Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), alleging that defendant improperly redacted certain information regarding plaintiff’s transfer from ICE custody to officials in Decatur County, Indiana, where plaintiff was subject to criminal DUI prosecution. Record showed that out of 561-page response to plaintiff’s FOIA request, defendant produced 51 pages that contained redactions, which included redactions for attorney-client, work product and/or deliberative process privileges that qualified for exemption under 5 USC section 552(b)(5) and redactions for names of government employees that qualified for exemption under 5 USC section 552(b)(6) and (7). Dist. Ct., which conducted in camera review of un-redacted pages at issue in instant case, had sufficient information to make legally sound decision about whether instant exemptions applied to redacted pages, and plaintiff did not dispute that said exemptions applied to certain documents. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s argument that crime-fraud exception to attorney-privilege exemption applied so as to require disclosure of certain documents dealing with decision to transfer him to Decatur County authorities, where record contained no factual foundation to support claim that defendant engaged in criminal conspiracy with Indiana authorities to allow criminal prosecution to go forward.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, where plaintiff alleged that defendant used excessive force, when he shot and killed plaintiff’s decedent following high-speed chase. Record showed that defendant and other officers were observing what they thought to be drug purchase by decedent, and that following said purchase, decedent attempted to flee traffic stop by starting high speed chase that concerned speeds up to 115 miles per hour on highway and weaving in and out of traffic at dangerous speeds on Chicago streets. Decedent eventually stopped car on Chicago street because both lanes were occupied and corner had red light. Defendant then got out of his car with rifle, came up to 25 feet of front of decedent’s car, and directed decedent to stop and get out of his car. Instead, decedent moved his car forward in attempt to move into other, now free lane, and defendant shot and killed decedent. Defendant could use deadly force under these circumstances given decedent’s prior erratic and dangerous behavior, as well as decedent’s movement of car toward defendant, and no case law gave defendant notice that he could not use deadly force under instant circumstances. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant unreasonably created instant danger to himself by running toward decedent’s car with rifle, and thus could not cite to instant danger to excuse his use of deadly force.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering judgment in favor of defendants-police officials in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from committing suicide while decedent was in defendants’ jail for 19 hours awaiting a bond hearing Record showed that decedent’s arrest warrant already had set bond at $500, and that decedent had enough money in his possession at time of arrest to post bond. While plaintiff argued that defendants were responsible for decedent’s suicide because they did not immediately release him on bond, record also showed that decedent’s warrant was issued by court in Lee County, and Chief Judge in Cook County had issued order requiring bond hearings for all persons arrested on warrants issued by courts outside of Cook County. While plaintiff argued that Chief Judge’s order was inconsistent with Illinois statute that permits arrestees to waive local bond hearings, said alleged state law violation did not support instant section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim, where: (1) plaintiff’s claim does not rest on violation of Illinois law, but rather violation of Fourth Amendment; and (2) violation of state law does not permit any damage award under section 1983. Moreover, plaintiff did not allege that instant 19-hour delay exceeded federal rule for how much time that police can take to present arrested person to judge to conduct bond hearing. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly find that decedent did not present risk of suicide to defendants throughout his detention.

Ct. of Appeals Justice granted defendant’s motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, even though Dist. Ct. had denied defendant’s similar request. Record showed that requisite filing and docketing fees totaled $505, and that defendant had $573 in his prison account just prior to filing his notice of appeal. While Dist. Ct. based denial of defendant’s request on fact that defendant could pay entire docketing and filing fees at time he filed notice of appeal, Ct. of Appeals Justice found that defendant was entitled to take advantage of terms set forth in 28 USC section 1915(a) that required that defendant initially pay only 20 percent of greater of defendant’s average monthly deposits or balances in past six months in prison account and then pay balance of filing and docketing fees in installments based on 20 percent of defendant’s future monthly income until full debt is paid. Ct. of Appeals Justice further observed that: (1) drawing line for in forma pauperis eligibility at mere ability to pay full fee at time of initiating appeal runs contrary to intent of Congress; (2) prior cases have noted that prisoners with up to $2,000 in assets might be eligible for in forma pauperis treatment; and (3) there was nothing to indicate that defendant had depleted his prison account to avoid paying full fees at time of initiation of his appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying petitioner’s application under 28 USC section 1782(a) seeking broad discovery from respondent in petitioner’s lawsuit against respondent filed in Switzerland regarding respondent’s termination of dealership that covered sales of respondent’s products in Venezuela. Agreements between parties contained forum selection clause that required that litigation take place in Switzerland under Swiss law. Dist. Ct. could properly deny instant application under factors set forth in Intel Corp., 542 U.S. 241, where: (1) instant sophisticated parties made contractual choice to litigate disputes in Switzerland; (2) petitioner made broad requests for discovery in instant application under circumstances where Swiss court would likely view wholesale importation of U.S. discovery with degree of skepticism; (3) respondent agreed to provide discovery in Swiss court; and (4) parties essentially agreed to resolve their disputes in Swiss court with its more circumscribed discovery procedures.