approximately one year apart, about plaintiff’s debt that had been discharged in bankruptcy. Dist Ct. could properly find that plaintiff failed to allege that he had suffered any concrete injury in fact, where he alleged only that he suffered confusion, stress, concern, and fear arising out of receipt of defendant’s collection letters. Plaintiff also failed to allege that defendant took any steps to report plaintiff’s discharged debt to any other agency. Ct. of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s claim that his allegations of intangible damages correlated to common law torts of invasion of privacy and intrusion upon exclusion, and thus were sufficiently concrete injuries for purposes of standing to sue. (Dissent filed.)

Plaintiffs-independent-expenditure political action committee (PAC) and private entity filed action, alleging that Indiana Election Code violated their First Amendment rights to extent that Election Code does not allow independent-expenditure PACs to accept donations from corporations. Defendants-Indiana election officials asserted that Election Code does not prevent such donations, and that plaintiffs therefore lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit seeking to prevent defendants from enforcing Election Code to limit or ban corporate contributions to independent-expenditure PACs. Dist. Ct. found that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that standing issue could not be resolved without determining Code’s meaning and certified following question to Indiana Supreme Ct: “Does the Indiana Election Code--in particular sections 3-9-2-3 to -6-- prohibit or otherwise limit corporate contributions to PACs or other entities that engage in independent campaign-related expenditures?”

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff's section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, when defendant assessed plaintiff forfeiture and penalty totaling $11,190, which represented all unemployment benefits that plaintiff had received during 24-week period, plus 25 percent penalty, after defendant found that plaintiff had failed to report during same 24-week period fact that she had received income from part-time job that would have reduced her weekly unemployment benefit, as she was required to do under Indiana statute. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff received $8,952 during instant 24-week period, when she should have only received $6,123.25 had she properly reported her part-time income; (2) plaintiff made 24 weekly false statements indicating that she had not made any income during same 24-week period; and (3) defendant notified plaintiff that she was required to repay all of her $8,952 in benefits because of her false statements, as required under Indiana statute and tacked on $2,238 penalty, as allowed under Indiana statute. Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause applies only to “punitive” as opposed to “remedial” fines, and record showed that $2,238 penalty, as well as only amount that plaintiff could have received had she been honest, i.e., $6,123, potentially qualified as being covered under Excessive Fines Clause. However, no Excessive Fines Clause violation occurred, where total amount of sanction under Eight Amendment scrutiny is not grossly disproportionate to plaintiff’s 24 separate false statements that attempted to hide her part-time income that would have reduced her weekly unemployment benefit.

Plaintiff-student filed action against defendant-University, alleging that defendant’s closure of campus, cancelation of one-week’s classes and migration of its classes to virtual/remote classes as consequences of COVID-19 pandemic resulted in breach of contract and/or unjust enrichment, where defendant refused to provide partial refunds for in-person tuition and activity fees to account for closure of campus/in-person classes and failure to reschedule canceled classes. Dist. Ct. granted plaintiff’s motion to certify for class action treatment two classes of all students who paid in-person tuition and activity fees. Ct. of Appeals, though, held that Dist. Ct. erred in certifying both classes, after noting that predominance requirement for certification under Rule 23 is only met when common questions represent significant aspect of case, and Dist. Ct. erred by listing one common question for each claim without explaining that question’s relative importance to each claim, whether any individual questions exist or how common questions predominated over individual ones. Ct of Appeals further observed that Dist. Ct. in general failed to apply required rigorous analysis to plaintiff’s claims so as to understand relationship between each claim’s common and individual questions and to determine which issues were common or individual issues and which issues were predominate.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-Sheriff’s and County’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-inmate’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his due process rights by enacting policy that limited inmates to only three books per cell and then conducting search and seizing over 30 books from his cell and then subsequently destroying said books. Instant three-book limit is constitutional, and record showed that three-book policy was contained in prisoner handbook to which plaintiff had received copy. Moreover, plaintiff received oral notice that his and other cells would be searched for excess books some days prior to actual search, and defendants provided inmates options for disposing excess books by allowing them to mail them to others, allowing third-parties to come to jail to pick up excess books on behalf of inmates, and by allowing inmates to donate excess books to other inmates. While plaintiff established that he had protected property right in his excess books, defendants nevertheless provided plaintiff with adequate due process by giving him advance notice of policy, in-person notice of future search and availability of grievance procedure. Fact that plaintiff did not avail himself of any option to comply with policy or did not file grievance did not require different result. Also, plaintiff could not establish any Monell liability, where he provided evidence of only one possible constitutional violation, which failed to establish required pattern of similar constitutional violations that would have given defendant-County notice that its three-book policy violated Constitution.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-jail officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants failed to protect him from another prisoner, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff could not proceed on instant claim because he had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit. Plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies, where plaintiff received confusing response from jail officials after he filed grievance on instant matter that was so obscure in attempting to inform plaintiff of required appeal procedure, where jail officials had merely referred grievance to different entity, such that no prisoner could make sense as to when he or she could file any required appeal from denial of grievance. Dist. Ct., though, did not err in dismissing plaintiff's failure to promptly afford him medical care claim, where plaintiff had failed to include named defendant-officer in his grievance so as to allow defendants ability to address issue internally on merits.

Ct. of Appeal vacated Dist. Ct.’s order that granted defendants-election officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that state statutory requirements that plaintiff as independent candidate for 13th Congressional District seat in 2016 obtain signatures representing five percent of voters in prior general election and to have notarized nominating petitions in order to obtain spot on ballot were unconstitutional. Record showed that boundaries of District were significantly altered as result of redistricting that occurred in 2020. As such, Ct. of Appeals vacated District Ct.’s order and remanded case with instruction to dismiss lawsuit based on mootness doctrine, where: (1) District’s geographical boundaries had significantly changed due to redistricting; and (2) plaintiff’s as-applied challenge that pertained to alleged burdens in collecting and notarizing signatures concerned geographical characteristics of pre-2020 District, as opposed to current post-2020 District. As result, federal courts could not provide plaintiff was any effectual relief.