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs-current and former policyholders’ motion for remand back to state court their four claims, alleging breach of contract, Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty against defendants-mutual insurance company and its current and former Board members and officers, where defendants had removed said claims to federal court under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Instant case qualified for internal affairs exception to removal under section 1332(d)(9)(B) of CAFA, where: (1) each claim essentially alleged that defendants accumulated and retained excess surplus from policy premiums  of $3.2 billion and in turn failed to provide plaintiffs with insurance policies at cost, and (2) allegations of complaint satisfied said exemption, where plaintiffs alleged that defendants exercised discretion to set capital levels and to distribute dividends in impermissible ways. Ct. further found that home-state exemption to removal under CAFA also applied, where record showed that: (1) two-thirds of proposed class members and 45 out of 46 defendants were citizens of Illinois; and (2) sole defendant, who was insurance company’s chief fiscal officer and citizen of Massachusetts, was not “primary defendant,” or “real target” of plaintiffs’ lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid claim, plaintiff-attorney’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-ARDC’s suspension of plaintiff, as well as ARDC’s alleged defamatory description of said suspension on its website violated his equal protection and substantive due process rights. Basis of 90-day and until further notice suspension was fact that: (1) plaintiff, who held New York law license, had applied for Illinois law license, but was turned down; (2) between 2004 and 2019, plaintiff nevertheless maintained active law practice in Illinois based on series of successful pro hac vice motions; (3) ARDC charged plaintiff with misconduct for representing that he was licensed to practice law in Illinois; and (4) defendant-ARDC administrator successfully moved Illinois Supreme Court to impose instant suspension. Ct. of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s argument that any Dist. Ct. judge, as licensed Illinois lawyer, was biased against him, and thus could not act on instant complaint. Ct. further found that suspension decision of Illinois Supreme Court could not be collaterally attacked via instant civil action. Moreover, plaintiff could not use section 1983 action to seek money damages against ARDC because ARDC, as state agency, was not “person” for section 1983 action purposes. Also, plaintiff could not bring defamation claim under section 1983 against defendant-ARDC administrator, since defamation action is not cognizable Constitutional claim under either equal protection or due process clauses. Ct. also issued rule to show cause as to why plaintiff should not be sanctioned for bringing instant action.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs' motion for issuance of preliminary injunction in plaintiffs' claim, alleging dormant Commerce Clause challenge to residency provisions of licensure of cannabis dispensaries under Illinois Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act, where plaintiffs-unsuccessful out-of-state applicants for said licenses alleged that rules for 2021 issuance of said licenses heavily favored applicants who were residents of Illinois. Denial of preliminary injunction, which sought stoppage of completion of licensing process for 2021 and 2022 licenses, was appropriate, even though plaintiffs had established likelihood of success on their dormant Commerce Clause claim, where, to extent some form of unwinding relief was possible: (1) plaintiffs waited too late to bring instant cause of action, i.e. from 2019 enactment of said rules to March 2022 when it brought instant lawsuit, where 2021 licenses had been awarded on conditional basis in September of 2021; and (2) plaintiffs’ challenge to issuance of 2022 licenses was unripe, since state agency had not issued final rules for issuance of said licenses. Ct. further noted that residency preferences for issuance of 2022 licenses had since been withdrawn. Also, portion of plaintiffs’ appeal was now moot, where denial of preliminary injunction cleared way for issuance of 2021 licenses.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on collateral estoppel grounds portion of plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-police officials unlawfully searched and seized firearms from his hone, where seizure of said firearms eventually led to filing of series of criminal charges, and where plaintiff eventually pleaded guilty to charge of aggravated discharge of weapon. While Dist. Ct. believed that plaintiff’s search and seizure claim was collaterally estopped due to unfavorable ruling in prior action, said prior action did not concern any search and seizure claim, but rather pertained only to plaintiff’s contention that State of Illinois and Cook County Dept. of Corrections were holding him under false pretenses. Moreover, prior action did not resolve whether instant warrantless search of defendant’s home and seizure of his property were justified. Dist. Ct., though, properly dismissed plaintiff’s unlawful detention claim, where: (1) said claim is Heck-barred because it would necessarily imply invalidity of his conviction; and (2) plaintiff lacked standing to pursue claim that his five-year pre-trial detention was unlawful, where said period was credited to his valid sentence on his conviction for aggravated discharge of weapon, and where section 1983 plaintiff could not receive damages for time spent in custody that was credited to valid sentence.

In class action alleging that defendant engaged in price fixing in broiler chicken market, Dist. Ct. erred in awarding class counsel attorney’s fees totaling $57.4 million, following plaintiff-class’s settlement of action for $181 million, where award represented one third of settlement amount, excluding expenses and incentive awards. While Dist. Ct.’s assessment of attorney’s fees is normally accorded deference, remand was required for new consideration of fee award, where: (1) Dist. Ct. was required when calculating attorney’s fee awards to calculate fees in accordance with hypothetical ex ante bargain; and (2) when calculating instant fee award, Dist. Ct. improperly failed to consider bids made by class counsel in auction of other claims, as well as fee awards received by class counsel obtained in cases originating outside of Seventh Circuit Ct. of Appeals. Ct. of Appeals also directed Dist. Ct to reconsider defendant’s request to obtain discovery from plaintiff’s experts who rendered opinion of plaintiff’s fee request.